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 Reliable public communication before, during, and after a crisis can save lives and 
protect property, yet scholarly research has neglected crisis communication in the public 
sector, particularly from an organizational perspective. To begin to fill this void, this 
dissertation employed the qualitative methods of participant observation and in-depth 
interviews to analyze the organizational practices of state emergency management agencies’ 
(SEMA) public affairs offices. An understanding of the roles that public affairs officers have 
in supporting SEMA’s mission of disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery 
emerged from the data analysis. The public affairs office had two distinct personalities while 
operating under routine conditions and under crisis conditions. As a result, this research 
presents a new model to explain how SEMA public affairs offices shift into disaster mode. 
Crisis Adaptive Public Information (CAPI) accounts for two distinct operational philosophies 
and explains the transitional nature of this type of organization as it reacts to a crisis 
stimulus. CAPI incorporates chaos theory as a means of interpreting a crisis event and the 
concept of high reliability organizations as a means of interpreting the public affairs office’s 
organizational behavior. This model considers the specific organizational environment of 
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 Crises come in all forms: big or small, domestic or international, long or short-term, 
natural or man-made, creeping or sudden, and manageable or catastrophic. Many of the crisis 
events transpiring since the beginning of the 21st century present new challenges for 
government agencies in the United States. Long accustomed to dealing with concerns of 
natural disasters, public safety issues, and routine traffic jams, government communicators 
have more recently found themselves trying to talk about a serial sniper terrorizing the 
nation’s capitol region, hijacked airplanes flying into icons of American capitalism and the 
military, and a mysterious white powder that was coursing through the mails. Not only was 
there a delay in public officials’ full understanding of these three crises, but no guidelines 
existed for responding to these specific incidents. The public wanted reassurance, and they 
needed answers.  
 Federal, state, and local government agencies became involved in all three crises, but 
there was no true precedent for them to follow. Public safety was a real concern until the 
serial killers were captured, the nation’s airports were secured, and the post offices were 
cleared of anthrax spores. In the meantime, uncertainty prevailed for the public as well as the 
investigators involved in each incident. The media clamored for information and ran expert 
speculation alongside terse official statements. The public relied on the government to solve 
the problems and prevent them from happening again; there is no other entity that can single-
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handedly help the public recover from such tragic acts and work to mitigate them in the 
future (Schneider, 1995). To further complicate matters, government agencies cannot predict 
or plan for every possible crisis scenario.  
 The crisis management shortcomings and vulnerabilities of all levels of government 
were exposed by the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the Washington-
area snipers, and the anthrax outbreak. Since these events, daily government communication 
has been extended to include critical information for the public about security threat levels, 
public safety, and the country’s military response. Meanwhile, the federal government 
created a new Department of Homeland Security and introduced a color-coded alert system, 
which quickly became a routine part of television newscasts as well as fodder for cynical 
comedians. The Homeland security director, Tom Ridge, compounded Americans’ fear of the 
uncertainty of terrorism by instructing them to buy duct tape and plastic sheeting to protect 
their homes from chemical agents. The Department of Homeland Security attempted to 
correct some communication miscues by launching an ad campaign five months after the 
attacks featuring Secretary Ridge calmly telling Americans how to prepare for future terrorist 
activity (Advertising Council, 2003). 
 Soon after the federal government completed its investigation of the September 11 
response and redirected the nation’s resources for terrorism preparedness, along came 
Hurricane Katrina in September 2005. This massive natural disaster wiped out nearly an 
entire Gulf Coast port city, putting local, state, and federal governments to the ultimate test of 
disaster response and recovery. Once again, citizens demanded information and explanations, 
this time asking when the National Guard would rescue them from their flooded homes, how 
could they get help, where were their evacuated families staying, and what could be done to 
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restore their homes and jobs, and thus, their lives. The U.S. government will be responding to 
Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath for several years to come. 
 Both the public and private sectors played vital roles in the response to the 
aforementioned crises. During a public crisis, however, government entities often have to 
respond quickly to avoid loss of life and damage to property, public structures, and public 
services. The public sector’s ability to effectively communicate with citizens during a crisis 
is not only necessary, it is expected. As Garnett (1992) observed, “Speaking, writing, 
reading, listening, gesturing, transmitting data, and other forms of communication so pervade 
government that they are often taken for granted. And yet communication often makes the 
difference between government success and failure, sometimes between life and death” (p. 
3).  
 Despite the importance of public communication, there is significantly less analysis 
and empirical study about government crisis communication than corporate (Garnett & 
Kouzmin, 1997; Graber, 2003; Horsley & Barker, 2002). This is surprising, considering the 
vital role of government in communicating to its citizens and its obligation to inform citizens, 
especially in times of crisis.  
 The purpose of this dissertation is to explore crisis communication in the public 
sector, filling gaps in existing research that have ignored this crucial obligation of 
government to its citizens. This research employs an organizational perspective to reveal how 
state emergency management agencies communicate with the public during both routine and 
critical times. The introductory chapter defines crisis and crisis communication, explains the 
unique environmental characteristics of the public sector that merit a new research approach 
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apart from the private sector, illustrates examples of crisis communication from case studies, 
and reviews the public sector crisis communication research. 
 
Defining Crisis for the Public Sector 
 There is a corporate bias in the crisis management literature in which crisis is defined 
in terms of its impact on an organization. Crisis has been defined as “a specific, unexpected, 
and non-routine event or series of events that create high levels of uncertainty” (Seeger, 
Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998, p. 233). These events threaten “image, legitimacy, profitability, and 
even survival” of an organization (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 4). Pearson and Clair 
(1998) classified crisis as “a low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of 
the organization and is characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, 
as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly” (p. 60). Hearle (1993) defined a 
crisis based on the effect it has on an organization: “a crisis is a situation that, left 
unaddressed, will jeopardize the organization’s ability to do business normally” (p. 397). 
 According to Fink (2002), “A crisis is an unstable time or state of affairs in which a 
decisive change is impending—either one with the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable 
outcome or one with the distinct possibility of a highly desirable and extremely positive 
outcome” (emphasis in original; p. 15). Fink (pp. 15-16) lists the characteristics of an 
oncoming crisis as follows: 
1. Escalating in intensity. 
2. Falling under close media or government scrutiny. 
3. Interfering with the normal operations of business. 
4. Jeopardizing the positive public image presently enjoyed by a 
company or its officers. 
5. Damaging a company’s bottom line in any way.  
5 
 
Although he emphasizes that not all crises are negative, Fink’s list of characteristics imply 
that crises have an adverse effect on an organization. 
 Coombs (2002) generalized the various approaches to operationalizing the concept of 
a crisis in the existing crisis management literature, concluding that the term is used in two 
ways: as an event that disrupts an organization’s operations, or as an event that threatens an 
organization’s reputation. As Coombs explained, these approaches “tie crises to the financial 
bottom line of an organization” (p. 340). Neither approach considers the impact of a crisis on 
the public, as most crisis research focuses internally on the organization rather than 
externally on publics. Lee (2005) summed up the definitions found in organizational crisis 
literature: “Three core elements characterize an organizational crisis: significant threats, 
unpredictability or suddenness, and urgency or immediacy” (p. 277). Once again, the concern 
rests with the impact of the crisis on an organization.  
 Interestingly, Millar and Heath (2004) considered government organizations in 
formulating a definition of crisis. They also focused on the organizational frame, stating, 
“each of these crises consists of an event, or series of events, that gives stakeholders reason 
to believe that the leadership of the organization has lost control of the organization’s 
operations in ways that harm its stakeholders” (p. 3). In this definition, the impact on 
reputation and operations is the key consequence of a crisis. In keeping with this corporate 
bias, crisis communication is conceptualized as a process of communicating about an 
unexpected event to concerned publics in an effort to “minimize damage to the image of the 
organization” and to “alleviate or eliminate the crisis” (Fearn-Banks, 2002, pp. 2-3). 
 The public administration literature has presented definitions of crisis that are more 
applicable to the public sector than the existing crisis management literature. The focus here 
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is on society rather than the bottom line. Governments may face crises that are more diverse 
in nature with broader and more significant implications than corporations, including “natural 
disasters, transportation and industrial accidents, war or military operations, terrorism and 
sabotage, major service or performance breakdowns, corruption and scandal, hostile changes 
in leadership, major misinformation or miscommunication, and severe citizen dissatisfaction” 
(Garnett, 1992, p. 204). Definitions of crisis in the public sector focus more on the 
government’s response rather than the impact. For example, public affairs scholar John M. 
Bryson (1981) argued that crises occur “when a system is required or expected to handle a 
situation for which existing resources, procedures, laws, structures, and/or mechanisms, and 
so forth, are inadequate” (p. 181). Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1997) added that shortened 
response times differentiate a crisis from normal operations, and, during a crisis response, 
government agencies often experience atypical interruptions in communications or resources. 
 Broadly speaking, crisis communication in government involves all four phases of a 
public crisis: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (Petak, 1985). Mitigation 
activities work to reduce the harm of a disaster, preparedness activities help to identify and 
even avoid potential crises, response activities address immediate needs after a disaster, and 
the recovery phase includes long-term efforts to rebuild a community and assess the disaster 
response. One only has to watch the top stories on the evening news to see how critical it is 
for government agencies to communicate with citizens before, during, and after natural 
disasters, terrorist attacks, and other public emergencies. 
 Therefore, for the purposes of this dissertation a crisis is defined as an event that 
requires a response from one or more levels of government, exceeds the range of normal 
operations for a single government agency, disrupts a governmental organization’s routine 
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operations, and affects a number of citizens. Furthermore, a public crisis is an event to which 
no private or nonprofit organization can sufficiently respond without government 
intervention and one in which government agencies can anticipate intense media and public 
scrutiny. Crisis communication is initiated by and directed through the responsible 
government entities to help citizens prepare for, respond to, and recover from a crisis event. 
 
The Public Sector Environment  
 Current organizational research acknowledges the importance of understanding 
environments in analyses of organizations. The environmental differences between the public 
and private sectors necessitate a new approach to government crisis communication research. 
Although these distinctions have not been made apparent in the existing crisis 
communication literature, the unique environment of the public sector has been well 
documented. Public administration scholar Hal G. Rainey (2003) asserted that the study of 
the public sector environment is particularly important because government agencies are 
subject to more obligations and limitations than other types of organizations. Despite this 
importance, much of the organizational research “has focused on the private sector, and 
although adapting private-sector models to public-sector research has been useful, it has been 
inadequate” (Viteritti, 1997, p. 81). 
 Rainey (2003) suggested a continuum exists, rather than a clear dichotomy between 
the sectors, that ranges from a government bureau to a private business with various 
crossbreeds in between (see Table 1.1).  The continuum considers ownership, sources of 
funding, and method of control for each organization.  This chapter focuses on pure 




The public-private sector continuum (Adapted from Rainey, 2003). 
Public Hybrid Private 
   
Transportation Agency American Red Cross Privately held business 
Emergency Management Agency Nuclear Power Station Independent Consultant
Public Health Agency Research University  
Law Enforcement Agency U.S Postal Service  
 
 There are at least seven environmental characteristics unique to the public sector that 
play a role in government communication: “focus on the public good rather than the market; 
transparent environment coupled with legal restraints; constant media scrutiny; lack of 
importance of the communication function; negative public perception of government 
communication; lagging professional development; and complicated network of relationships 
due to federalism” (Fisher & Horsley, 2005, p. 4). These factors, when combined with the 
government’s mandate to respond to public crises, create circumstances for crisis 
communication practices that are not integral to private sector crisis communication and 
merit attention in scholarly research. 
 A primary environmental difference between the public and private sectors is that 
government agencies are not subject to market pressures or preoccupied with organizational 
survival (Garnett, 1997; Graber, 2003; Rainey, 2003).  Agencies operate within established 
budgets to accomplish their missions without concern for making a return on investment or 
beating the competition.  Rainey (2003) explained that government organizations “provide 
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services that are not exchanged on economic markets but are justified on the basis of general 
social values, the public interest, and the politically imposed demands of groups” (p. 64). 
More importantly, government manages social problems and emergencies that exceed the 
ability of a market economy to address.  
 Transparency, or openness of operations, distinguishes public sector agencies from 
most private corporations.  In a democracy, the public has a right to government information. 
The only legal barriers to open information are exemptions imposed by state and federal 
access-to-information laws. Public administration scholar Joseph P. Viteritti (1997) 
explained, “Meaningful communication between government and the people is not merely a 
managerial practicality. It is a political, albeit moral, obligation that originates from the basic 
covenant that exists between the government and the people” (p. 82). The media play a large 
role in government transparency. Allison1 (2004) pointed out that government affairs are 
covered more often in the media than are the private sector’s, and that government decisions 
are often played out in the media and timed to meet reporting deadlines. There is a “mutually 
dependent” (p. 404) relationship between government and media that is not apparent in 
private industry. The media serve as yet another watchdog of government business, while the 
government relies on the media to communicate laws, policy, and other public matters to 
citizens. Although most government information is truthful and accurate, public perception 
does not always indicate trust in government communications (Graber, 2003). Government 
communicators must deal with the reality that “The negative connotations of the term 
‘propaganda’ and the derogatory use of ‘spin’ make the public cynical about the intentions of 
government communications” (Fisher & Horsley, 2005, p. 7). This makes the third-party 
                                                 
1 Original source: Proceedings of the Public Management Research Conference, November 19-20, 1979 (1980). 
Washington, D.C.: Office of Personnel Management, OPM Document 127-53-1, pp. 27-38. 
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distribution of government information all the more important, as the media add credibility to 
government messages (Viteritti, 1997). In addition, the media are uniquely capable of 
distributing information to a mass audience in a short amount of time; no government agency 
could replicate that scale of communication as effectively or as efficiently (Cutlip, 1981). 
Web sites, however, have been better utilized by government agencies in recent years to fill 
gaps in the information provided by the media and to make available more details to augment 
news reports (Graber, 2003). 
 The system of federalism in the United States adds another layer to the public sector 
environment.  During crises, the responsibility for a response moves from the local to the 
state and finally to the federal level, depending on the magnitude of the event (Bryson, 1981; 
Schneider, 1995). As Bryson (1981) explained, “A crisis tends to broaden the perceived 
scope of any issue by compounding or confounding the perceived causes and effects of the 
issue…. The broader the perceived scope of the issue, the more likely it will be dealt with at 
a higher level of government” (p. 185). The higher an issue goes, the more complex the 
governmental response as the number of governmental entities and interest groups who may 
ecome involved multiplies. Despite the increasing complexity of the response, any action 
taken on a crisis event is more likely to be met with “consensus at higher levels of 
government by changing the nature of the perceived costs and benefits of any proposed 
action” (p. 186).  In other words, once a problem reaches a certain level of government 
attention, it is perceived to have gained the importance necessary to merit a response and a 
financial commitment. A higher government response also equates with more resources to 
devote to the crisis. Although Bryson found greater consensus at higher levels, the United 
States’ system of federalism also creates an opportunity for miscommunication. As Graber 
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(2003) explained, “The lack of centralized control over external communications explains 
why public officials in the United States often do not speak with one voice about major 
issues. When authoritative pronouncements are contradictory, people become confused, 
annoyed, and often cynical” (p. 228). Discordant messages can create harm during public 
emergencies when the public does not have the time to question them. 
 The public will never lose its reliance on government information, whether in times 
of war, presidential scandals, social unrest, a poor economy, or a national disaster. Graber 
(2003) rationalized the importance of government communication, stating, “Every person’s 
life, in good times and bad, in peace and war, is affected by the ways in which government 
organizations, including thousands of administrative agencies, handle [communication]. That 
is why the study of communication in public organizations is so vital” (p. 5). 
 This section demonstrated why the definitions of crisis and crisis communication 
found in the prevailing crisis communication literature are inappropriate for the discussion of 
public crises, such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks. The unique environment of the 
public sector, coupled with the legislated mandate of government agencies to respond to 
public crises, requires the implementation of relevant terminology and definitions in order to 
develop suitable theories of public sector crisis communication. The following literature 
review describes the available research in crisis communication and demonstrates the 




 There is a wealth of literature on crisis communication that is designed to help 
businesses restore relationships with stakeholders and rebuild damaged reputations. Crisis 
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communication in the public sector, however, is a relatively unexplored area of scholarly 
study. This literature review first synthesizes the vast supply of crisis communication 
literature and identifies the inadequacies in addressing the needs of the public sector. Next, 
the scholarly studies and practical guidelines are discussed that were developed specifically 
for government agencies. This chapter concludes by pinpointing the gaps in public sector 
crisis communication literature and suggesting a new paradigm for research. 
 
Crisis Communication Literature 
The literature is abundant with advice on how organizations should prepare for and 
respond to crisis situations. Although most of the literature on crisis communication can be 
categorized as a case study or a guide for implementation, there is relatively little empirical 
research. Many authors go into great detail about how to anticipate problems, develop 
responses, and execute crisis communication plans (e.g., Penrose, 2000; Saffir & Tarrant, 
1996; White & Mazur, 1995). Significant problems with the existing crisis communication 
literature that prevent it from being fully applicable to the public sector are the definitions of 
public, crisis, and crisis communication, as well as the emphasis on the corporate operational 
environment.  
The public relations literature is known for segmenting publics, using marketing 
techniques to target key audiences, and treating publics as organizational artifacts that do not 
exist until they are identified as being important to the organization. The concept of a general 
public has been rejected for segmented publics that are easier to target and assess. Madsen 
(2005) argued that the use of the terms “public” and “publics” can have a significant impact 
on the understanding of how public relations should be done (normative models) versus how 
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public relations is done (positive models). The use of “publics” in the prevailing public 
relations and crisis literature excludes the audience for major crises such as natural disasters: 
the general public.  
 The definition of crisis is also problematic. Most of the definitions offered in the 
crisis communication literature focus on the organization, rather than an affected public. 
Coombs (2002) and Fink (2002) defined crisis as an unexpected event that can have 
deleterious effects on corporate image, operations, profitability, and reputation. Other 
definitions have focused on the interruption of operations (Hearle, 1993; Pearson & Clair, 
1998). Millar and Heath (2004) said that a crisis can make the public believe that the 
leadership is out of control of the situation. Lack of strong leadership can result in damage to 
an organization’s reputation, which can have an impact on the company’s bottom line. 
Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (2003) echoed the preceding definitions of crisis and added that 
the learning that occurs after a crisis benefits the organization, rather than an outside public. 
A definition of crisis that encompasses events that are external to an organization and have a 
detrimental effect on publics who are not intrinsic to an organization are necessary for crisis 
communication theory to be relevant to the public sector. 
Coombs (2005) argued there are two uses of crisis communication: as information 
and as strategy. During the crisis, communicators gather information that can be used by the 
crisis management team to develop or adjust its response. Strategy is about how to release 
information and when, and which response options to employ that will best preserve the 
interests of the organization. Crisis communication scholar Kathleen Fearn-Banks (2002) 
concluded that crisis communication is the process of protecting an organization’s self-
interests while working to reduce the crisis. All of these definitions, while useful for the 
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corporate world, do not address significant public crises such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and 
public health scares, in which most of the harm is done to a public rather than to an 
organization. 
 Of course, there are instances when the private sector definition of a crisis is 
applicable to government, such as during a presidential scandal or act of fraud by a public 
employee. Those types of crises, however, are already addressed in the reputation 
management literature (i.e., Coombs, 1999). The gaps in the literature concern the crises that 
are external to any one organization and that have a negative impact on a community, region, 
or nation.  
 
Crisis Stages and Response Practices 
 Many researchers have analyzed crises and suggested phases and best practices that 
aid in the analysis of a crisis situation from both academic and practical perspectives. The 
resulting models help researchers dissect a crisis response as well as assist crisis managers in 
responding to a crisis event. Crisis management expert Steven Fink (2002) found there were 
four phases in the life cycle of a crisis: prodromal, trigger event, chronic phase, and 
resolution. During the prodromal phase, a potential crisis is noticed and may start to develop. 
The trigger event is generally unexpected, although it may not be unforeseen, and 
immediately focuses public and media attention on the organization. The event leaves the 
organization with a short time frame to respond. The chronic response phase encompasses 
the crisis management and communication strategies, selection of response approaches, and 
maintenance of message formation and information dissemination. Resolution signals when 
the event is over and is no longer a concern of the organization’s stakeholders. The resolution 
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phase potentially can last for a long period of time, as evidenced by the continuing clean-up 
and recovery efforts following Hurricane Katrina in the gulf region. Fink’s four phases of 
crisis do not mention steps for evaluation or feedback on crisis management efforts, nor do 
they mention providing for the information needs of the public during a crisis situation. 
  Public relations researcher Timothy Coombs’ (1999; 2005) four stages of crisis 
communication vary from Fink’s crisis management model. His stages include preparation, 
the crisis event, response, and learning. During preparation, the organization identifies and 
prepares for a variety of crises that may affect the company. This is where the crisis 
communication plan is developed and rehearsed. The crisis event, much like in Fink’s 
explanation, is sudden and unexpected, although not necessarily a surprise. During the 
response phase, the organization has three options: deny, diminish, or deal. The organization 
can refuse to accept any responsibility, it can attempt to dilute the problem by shifting blame 
or claiming that the situation is not as bad as reported, or it can deal with the situation head-
on, accepting full responsibility for the problem and the recovery. As an example of 
response, after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, leaders at first tried to put all blame on the ship’s 
captain. Then they attempted to diminish the amount of harm that was done by saying that 
not as many animals had died as previously reported. When neither of those tactics worked, 
Exxon ultimately took responsibility for the accident and cleanup efforts, although it was too 
late to reverse public opinion. Finally, the organization learns from the experience so that it is 
better prepared to address the next crisis. Coombs’ response phase, in which the organization 
decides if or how it will accept responsibility for the crisis, does not consider the legislated 
mandate of government agencies, such as department of emergency management, that must 
respond to a crisis whether or not it is to blame for the events. 
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 Fearn-Banks (2002) explored the public relations crisis literature, specifically 
Grunig’s excellence theory, to develop a list of best practices for crisis communicators. 
Unlike the previous crisis management researchers, her analysis was specific to public 
relations practices and scholarship. Fearn-Banks’ list suggested inclusion of the public 
relations manager in the organization’s leadership; implementation of two-way 
communication; identification, segmentation, and ranking of key publics, and evaluation to 
inform future crisis responses. All of her best practices are intended to reduce financial and 
perceptual damage of an organization. 
 Corporate-based models of crisis and organizational response do not address the 
public sector’s priorities of serving the public good during a public crisis. The focus on 
private sector goals such as reputation management and profitability, as well as the concern 
with acceptance of blame, are antithetical to the goals and concerns of government agencies 
communicating with the public during a natural or manmade disaster.  
 
Crisis Communication Research and Theoretical Scope 
 In public relations, there is an abundance of case studies and theory building research 
with limited empirical analysis. This section explores some of the predominant theories used 
for crisis communication research, including corporate apologia, image restoration theory, 
situational crisis communication theory, contingency theory, sensemaking, organizational 
learning theory, and chaos theory.  
 Coombs (2002; 2005), a prolific corporate crisis expert, identified three major 
research streams in the crisis communication literature: corporate apologia, image restoration 
theory, and situational crisis communication theory. In corporate apologia, the organization 
17 
 
uses rhetoric to protect and maintain reputation while providing an explanation for what 
happened. The three response options are denial of responsibility, shifting of responsibility, 
or taking full responsibility through an apology. Any one of these responses can be effective 
based on the circumstances. For example, denial of responsibility worked for Johnson and 
Johnson when the company proved that the lethal contamination of its popular over-the-
counter drug Tylenol did not occur in the factory or while the drug was under its control 
(Andrews, 2005). The shifting of blame option was used by Pepsi when the company’s 
leaders were able to demonstrate that syringes could not have been placed in the cans in the 
factory and that consumers were attempting to defraud the company (Fearn-Banks, 2002). An 
example of full responsibility is demonstrated by the recent PlayStation II video game crisis 
when faulty electrical cords shocked consumers. Sony quickly responded, recalled the faulty 
video game systems, and replaced the defective parts. Rather than blame a parts vendor and 
wait for them to take action, Sony acknowledged the problem and dealt with it (Davies, 
2005). 
 Image restoration theory explains how a company works to repair damage done by an 
organizational crisis. The theory assumes that an organization had a positive image in the 
first place. Some hurdles to image restoration include legal issues, culturally unacceptable 
behavior, and failure to take responsibility whether the organization is to blame or not 
(Coombs, 2002; 2005). In the Tylenol case, the company did not face legal issues because it 
was not to blame for the contamination. The company’s leaders, however, did not ignore the 
public’s fears about the safety of their product. They took responsibility by introducing 
tamper-evident packaging and convincing the public that they wanted to ensure the safety of 
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their products. The public ultimately perceived Tylenol as a victim of the contamination 
scheme and applauded the company’s efforts to protect consumers (Andrews, 2005). 
 Situational crisis communication theory combines apologia and image restoration 
theory, but adds the element of operational concerns. The crisis response may include any of 
the response choices listed above but would also attempt to put the crisis in perspective with 
the organization’s contributions to society (Coombs, 2005). For example, a baby formula 
manufacturer may attempt to overshadow a crisis by emphasizing that it produces a critical 
item that is needed for a baby’s survival when natural feeding options are not available. By 
emphasizing a company’s mission, goals, and contributions to a community (as in jobs) or 
the larger society (as in goods or services), the company can balance some criticism that is 
created during a crisis. The downside of this approach is that the company avoids the 
problem rather than dealing with it up front. For government agencies, avoidance of 
responsibility is not the preferred response. Agencies have mandated responsibilities that are 
integral to their missions, and the system of checks and balances at all levels of the U.S. 
structure of federalism works to ensure that government agencies are fulfilling their duties. In 
addition, the watchdog role of the media and public interest groups prevents government 
agencies from easily abdicating responsibility. 
 Contingency theory (Cancel, Cameron, Sallot, & Mitrook, 1997; Cancel, Mitrook, & 
Cameron, 1999; Shin, 2005) is an approach to conflict management that has been used in the 
crisis communication literature. The organization’s dynamic shifting from accommodation to 
advocacy is determined by 86 factors that the organization can take into consideration. The 
resulting level of accommodation or advocacy can have an impact on the level of conflict and 
cooperation achieved between the organization and its publics. In a crisis situation, this 
19 
 
approach would help develop an understanding of the choices that the organization made in 
formulating its response and how the public received the information to form an opinion. The 
86 factors, however, do not include factors from the public sector environment that affect the 
choices that government communicators must make. For example, the factors do not include 
consideration of political appointments, regular turnover of elected officials, the effect of the 
federalist system on agency decision making, or the importance of public good over profit 
making (Fisher & Horsley, 2005). 
 Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (2003), in their book on organizational crisis 
communication, identified three relevant theories: sensemaking, organizational learning 
theory, and chaos. Sensemaking, which was developed by organizational scholar Karl Weick 
(2001), explains how an organization works to understand and respond to a crisis. There are 
three phases: enactment, selection, and retention. Enactment describes how members of the 
organization choose what information to collect, how they assess the crisis situation, and how 
they develop explanations of what went wrong. Selection involves the members deciding 
which interpretation of events best explains what went wrong. Retention involves the 
members learning from the experience and storing the information in such a way that it can 
be used in the resolution of similar crises in the future. One key difficulty with the 
sensemaking approach is that all of the learning and decision making takes place in the 
organization. Sensemaking may be applicable for organizational crises, but it does not 
consider the public during an external crisis, such as a natural disaster.  
 The authors’ second theory, organizational learning, supports the view that with 
failure comes learning; an organization does not learn unless it first fails. Organizational 
learning supports the concept that a crisis can actually benefit an organization in the long run. 
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Both sensemaking and organizational learning share one thing in common: the impetus of 
learning is on the organization (Seeger et al., 2003). These theories do not address the 
public’s capacity to learn from crisis situations, or the organization’s capacity to respond to 
crisis events that exceed the organizational boundaries. 
 Chaos theory alters the worldview of an organization so that crises are no longer 
annoying interruptions in operations but are explained as naturally occurring events that 
signal change. Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (1998) suggested that chaos is best used as a 
paradigm for crisis management that can inspire holistic assessment of a problem that will 
provide more than a band-aid fix to a crisis. This approach is appropriate for the types of 
crises identified in this dissertation, including violent weather and terrorism, because the 
holistic assessment includes groups outside of the primary organization, such as 
communities, the media, and emergency responders. For example, chaos theory has been 
used to explain how law enforcement and government officials managed crisis 
communication during the 2002 Washington, D.C., sniper shooting spree (Horsley, 2005). 
While most of the other theories discussed in this section are most suited to organizational 
crises, chaos offers an approach that shows strong potential for crisis management and 
communication before, during, and after major disasters. Chaos is discussed in greater detail 
in Chapter II of this dissertation. 
 In sum, most of the predominant theories for crisis communication focus on 
organizational crises, rather than larger-scale public crises that exceed the boundaries of any 
one organization. Learning is primarily accomplished by the organization, not by publics 
affected by a crisis event. Chaos theory’s holistic approach offers a new way to examine 
crises, both in practice and in research. 
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 The prevalent interpretations of crisis and the resulting best practices are useful to 
many types of crisis communication, but they ignore key factors that are present in public 
sector crisis communication. Namely, these problems include definitions of a crisis, crisis 
communication, and public. The problems in applying corporate-based crisis communication 
research to the public sector are discussed below. 
 
Crisis Communication in the Public Sector 
As explained above, corporate-based crisis communication research utilizes 
definitions of public, crisis, and crisis communication that do not adequately cover the 
realities of government crisis response efforts. Public administration and public health 
literature help to fill the gaps in crisis communication that are left by public relations 
research. No single discipline appears to be doing a comprehensive job of addressing public 
sector crises. The public relations literature certainly informs general crisis communication 
research, but it does not address concerns that the public administration and health 
communication literature do. The three disciplines in combination offer a new direction for 
crisis communication research. Consideration of the public sector environment coupled with 
more appropriate definitions of public, crisis, and crisis communication can launch a new 
research paradigm that specifically addresses this overlooked segment of crisis 
communication. As government scholar Joseph P. Viteritti (1997) said, while the private 
sector models have contributed to the public sector, they have been inadequate. It is time for 
a new model. 
The Centers for Disease Control’s Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication 
manual (Reynolds, 2002) addresses the definition of crisis communication that is absent from 
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the public relations literature. Reynolds explained that the goal of crisis communication 
during a public health disaster is to provide information to the public so that they can make 
informed decisions about their own health and safety. Public education is a major component 
of crisis communication for the CDC. During a crisis, the communicator is an agent, rather 
than a participant in the crisis. For example, the disastrous aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 
showed us that government agencies can be criticized for their response to a crisis as an 
agent, but government agencies did not cause the hurricane and were not involved in the 
subsequent flooding of the city as a participant. This distinction further separates government 
agencies from corporations involved in an organizational crisis. Reynolds outlined nine steps 
to public health crisis communication: 
1. Verify the situation before acting 
2. Notify leadership and other agencies of the situation 
3. Assess the scope of the crisis 
4. Assign jobs to members of the crisis team 
5. Prepare information that will explain the situation and agency response 
6. Release the information to the public, media, and stakeholders 
7. Gather feedback to be sure the messages are being interpreted correctly and to see 
what needs to be addressed further 
8. Educate the public so that they can respond to the situation better the next time 
9. Monitor the information flow, messages, and ongoing situation and make 
adjustments in the communication plan as needed. 
 
When compared to Coombs’ (2005) uses of crisis communication as information and 
strategy, Reynolds’ (2002) stated use of crisis communication looks very different. Her focus 
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is on informing and educating the public so that they can make good decisions about their 
own welfare. While Coombs explains the benefit of crisis communication to internal crisis 
managers, Reynolds’ explains that both the organization and the public must learn from a 
crisis situation so that both parties can improve their responses in the future. These opposing 
uses of the same term suggest that there is another world of crisis communication that has yet 
to be explored by public relations scholars.  
 Many of the same concerns about crisis communication in the private sector apply to 
the public sector, particularly when a government agency is confronted by an organizational 
crisis. There is significantly less analysis and empirical study, however, about government 
crisis communication than corporate (Garnett, 1992, 1997; Horsley & Barker, 2002). This 
lack of analysis is surprising considering the vital role of government in communicating to its 
citizens and its obligation to inform citizens, especially in times of crisis. Garnett (1992) 
observed, “Speaking, writing, reading, listening, gesturing, transmitting data, and other forms 
of communication so pervade government that they are often taken for granted. And yet 
communication often makes the difference between government success and failure, 
sometimes between life and death” (p. 3). Governments may face crises that are more diverse 
in nature with broader and more significant implications than corporations, including “natural 
disasters, transportation and industrial accidents, war or military operations, terrorism and 
sabotage, major service or performance breakdowns, corruption and scandal, hostile changes 
in leadership, major misinformation or miscommunication, and severe citizen dissatisfaction” 
(p. 204).  
Public administration scholar James L. Garnett (1992) presented an eight-stage 
process in crisis communication for government: recognition of crisis, appearance on the 
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scene, recruiting a crisis council, mobilizing resources, implementing a crisis plan, 
announcing the outcome, distributing rewards, and learning to improve crisis performance. 
These stages include many of the pre-crisis steps discussed in the private sector literature, 
including identifying potential threats and organizing a crisis team in advance, although it is 
unique in that it considers the morale of the government employees involved in the crisis 
situation. Garnett’s discussion includes historical information from previous presidential 
administrations to show how crisis communication plans were implemented, and brings up 
issues specific to the public sector. 
 Doris Graber (2003), an expert on public administration communication, concurred 
with Garnett regarding the unique position of government in crises and adds the role of the 
public affairs officer. She stated “The principle challenge facing public affairs officials 
during crises is to obtain and release accurate information without causing unwarranted panic 
or complicating recovery efforts” (p. 244). There are four factors unique to government 
agencies in crisis situations: crises spur skepticism about government capabilities; a 
government’s role in a crisis is not always clearly defined or understood; crises can turn into 
political opportunities rather than be “occasions for decisions;” and government agencies can 
be at risk for restructuring or reallocation of resources if they fail during a crisis (Rosenthal 
& Kouzmin, 1997, pp. 282-83). These factors can be applied to most major crises facing the 
United States, including terrorism. 
 The public administration literature contributes an understanding of the public 
sector’s environmental constraints and opportunities that have been overshadowed by 
corporate concerns in public relations. Fisher and Horsley (2005) found seven factors from 
the literature that influence public sector communication: regulated transparency, public and 
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media scrutiny, lack of professional development for communicators, lack of importance 
placed on the communication function by leadership, negative public perception of 
government communication, constraints of a system of federalism, and a focus on the public 
good. Nowhere in this list are issues with profits, corporate image, or organizational survival. 
These distinctions between the public and private sectors are crucial in developing a new 
research agenda and theoretical scope of crisis communication in the public sector. 
 Research on responses to health crises, which meet the definition of a public crisis 
used in this dissertation, are also informative for developing public sector theory. Recent 
research has focused on the communication of the anthrax threat that followed the September 
11 terrorist attacks (Mebane, Temin, & Parvanta, 2003) and public information policies 
regarding West Nile virus and anthrax (Maxwell, 2003). The communication strategies of 
government leaders have brought attention, including criticism of Homeland Security 
Director Tom Ridge’s advice to buy duct tape and plastic sheeting to protect against 
bioterrorism (Alter, 2003) and praise for the “Giuliani press conference model” that New 
York’s mayor employed during both the September 11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent 
anthrax attacks (Mullin, 2003). These studies highlight the dissemination of information to 
the public during crisis, the capacity for empathy for the public’s fears and personal losses, 
the ability of authority figures to generate trust in the messages, and the degree of learning by 
both the responsible government agencies and the public. If researched under the theoretical 
scope offered by public relations crisis communication, the focus would undoubtedly rest on 
the harm done to the government’s image, interruptions in the daily work of government, and 
excuses or explanations that were used when things went wrong. 
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 Horsley and Barker (2002) derived a synthesis model of crisis communication for the 
public sector from the prevailing public relations, public administration, and health 
communication literature. The model has six stages: ongoing public relations, identification 
of and preparation for potential crises, training and rehearsal, the crisis event, evaluation and 
revision of communication, and interagency and political coordination analysis. On the 
surface, the resulting model appears to be similar to those developed by Coombs (2002; 
2005) and Fink (2002); however, this model incorporates the public sector environment and 
the focus on the public good. 
Fisher and Horsley (2005) expanded this concept and developed a model for public 
sector public relations: the government communication decision wheel (see Figure 1.1). Once 
again, this model is drawn from the various disciplines and works to fill the gaps in public 
sector crisis communication. The advantages of this model are that it defines the public 
sector environment, it can be used in a variety of situations, it employs opportunities for two-
way communication, it values public feedback, and it considers the best channels to reach the 
public with credible messages.  
This model incorporates the importance of the unique environmental characteristics 
of the public sector by demarcating four co-existing micro-environments within the public 
sector. The four micro-environments are not exclusive and can operate concurrently, but in 
some situations one or two micro-environments may be more influential than the others. 
Within each micro-environment, communicators must balance mediated and direct 
communication. Finally, all of the micro-environments are affected by the seven primary 
environmental constraints and opportunities (focus on the public good, transparency, media 
scrutiny, a devalued communication function, negative public perception of government 
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communication, lagging professional development, and the influence of federalism), but 
some constraints and opportunities may affect one micro-environment more than another. 
 
Figure 1.1 
Government Communication Decision Wheel (Fisher & Horsley, 2005). 
 
 
Role of Communication in Public Sector Crises 
 In examining crisis communication in the public sector, it is useful to understand the 
role of communication during all phases of a disaster, which is missing in the crisis 
management literature. Many disaster management plans focus on the physical response to a 








Four Public-Sector Micro-Environments 
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that features communication as a part of a disaster response focuses on the role of 
communication after a crisis has hit. Communicators’ roles before and after a crisis are 
mentioned only vaguely (Coombs, 2005; Fink, 2002; Millar & Heath, 2004; Seeger et al., 
2003). This section will define the stages of disaster and emergency management, summarize 
two case studies that illustrate a government response to a crisis, and then present public 
sector guidelines for disaster communication that reveal how communication fits into the 
phases of a disaster response. 
 Carroll (2001) explained the United States’ model of disaster management in an 
article in the Handbook of Crisis and Emergency Management. The four-phase model, which 
was developed by a national governor’s association in the 1970s and later adopted by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, recognizes the phases of mitigation, preparedness, 
response, and recovery. During the mitigation phase, disaster management agencies conduct 
an assessment of potential disasters, how they would respond to them, and how they could be 
alleviated or even prevented. The preparedness phase includes the development of written 
response plans, training, rehearsals, resource allocation, creation of mutual aid agreements 
with other jurisdictions, and other coordinated efforts that would need to be in place when a 
disaster strikes. The response phase begins as soon as a disaster event happens (the trigger 
event) and the responding agencies implement their disaster management plans. The recovery 
phase includes all actions needed to restore the community back to normal, including 
restoration of public services, including power and water supplies, and any temporary needs 
such as housing or food. The first two phases, mitigation and preparation, are the proactive 
stages, and the last two, response and recovery, are the reactive stages. 
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 The corporate crisis management literature also offers explanations of stages of crisis 
that are similar to the FEMA model. A key difference in Coombs’ (1999; 2005) model is the 
use of the term “learning” phase. His model emphasized that the organizations learn from a 
crisis so that they are better prepared for the next one. Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (2003) 
derived a model from the literature that also concludes with a learning phase. Many of the 
government disaster response models, however, make the public’s learning a key part of their 
model, in addition to organizational learning and evaluation (see Carroll, 2001; Reynolds, 
2002). Public outreach during all phases of a disaster is an important responsibility for 
government agencies that is not addressed in the corporate literature. 
 
Case Studies 
 There are few analyses of communication efforts during the phases of a disaster. 
Below are two studies, one from the mass communication literature and one from public 
health communication, that qualitatively describe government communication efforts before, 
during, and after a crisis. The authors of the first case study used chaos theory in their 
analysis. The authors for the second case study did not implement chaos theory. However, 
their organizational approach to studying crisis communication in the Centers for Disease 
Control is a novel approach that has not been implemented in the crisis research but that will 
be used for this dissertation. 
 
1997 Red River Valley Floods 
 Sellnow and Seeger (2001) conducted a case study of the 1997 Red River Valley 
floods that devastated areas of Minnesota and North Dakota. Using the lens of chaos theory, 
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in which crises are naturally occurring events signaling change that must be examined 
holistically, they explicated the various stages of the disaster and the role that communication 
played. During the pre-disaster phase, officials underestimated the flooding potential and 
assured the residents of the river valley that the expected spring flood would not exceed a 
certain level. The authors found that the officials used linear measures, rather than nonlinear 
ones, to determine the predicted water levels. The linear measures ignored the effect of a 
record level of snow that remained in the valley and how that would affect the rising rivers 
that were filling from the spring thaw. The officials issued forecasts that were so precise and 
reassuring that the authors argued it was unethical. Chaotic systems have unpredictable 
outcomes, and the officials ignored the warning signals and relied instead on their traditional 
measures. The resulting communication left entire communities unaware and unprepared for 
the impending disaster. 
 The bifurcation point, or event signaling a major change in the chaotic system, 
occurred when the river levels unexpectedly exceeded previous records. Officials now had a 
situation that they had never encountered before. During the crisis phase, emergency 
management agencies from the local and state levels self-organized to respond to the crisis. 
This situation required actions and procedures that were not in their routine crisis repertoire. 
Sellnow and Seeger (2001) stated that the presence of the National Guard and FEMA became 
strange attractors as they moved in to manage the situation and get help and public services 
to those who needed it. In other words, assistance from the military and federal agencies 
helped to focus and create some structure for the crisis management efforts. Crisis 
communication also became a strange attractor as the public was drawn to government 
sources of information to learn what happened and how. 
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 The recovery phase after the Red River Valley flood included lessons learned from 
the disaster, such as how to better prepare residents for future floods and how to more 
accurately communicate the risks associated with springtime thaws. Only another flood of 
the same magnitude can reveal if the government organizations and citizens learned from the 
experience, but the potential is there. 
 
2001 Anthrax Attack 
 While the country was still reeling from the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
Americans were confronted with a much quieter and covert threat–anthrax. Robinson and 
Newstetter (2003) conducted an organizational case study of the Centers for Disease 
Control’s response to the anthrax attack and how the organization managed throughout the 
phases of a major health crisis. Their findings, based on interviews with CDC 
communicators, revealed that the agency adapted to the crisis and transformed to manage this 
new health threat. Before the anthrax outbreak became known, the CDC had a 
comprehensive crisis communication plan and an army of communicators working in the 
field as well as in the agency’s headquarters. As soon as anthrax was discovered, however, 
the CDC’s crisis plan and arsenal of health crisis information became obsolete. This was a 
health threat that was relatively unknown and undocumented. The discovery of anthrax-
related skin lesions on unsuspecting victims all along the East Coast marked a critical 
challenge for the CDC and its communication team. 
 As a result, the CDC was forced to reorganize. The staff members had to come up 
with creative solutions to learning about the problem and explaining it to the public. The 
crisis communicators were sent out into the field with research scientists so that they could 
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learn and report back as the scientists were learning. Meanwhile, the communicators at 
CDC’s headquarters developed news releases and public information materials as the 
situation developed. The collaboration between public information officers and the research 
scientists was not a routine one, and, as the authors discovered, it was not an easy match. 
Conflicting goals of the scientists and the communicators resulted in delays in getting vital 
information to the public. One cause of the delays was a slow, bureaucratic system of 
authorizing the release of information. The communicators working the field learned how to 
circumvent this obstacle and resorted to having the local health departments release the 
information to the communities instead of the CDC. Continued delays in release of 
information would have resulted in more public anxiety and the spread of rumors that would 
fill the information void (Robinson & Newstetter, 2003). 
 After the anthrax crisis was resolved, the CDC enacted new procedures and bulked up 
its information resources. The agency developed an entire line of materials related to 
potential bioterror agents, such as smallpox. CDC managers began to include communicators 
in information sessions with scientists so that the communicators could keep up with 
evolving public health research. The CDC also implemented new systems that would be put 
into place when a situation warranted a crisis response. The CDC communicators adapted to 
the public health crisis, and, as a result of the changes, they learned from the experience. Had 
the communicators not taken the initiative to work around bureaucratic obstacles and 
reinvent their role in a crisis response, the agency would not have been able to cope with the 




Communication Guidelines from the Public Sector 
 The gaps in the corporate crisis communication literature must be supplemented by 
guidelines produced by the public sector to sufficiently model crisis response by government 
agencies. Even then, the guidelines found in the public sector tend to reduce the phases to 
pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis, a model that was also derived from the communication 
literature by Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (2003).  
 To address crisis communication needs at the local level, Lampen and Walsh (2002) 
developed a guide for city, county, and town officials. They recommended a focus on both 
internal and external communication in preparing for crisis events, which for local 
government consist primarily of threats to “citizens’ safety and security” (p. 3). Information 
before, during, and after a crisis should help empower the public to make good choices for 
themselves. The authors concluded that by planning ahead while developing strong 
relationships with the media and citizens during the pre-crisis stage, localities can make the 
response by both government agencies and the public more effective. 
 Ann M. Beauchesne (2001; 2002) authored a two-volume state emergency 
management guide for the National Governor’s Association. Volume two was written after 
the terrorist attacks on September 11 and therefore focuses on homeland security issues. As a 
whole, the two volumes offer guidelines for governors during natural disasters, 
organizational crises, terrorist attacks, and various forms of bioterrorism. Each volume 
includes a section on state level crisis communication.  
 During the pre-crisis phase, government communicators familiarize themselves with 
emergency management plans, learn response procedures, and learn how various state 
agencies fit into the overall disaster response process. Communicators need a clear 
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understanding of the state and federal roles in a disaster so they can collaborate effectively 
with other responding agencies and be able to quickly and easily explain those roles to the 
public. Agency communicators generate media lists, concentrate on developing strong media 
relations, and produce materials that contain background information related to common or 
anticipated disasters. During this time, they also develop communication programs that can 
help reduce the impact of a disaster and help the public understand the risks. 
 Once the trigger event, or crisis, has occurred, the communicator’s greatest job 
becomes keeping lines of communication open with agency leadership, emergency 
responders, the public, and news media. The state opens a joint information center (JIC) that 
includes public information officers from all levels of government and from all the 
responding agencies. The JIC helps all the organizations develop cohesive messages so that 
the press and the public do not receive incongruent or contradictory information. The JIC 
also makes it easier to identify a primary spokesperson, run press conferences, respond to 
media inquiries, and answer questions from the public.  
 Beauchesne (2001; 2002) offered a timeline for communication after a crisis. Within 
the first 12 hours, the spokesperson offers an initial explanation of the event and agency 
response. A media room should be set up to accommodate the press. Within 24 hours, the 
agency should have established a press briefing schedule. Within 36 hours, the agency should 
be actively talking with the media, correcting inaccuracies, and generating uniform 
information. During the recovery, or post-crisis, stage, the agency needs to keep public 
information a priority. Issues that have developed since the disaster, such as health risks, 
should be addressed. Beauchesne (2001; 2002) added that communications at this point 
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should foster a positive outlook that shows the state is concerned about the public’s welfare 
and working to restore order and normalcy. 
 While Beauchesne (2001; 2002) offered guidelines for state government 
communicators, the Federal Communicators Network (2001) has published guidelines for the 
federal level. The FCN’s guide is similar to the state guide regarding communication 
practices before, during, and after a crisis. The primary difference is the addition of a final 
phase of crisis, the evaluation phase. The FCN advocates not only a quantitative accounting 
of communications (i.e., the number of press releases, Web site hits, or media inquiries), but 
also a qualitative assessment of the messages. By evaluating the agency messages, how they 
were presented in the press, and how they were received by the public, a government agency 
can be better prepared to communicate effectively the next time. 
 Unlike the simplification of three stages of disaster management shown above, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention offer a communication model that is similar to 
the FEMA model (Reynolds, 2002). The CDC’s Crisis Communication Lifecycle model has 
five phases: pre-crisis, initial, maintenance, resolution, and evaluation. Pre-crisis is the time 
to test messages and plans. During the initial phase, the agency acknowledges the crisis and 
begins to explain the situation at hand. The maintenance phase is the time to help the public 
understand the crisis and the government’s response, provide background information on the 
problems created by the crisis (such as health concerns), and elicit feedback to correct 
miscommunications. The fourth phase, resolution, offers a greater focus on the public’s 
informational needs than the FEMA model. During this phase, the agency educates the public 
to help improve the public response during the next crisis. The agency also works to promote 
the organization and its mission so that the public has a better understanding of its role in 
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similar disasters. The final phase, evaluation, emphasizes the potential for organizational 
learning and recommends adjustments in policies and procedures so that the next crisis can 
be managed more effectively.  
 Barbara Reynolds (2002) argued that disasters are different from routine matters, and 
that the communication function must adapt accordingly. She supported Koehler and his 
colleague’s (2001) explanation of morphogenesis by emphasizing that communication must 
change when a crisis strikes. The goals of communication during a crisis change and focus on 
reducing and preventing death, injury, and illness while helping the community get back on 
its feet. During a crisis, communication is vital for reducing harmful behavior such as 
looting, alcohol or drug abuse, unreasonable public demands, and fraudulent activities. 
Americans witnessed many of these disaster-related bad behaviors in New Orleans with the 
excessive looting, gang activity, charges of price-gouging, and fraudulent disaster relief 
claims filed by people who were not affected by Hurricane Katrina.  
 In sum, the crisis communication guidelines developed for government agencies help 
fill the void left by the crisis management literature. These guides describe the government 
communicator’s role during the phases of a disaster and how effective communication can 
alleviate some damage caused by a crisis situation.  
 
Toward a New Paradigm 
 The case studies and examples cited above demonstrate government crisis 
communication during all phases of a disaster. The available research is limited, however, in 
that there are only a few disaster management studies that specifically address government 
communication, and even fewer that address the application of communication in all phases 
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of the disaster.  The prevalence of crisis communication guides for the public sector is 
encouraging because it suggests that government communicators take their role in a disaster 
seriously and are working to be prepared. More research needs to be done on this specialized 
area of communication, but the existing literature suggests that this is a viable direction for 
both research and practice in public sector crisis communication. 
 Based on the literature from several disciplines, this dissertation suggests a new 
paradigm for public sector crisis communication that encompasses a worldview provided by 
chaos theory and an organizational culture of high reliability. This paradigm supports the 
development of a model that is specific to the needs of the public sector environment and fills 
the gaps left by the prevailing public relations research. This theoretical framework is 












A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC SECTOR 
CRISIS COMMUNICATION 
 
 To prepare for the natural and man-made crises of the 21st century, this chapter 
suggests a shift in government organizational culture that endorses a new paradigm of public 
sector crisis communication. The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical 
framework of chaos coupled with the concept of high reliability organizations (HROs) in the 
public sector. Chaos theory offers a systematic means of interpreting a crisis event, while 
high reliability provides a structure for the study of organizations that operate under chaotic 
conditions as a matter of routine. This combination allows for the depth of analysis of a crisis 
and the organizations that react to that crisis that is not available from the prevailing crisis 
communication theories. These concepts will be explicated with the specific environment of 
the public sector in mind. Although these theories have been researched in the corporate 
world (e.g., Seeger et al., 1998; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2001; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001), 
there has been limited research related to the application of these theories in the public sector 
(Kiel, 1994, 1995; Sellnow, Seeger, & Ulmer, 2002). Scholars have only recently considered 
chaos theory in public relations research (Murphy, 1996), while the notion of high reliability 
has yet to cross over to crisis communication.  Additionally, there has been little research 
dedicated to crisis communication preparedness in the public sector as a whole (Garnett & 
Kouzmin, 1997; Graber, 2003; Horsley & Barker, 2002; Tierney, Lindell, & Perry, 2001).  
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 This chapter defines chaos theory, which originated in the natural sciences, and high 
reliability theory, which was developed for organizational science, followed by an 
explanation of how these two concepts fit together to form a new theoretical framework that 
is specific to public sector crisis communication.  
 
Chaos as a Form of Order 
 Chaos theory emerged in studies of the natural sciences in the 1970s and was quickly 
applied to the social sciences. Management and complexity researchers Parker and Stacey 
(1994) proclaimed the usefulness of chaos theory in social science research, saying “Since 
human systems, including business organizations and economies, are non-linear feedback 
systems, the lessons from chaos are profound” (p. 39).  
 But what does chaos mean exactly, in this context? Chaos may not be as 
unpredictable and “chaotic” as one may assume. Simply stated, it is a paradigm shift in 
believing that the apple always has to fall down from the tree; it is a leap of faith from the 
Newtonian concept of order and predictability. A chaotic system is nonlinear, meaning that 
variables within the system do not change at a steady, predictable rate. In chaos, small 
variations in a nonlinear system result in extreme changes over time. A chaotic system is 
nonlinear, but a nonlinear system is not necessarily chaotic (Lorenz, 1993). The nonlinear 
nature of chaos makes it complex and difficult to analyze using the standards of modern 
science. According to Gleick (1987), chaos theorists are not interested in the atomic, or 
simplified, level of things. They are looking for patterns, apparent randomness, complexity, 
and the big picture. They attempt to explain something by looking at its beginning and its 
end, searching for clues as to how it got to be what it is now by learning what it used to be. 
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Despite the seeming vastness of chaotic systems, they are constrained by a number of factors. 
The system is deterministic, meaning that it is not truly random and does have a pre-
determined end result. A chaotic system is bounded, limiting the variables to a finite range. 
In addition, a chaotic system is dependent on initial conditions. These conditions can be 
benchmarked at any point in time, but the outcome of a system over a period of time is a 
direct result of the variables that existed at the beginning of the time frame (Lorenz, 1993). 
 This phenomenon in observation can be explained by a concept that was derived from 
climate studies: the butterfly effect. Edward Lorenz, a research meteorologist, discovered that 
the slightest change in one of his computer formulas would create an entirely different 
weather forecast. This miniscule change explained why the weather was so difficult to 
predict. He created the analogy of a butterfly flapping its wings and affecting the weather on 
the other side of the world. The idea that an ever-so-slight movement of the air could start a 
ripple effect that would change the climate many days later and thousands of miles away 
helped explain why forecasters could not accurately predict the weather for a given location 
at a given time (Gleick, 1987). By simply observing the initial conditions or the resulting 
weather as individual phenomena, scientists never would have put together the two concepts 
to create this complex explanation for climate change. 
 Besides its nonlinear nature, there are several other characteristics of chaos that are 
helpful in understanding its application to other disciplines: positive feedback, bifurcations, 
strange attractors, sensitivity to scale, fractals, and self organization. Chaos has an inherent 
system of positive feedback that amplifies certain elements, destabilizes the status quo, and 
creates new patterns (Gleick, 1987; Lorenz, 1993). Negative feedback will keep a system 
stable, such as when a mother corrects a child so that she behaves in a socially acceptable 
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way in public. If a mother gave her child candy every time she screamed in public, however, 
this positive reinforcement would increase her future outbursts in attempts to get what she 
wants. Positive feedback essentially gives a chaotic system the energy it needs to ultimately 
attain a more dramatic change (either good or bad) than a stable system (Lorenz, 1993; 
Parker & Stacey, 1994). 
Bifurcations are points at which the chaotic system diverges and regroups, much like 
the way a river flows around a small island. One cannot predict exactly what form it will take 
once it reorganizes. Lorenz (1993) defines a nonlinear bifurcation as, “an abrupt change in 
the long-term behavior of a system, when the value of a constant is changed from below to 
above some critical value” (p. 206). A bifurcation can render a system more or less stable, 
depending on the direction of the change. A change in just one variable can mark a 
bifurcation point with deterministic results, such as the extinction of a species (Gleick, 1987). 
The extinction of a species itself then becomes another bifurcation that affects other life 
forms in positive or negative ways.  
Strange attractors are “multiple points of attraction within a finite space” in which 
“the system’s behavior becomes unstable but within bounds” (Parker & Stacey, 1994, p. 97). 
Strange attractors explain how a seemingly unorganized system is organizing. When the 
variables are graphed, the resulting shapes look like uneven spirals that have been described 
as a butterfly’s wings or the eyes of an owl. Although they appear to be random, the graphs 
fit within a finite boundary, and their centers are drawn to a common point, or attractor 
(Gleick, 1987; Murphy, 1996). The attractor constrains the system and dictates the range of 
the variables. The system changes when the attractor changes (Parker & Stacey, 1994).  
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Scale is another characteristic of chaos that unsettles followers of Newton’s science. 
Depending on the observer’s perception, distance, and methods of measurement, the same 
phenomenon will appear differently under varying circumstances or when viewed by other 
people (Gleick, 1987). Thus, a dollar bill looks very different when viewed at arm’s length 
than when examined under a microscope. Likewise, a system will appear differently to 
multiple observers if each one discerns a different variable. Murphy (1996) stated “the 
‘reality’ that describes a given phenomenon is determined, not by its universal qualities, but 
by the observer who chooses the scale” (p. 99). Observers who only study parts of a chaotic 
system will never comprehend the entire system; chaos theory encourages holistic 
exploration of a phenomenon to develop a more comprehensive understanding of all the 
elements. The parable of the blind men and the elephant helps describe the impact of the 
observer’s perception on scale. Several blind men each touched a different part of an 
elephant and drew their own conclusions on what an elephant was based on the part they 
touched. Needless to say, each man created a very different definition of an elephant, from a 
large wall (touching his side) to a snake (touching its trunk).  
Fractals, like strange attractors, provide another visual for studying chaos. As 
explained previously, chaos must be examined as a whole, not in small units. A fractal is a 
self-generating organic image that changes with each successive iteration. If you pulled out 
two separate iterations and tried to compare them, they would look nothing alike. But by 
viewing the fractal in its entirety, you can discern patterns that explain how it evolved from 
an observed starting point to an end point (Gleick, 1987; Murphy, 1996). Benoit Mandelbrot 
named these iterations “fractals” because they are fractions of a larger system. Fractals are 
self-similar, meaning “in many fractal systems, several suitably chosen pieces, when suitably 
43 
 
magnified, will each become identical to the whole system” (Lorenz, 1993, p. 170). As cited 
by Murphy (1996), Mandelbrot’s fractals addressed the problem of measuring complex 
systems by providing a qualitative measure of “‘the relative degree of complexity of an 
object’” (p. 100). Murphy explained, “By abandoning traditional quantitative measurement 
scales and using fractals, it becomes possible to identify correspondences or ‘couplings’ 
between forms that vary vastly in scale but have similar patterns of complexity, such as 
clouds, coastlines, or mountains” (p. 100). Each bifurcation creates slight changes in the 
fractals, but by examining the system as a whole, one can track patterns and learn how 
change evolved. 
Finally, a chaotic system can be described as having the ability to reorganize under 
its own volition. While its other characteristics promote destabilization, it can also return 
itself to its own brand of order (Gleick, 1987). Although a chaotic system is in constant flux, 
iterations share commonalities: “iteration also means that systems have continuity; they carry 
elements of their original order from step to step, shown in the shape of strange attractors or 
fractals” (Murphy, 1996, p. 100). As the new pattern is replicated, the system self-organizes 
into a new entity without the help of outside influences.  
In sum, a chaotic system exhibits a structure that can be broken down and analyzed. 
The elements are best understood in terms of their relationship to other parts of the system. 
The apparent randomness and lack of predictability in chaos can be explained using a 
systematic method of analysis. The next section discusses a type of organizational structure 





The High Reliability Organization Meets Chaos 
 The worldview represented by chaos would leave one to wonder what type of 
organization could successfully function in such an environment. One candidate is a high 
reliability organization (HRO). HROs are defined as operating in a highly complex 
technological environment in which the consequences of failure are catastrophic and the 
activities are subject to intense regulatory scrutiny (Rochlin, 1993). By definition, 
government agencies that manage communication during public crises are not HROs. This 
section argues, however, that crisis-mandated government agencies, like HROs, operate in an 
increasingly complex environment where mistakes can result in the loss of life and property 
during a crisis event. In addition, public agencies are subject to intense scrutiny by the media 
and the public and are innately bureaucratic. By applying this concept metaphorically to 
crisis-mandated agencies, one can then replicate the work of HRO theorists in this unique 
environment and develop a new theory that applies to public sector crisis communication. 
 First, this section defines high reliability and summarizes the work of organizational 
theorists who have researched HROs. Then the weaknesses and limitations of HRO theory 
are addressed.  
 
High Reliability Characteristics 
 High reliability organizations were first researched by organizational scientists at the 
University of California, Berkley (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). Organizational theorists 
Weick (1987; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) and Roberts (1990b) observed organizations that 
operate in an environment of high risk and uncertainty, yet where the mission is carried out 
with a high level of reliability. The authors are careful to point out that efficiency and 
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reliability are not the same thing, and that many other organizational studies only focus on 
the efficiency outcome. Effectiveness is an important element of high reliability because the 
outcomes generally can not be measured in terms of dollars or production levels, but in terms 
of safety records and an unknowable count of how many things did not go wrong. Examples 
of HROs include “aircraft carriers, air traffic control systems, aircraft operations, hostage 
negotiation, emergency medical treatment, nuclear power generation, continuous processing 
firms, and wildland firefighting crews” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. xiii). All of these 
organizations and groups have safety and reliability of operations at the heart of their primary 
missions. Other researchers have added to this list the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ inmate 
transport division (Babb & Ammons, 1996), nuclear submarines (Bierly & Spender, 1995), 
the federal Transportation Security Administration’s airport security function (Frederickson 
& LaPorte, 2002), a hospital medical records department (Guy, 1991), pharmaceutical work 
with dangerous drugs, bridge and dam safety, and the use of pesticides in agriculture 
(LaPorte & Consolini, 1991), and an electrical company’s distribution system (Roberts, 
1989). Weick and his fellow researchers found that although these organizations seem very 
different on the surface, they share characteristics that enable them to succeed in their 
potentially volatile environments. They presented their findings as models for corporations to 
follow to help them prepare for and react to crises. 
 A key characteristic of an HRO is an organizational culture that is concurrently 
centralized and decentralized. From the beginning, the leadership establishes a strong, central 
command with a clearly defined multilevel hierarchy (much like the military model). During 
a crisis situation, however, or even during the precursor to a crisis, personnel at lower levels 
of the chain of command have the authority to make decisions. The lowest-ranking sailor on 
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the flight deck of an aircraft carrier can call a halt to all landing operations if he spots a 
potential hazard on the deck. The sailor must be empowered to make this decision on his 
own, because seeking approval from the officer in charge would take time and could mean 
the difference between a crash and a safe landing. Autonomy thus becomes an important 
cultural characteristic of an HRO (Weick, 1987). A controlled bureaucracy can make 
organizational learning and communication difficult, while decentralization encourages both 
(Bierly & Spender, 1995). Roberts (1989) found that existing organizational culture studies 
did not include “concerns for safety, accountability, and responsibility, three aspects of 
culture mandatory in high reliability organizations” (p. 120). These unique cultural 
characteristics further differentiate HROs from other organizational cultures. 
 Roberts (1990b) found cultural characteristics that were similar to Weick’s (1987) in 
her study of aircraft carriers and discovered more elements that allowed the crew to operate 
in “organized chaos” (p. 168). She found evidence of empowerment at all ranks; a common 
understanding of goals; an implicit understanding of the safety concerns on the flight deck; 
tight coupling between operational functions (i.e., the ship’s movement is a separate 
operation but must in be concert with the needs of planes taking off and landing); redundancy 
of tasks (i.e., multiple people are observing the take-offs and landings simultaneously from 
different perspectives); and interdependence among all the crew and their individual duties. 
She makes a significant point that all of these operations, while conducted in an environment 
of chaos, are actually routine directives for this type of organization. The day-to-day training 
on an aircraft carrier is normal; engagement in war is the rare exception. 
 An underlying assumption of HROs is that a collective group of people (i.e., an 
organization) can compensate for individual human weaknesses and operate successfully 
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within a framework of structure and clearly defined goals. Sagan (1993) identified four 
recurring elements of HROs: a shared understanding of the ultimate goal of safety, 
redundancy in key organizational functions, a culture that promotes reliability, and 
continuous rehearsal and evaluation. Although redundancy is associated with inefficiency, 
Sagan explained, “Redundancy is absolutely essential if one is to produce safety and 
reliability inside complex and flawed organizations” (p. 21). The “culture of reliability” is 
made possible when organizations “recruit, socialize, and train personnel to maintain a strong 
organizational culture emphasizing safety and reliability (p. 23). The resulting culture 
empowers individuals at all levels in the organization to independently make good decisions 
when there is no time to consult with upper management. Constant training and simulations 
enable all members of an organization to develop the skills and knowledge necessary to 
function in this culture. All four factors are necessary to effectively accomplish the 
organization’s primary goal of safety. 
 LaPorte and Consolini (1991) described three traits of HROs that differ from 
organizations that are not as subject to failure: a malfunction by one element can bring the 
entire organization to a halt; an HRO is intensely scrutinized by the public, which fears its 
potential for failure; and reliability takes precedence over efficiency. Roberts (1990a) further 
distinguished HROs from other organizations by the impact of mistakes on the public. “Many 
organizations fail for some of the reasons noted here, but their failures only show up on their 
balance sheets. HROs, however, must avoid errors or failure because the potential cost is 
unacceptable to society” (p. 112). She summed up the environmental pressures and the 
corresponding actions made by HROs to avoid failures (see Table 2.1). The elements listed 
under complexity help explain how an organization responds to uncertainty in the 
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environment, while the elements under tight coupling explain how the organization adapts 








• potential for unexpected sequences 
• continuous training 
• redundancy 
• complex technologies 
• continuous training 
• responsibility and accountability at 
all levels 
• potential for systems serving 
incompatible functions to interact 
• job design strategies to keep 
functions separate 
• training 
• indirect information sources • many direct information sources 
• baffling interactions 
• training of specialized language 
• flexible exercises 
Tight Coupling 
Characteristics Responses 
• time dependent processes • redundancy 
• invariant sequences of operations 
• job specialization 
• system flexibility 
• hierarchal differentiations 
• only one way to reach goal 
• redundancy 
• system flexibility 
• little slack 
• bargaining and negotiation 





 Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) developed the concept of mindfulness from their 
observations of aircraft carriers, a type of high reliability organization. The ability to be on 
the lookout for anything out of the ordinary, and then prevent it from harming the 
organization, sets HROs apart from other organizations. HROs notice issues early when they 
are still small and manageable; other organizations may only notice issues when it is too late 
to react, or when they are attempting to explain what happened after a crisis has hit. Thus, 
mindfulness is another key element of the HRO culture. 
 Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) uncovered five characteristics of mindfulness: 
“preoccupation with failure,” “reluctance to simplify interpretations,” “sensitivity to 
operations,” “commitment to resilience,” and “deference to expertise” (p. 10). HROs do not 
count their successes; they count their failures. They encourage personnel at all levels to 
report problems, share lessons learned, and to not become complacent. On aircraft carriers, 
crew members are not reprimanded for mistakenly reporting a safety problem because the 
officers do not want to risk someone not reporting a problem about which they are not 
certain. When scanning for problems, HROs do not simplify their findings: “Knowing that 
the world they face is complex, unstable, unknowable, and unpredictable, they position 
themselves to see as much as possible” (p. 11). Similar to the findings in chaos research, the 
slightest variation in a system can create significant problems for an organization. Sensitivity 
to operations is about awareness of one’s situation and being able to adapt without harming 
the organization. A key factor in sensitivity to operations is the leadership’s willingness to 
listen to the employees who are getting the job done and are the first to see potential 
problems. As in the above example of the crew member reporting a safety problem on deck, 
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the crew member must believe that he will be heard and that his concern will be acted on by 
the leadership. Otherwise, the crew member will not speak up.  
 A commitment to resilience describes how an organization can recover after an 
inevitable setback. As Weick and Sutcliffe explained, “resilience is a combination of keeping 
errors small and of improvising workarounds that keep the system functioning” (p. 14). 
HROs may not be immune from mistakes, but they operate in such a manner that encourages 
learning from errors. The final characteristic of mindfulness is that HROs defer to experts 
within the organization. Although there is a clearly defined hierarchy, the decision-making 
process is not purely top-down. Personnel from all levels in the organization who have 
expertise in a certain area are valued and included in the decision process (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001).  
 In sum, HROs differ from other organizations based on their primary goal of safety, 
an entrenched culture of reliability, redundancy of key tasks, tight coupling, and a 
commitment to mindfulness, all within a complex environment of uncertainty with the 
potential of harm to society. Thus far, the majority of the HRO research has focused on the 
military, utilities industry, and air traffic controllers. There are potentially more 
characteristics of HROs that may be discovered as more organizations are observed. As 
discussed in the next section, however, high reliability is not a perfect solution to 
organizational management, and it is not suitable for every type of organization.  
  
 
Weakness and Limitations of High Reliability 
 No one would argue that high reliability organizations are perfect. Clarke and Short 
(1993) point out that HRO theory may only apply under certain conditions. They cite the 
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erroneous shooting down of an Iranian commercial airliner by the U.S. Navy, in which 290 
passengers were killed, as an example of “scenario fulfillment” (p. 391), in which Navy 
personnel carried out an often-practiced drill with devastating results. Under the conditions 
of war (the Iran-Iraq war), the information that was given to the officers onboard the USS 
Vincennes became misconstrued and ultimately was taken as evidence that an Iranian fighter 
jet was about to launch an attack. The authors suggest that the shooting would not have taken 
place under routine conditions, given the same information. 
 Another limitation of high reliability comes from the difficulty in defining an HRO. 
The broadness of the definition of a high reliability organization creates the problem of 
identifying similar organizations that one can research and draw appropriate comparisons 
(Clarke & Short, 1993). Roberts (1990b) found the lack of a complete typology of high 
reliability to be an impediment to research. This dissertation suggests that the problem of 
formulating a typology of all HROs may be alleviated if other factors, such as environment 
and organizational mission, were used to further classify these organizations for comparative 
studies. 
 According to Bierly and Spender (1995), the flexibility and decentralization that are 
hallmarks of HROs also present great opportunities for errors. As the level of technology 
increases and systems become more complex, the possibilities of human error and bad 
decision making multiply. The culture of reliability also presents problems for assessment. 
The inherent conflict between reliability and efficiency creates the difficulty in determining 
how to evaluate an HRO. For example, travelers want to be assured of the safety of aircraft 
and the protection from terrorism when they board a flight, but they also want to get through 
airport security quickly and avoid flight delays (Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002). It is rather 
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easy to rate an airline based on timely flight arrivals and departures, but it is more difficult to 
assess an airline based on the lack of a mechanical malfunction or the absence of a terrorist 
attack.  
 Finally, redundancy, which is a critical method for avoiding errors in an HRO, is an 
expensive proposition. Onboard an aircraft carrier, for example, there are multiple personnel 
whose job it is to observe the approach of each fighter jet to be certain that nothing 
compromises the landing. Most organizations cannot afford the cost of personnel and other 
resources to duplicate efforts, even in the name of safety (Roberts, 1990b). In the public 
sector specifically, redundancy violates the public administration mantra to avoid duplication 
and control costs. For public managers, the idea that accidents are rare drives the decisions to 
cut costs and reduce redundancy (Frederickson & LaPorte, 2002). In addition to the cost, 
redundancy may also reduce reliability in some instances by compounding the probability of 
error within each redundant component or by actually decreasing the reliability of each 
component in the system. Interaction of components can also prove detrimental, and the 
addition of components can increase the system’s complexity rather than simplify it (Sagan, 
1994). For example, if five individuals are observing the landing gear on an approaching 
fighter jet, and one person is blinded by the sun, he would assume that the other four will 
compensate for his inability to see. If he is the one person with the best vantage point, 
however, and he does not indicate that he cannot see the landing gear, the other four will 
assume his silence is indicating that all is well. In this case, redundancy has decreased the 
reliability of the entire system. 
 In sum, the limitations of high reliability theory include appropriateness of 
conditions, the lack of clear definitions, the dangers of flexibility and decentralization, and 
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the inefficiency of and potential damage from redundancy. Some of these theoretical 
weaknesses may be addressed by assigning clear criteria for selection of organizations to 
study, including comparable operating environments, similar organizational missions, and 
analogous cultures. This selection refinement would reduce the limitations while creating 
compatible research programs. This research will address those limitations by considering the 
overall environment of public agencies that are mandated to respond to public crises. The 
following section describes how the characteristics of high reliability, when coupled with the 
worldview from chaos theory, can be applied to public sector crisis communication.  
 
A New Paradigm and Framework for Crisis Communication 
Chaos theory combined with the concept of high reliability organizations offers a 
fresh worldview and a framework from which to plan for and manage crisis communication. 
A multitude of books on crisis communication suggest that crisis planning and management 
are separate functions from normal communication activities (see Barton, 2001; Caponigro, 
2000; Fearn-Banks, 2002; Ferguson, 1999; Fink, 2002; Lerbinger, 1997).  HROs know the 
difference between normalcy and chaos, but the transition is seamless and anticipated (Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2001). These organizations are expecting the unexpected. 
Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2001) description of mindfulness shows similarities to the 
concept of issues management in public relations. Pratt (2001) explicated four functions of 
issues management in his research on the tobacco industry: “(a) anticipate and analyze issues, 
(b) develop organizational positions on issues, (c) identify key publics whose support is vital 
to the public policy issue, and (d) identify desired behaviors of key publics” (p. 336). Issues 
management is an essential, proactive activity for public relations practitioners both before 
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and after a crisis event (Seeger et al., 2001). Issues management can be seen as a 
complementary activity to mindfulness, which, as described above, is characterized by 
“preoccupation with failure,” “reluctance to simplify interpretations,” “sensitivity to 
operations,” “commitment to resilience,” and “deference to expertise” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001, p. 10). 
Public relations scholar Priscilla Murphy (1996) first applied chaos theory to public 
relations as a means of studying issues management and crisis communication. She 
considered crisis to be a natural part of organizational life. She found that chaos theory was 
especially useful for “public relations situations whose salient feature is the unmanageability 
of public perceptions” (p. 95). She viewed this theory as a qualitative approach to 
understanding changes in public opinion while detecting emerging issues. Murphy explains 
that an issue can explode into something entirely different than its original form, much like a 
fractal image. The initial and resulting issues may no longer resemble each other, but an 
issues manager would understand how it transformed over time by looking at the larger 
picture. Based on chaos theory, Murphy offers the following definition of crisis: “incidents 
become crises when they mark bifurcation points in social values…. [S]ome theorists define 
crisis as a point in an organization’s history which irreversibly changes its culture and 
business” (pp. 105-106). As an example, after the NASA Challenger disaster, the public 
perception of the space shuttle program changed dramatically, and NASA would forever be 
changed as it faced budgetary and operational restrictions from the federal government. 
Although Murphy laid the groundwork for application of chaos to public relations, she did 




Other scholars have also addressed the applicability of chaos theory to crisis 
communication. Communication scholars Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (1998; 2001) have 
done prolific research on organizational crises within the worldview of chaos. However, their 
exploration into chaos theory was a superficial one that did not reach the depths of 
understanding that Murphy provided. Their research mainly addressed development of crisis 
communication plans and analyses of organizational crises with suggestions for incorporating 
chaos into future research. Seeger (2002) goes a step further to explain the concept of chaos 
and to demonstrate how an understanding of complex systems can be useful in crisis 
communication. Seeger emphasizes the importance of examining the larger picture over time 
to get a better perception of the chaotic system. He proposes that communication itself is a 
bifurcation point and that crisis communication is a strange attractor. Although as yet 
untested, the fascinating propositions in these articles present opportunities for further 
exploration of crisis communication and chaos. Horsley (2005) used chaos theory to explain 
the violent system that was created by the D.C. snipers in 2002 and the resulting reaction to 
that system by law enforcement and government officials in their media and public 
communications. 
 Marra (1998) found that an organizational culture with the characteristics of an HRO 
was a better predictor of successful crisis communication efforts than having a crisis 
communication plan. The concept of autonomy was a deciding factor in case studies of 
AT&T’s long distance network failure in 1990 and the University of Maryland’s response to 
basketball player Len Bias’ death in 1986. Marra found that AT&T’s public relations staff 
had a high level of autonomy during their successful communication efforts and were 
empowered to perform their duties without intervention from management. Conversely, 
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Maryland’s director of public information had to get every message about the Bias case 
approved through university lawyers and administration. As a result,  
 The Washington Post covered the crisis for 42 consecutive days, with 
18 stories on page one and 42 stories on the front page of an inside section of 
the newspaper. The absence of autonomy for the university’s public relations 
practitioners contributed, in part, to the overwhelmingly (84%) negative 
stories in the Washington Post – stories that could likely have been balanced if 
public relations staff at the university [had] been able to communicate more 
quickly. (p. 471) 
 
 The author does not address questions of blame and liability in these two cases, which 
could have played a role in the response. The culture generated by a high reliability 
organization that empowers personnel at all levels to react to emerging issues in a timely 
fashion outweighs having a crisis communication plan when staff are powerless to enact it 
(Marra, 1998). 
 While communication researchers have noted the benefits of incorporating chaos 
theory in their research, no one has specifically addressed the application of chaos theory, 
coupled with high reliability, as a theoretical framework that is suited for the public sector 
environment. The next section demonstrates how this theoretical approach can be applied to 
crisis communication in government organizations. 
Chaos, HROs, and the Public Sector Environment 
 Although chaos theory is still an emerging field of study, it has quickly crossed over 
from the corporate realm to the public sector. Kiel (1994) proposed “a new paradigm” for 
managing government by using the characteristics of chaos to expose opportunities for 
positive change. Acknowledging that the government process is traditionally slow and 
cumbersome, Kiel suggested that managing from the viewpoint of chaos can help reorganize 
government, manage disasters, and realign the process of budgeting. As complex, dynamic 
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organizations, government agencies would no longer view change as a threat, but as an 
opportunity. Following the concept of a fractal, Kiel noted that crisis hopping, “a focus on 
the immediate problems of the moment without the foundation of any strategy guiding 
administrative behavior” (p. 181), may actually be damaging in the future. Without 
knowledge of the greater, more complex, issues surrounding that immediate crisis, the band-




 “Organizational Attributes of the Equilibrium-Seeking and Self-Organizing Organization” 







Organizational attributes Macro-level properties 
Culture Unified equilibrium Diversified far-from-
equilibrium 
Strategy Adjustment Continuous emergence 
Planning Stable goals Continuous bifurcation 
Structure Flattened Process structure 
Distance from client Remote Involved participation 
Environmental fluctuations Damping Creative response 
Work force demographics Mandated diversity Intentional diversity 
Organizational attributes Micro-level properties 
Work teams Stable Unstable 
Control mechanisms Defined tasks Bounded instability 
Work process Sequential Reengineered parallelism 
Process analysis None Activity-based costing 
Variation in systems Source of error Source for learning 
Change process Incremental 
restabilization 
Perpetual innovation 




Kiel (1994) used the premises of chaos theory to demonstrate the change in thinking 
that would result if the public sector adopted a non-linear worldview (see Table 2.2). 
Organizations that follow the traditional systems theory approach of management are labeled 
“equilibrium-seeking” (p. 186). These organizations work to maintain order, and “disorder, 
variation, and instability are seen as dysfunctional” (p. 13). Equilibrium-seeking 
organizations do change, but the change is slow and reactive. The self-organizing 
organization, on the other hand, welcomes change. As Kiel explained, “Uncertainty is 
considered an essential element of the change process; surprises are expected” (p. 15). Self-
organizing government organizations see chaos as an opportunity for learning and 
improvement (pp. 15-16). 
Sellnow, Seeger and Ulmer (2002) collaborated on an empirical investigation of their 
chaos propositions for crisis communication (see Seeger et al., 1998; 2001) with a case study 
in the public sector. They used the language of chaos to interpret the events surrounding a 
1997 flood in the Red River Valley in North Dakota and Minnesota and the government’s 
response. Using interviews of government officials and analysis of media coverage and 
agency documents, the authors identified the following characteristics of chaos: 
• Fractals: officials did not consider the full potential of flooding from the spring thaws, 
remaining ice, land flooding, and continuing snowfall when gauging the river levels. 
• Bifurcation points: the river surpassed previously recorded levels with which no one 
in the area had any experience; city, county, and state agencies self-organized to 
collaborate on their response. 
• Strange attractors: the National Guard and FEMA brought order and security to the 




 Government officials initially were unable to manage the chaos created by the Red 
River Valley floods because they relied on established routines and linear measures to 
mitigate the situation. At a time when the public needed the best available information in a 
timely manner, emergency management personnel were disseminating inaccurate 
information that lulled the public into a false perception of safety. The authors claimed that a 
less-certain assessment of the flooding potential would have been a more ethical approach 
when there were so many unknown factors. By ensuring the community that the river was not 
going to flood, officials did not make residents aware of the less probable consequences that 
would have allowed them to be more prepared for evacuation or to protect their property 
(Sellnow et al., 2002). 
 As shown above, high reliability has been researched almost exclusively in the public 
sector, including the U.S. Navy, government-run airport security, and federal prisons. There 
has been no research on crisis-mandated public agencies, however, such as departments of 
emergency management, or on the reliability of crisis communication. The limited field of 
crisis communication preparedness in the public sector demonstrates a need for more 
research and evidence that there is plenty of room for new theoretical approaches. Using 
Weick’s and Roberts’ characteristics of an HRO, one avenue of research would be to 
investigate the characteristics of a government HRO, such as an emergency management 
agency, and then present them to non-HRO government agencies, such as departments of 
agriculture or education, much in the way that Weick and his colleagues did for corporations. 
As Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) make clear in their findings, any organization can benefit 
from using the characteristics of an HRO, and those characteristics can vary from industry to 
industry. The goals and mission of a government agency would likely differ from a corporate 
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HRO and therefore present a different set of characteristics to explore. Additionally, the 
HRO characteristics have been applied to an organization as a whole, not to a specific 
activity such as communication. Furthermore, a quantitative area of research could include a 
survey of government public relations managers’ attitudes toward chaos and an evaluation of 
their potential to operate using such a worldview. The identification of fractals, bifurcations, 
and strange attractors would change the way public sector communicators evaluate their 
efforts and plan for future crisis situations. Chaos theory, when coupled with the concept of 
high reliability organizations, presents an abundance of opportunities for research in public 
sector crisis communications. 
 
Summary and Implications 
 Chaos theory and high reliability organizations (HROs) combine to allow an 
organization to better predict, adapt to, and manage crisis situations. In sum, chaos theory 
presents a worldview in which people expect things to go wrong naturally; crisis is an 
inherent part of organizational life and can lead to organizational learning and positive 
change. By operating within a chaotic worldview, people become more aware of potential 
dangers, are ready to respond to them, and accept these challenges as opportunities (Kiel, 
1994; Murphy, 1996). High reliability provides the structure for operating under such a 
worldview. Employees are empowered to respond to a crisis situation without having to go 
through a rigid hierarchy, all members of the organization have a clear understanding of the 
mission and goals, and everyone knows how his or her role corresponds to the 
accomplishment of that mission. An overarching characteristic of an HRO is the concept of 
mindfulness. Much like environmental scanning in public relations, all members of the 
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organization are on the lookout for anything out of the ordinary that may signal a change. 
Signals that other organizations might ignore as being insignificant are noticed and attended 
to in an HRO (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). The structure of an HRO allows an organization to 
benefit from the worldview of chaos and do a better job of mitigating, preparing for, 
responding to, and recovering from a disaster. 
 Koehler et al. (2001) elaborated on the benefits of chaos theory in disaster 
management. Using an evolutionary metaphor of organisms adapting as they approach “the 
edge of chaos” (pp. 297-98), the authors described how an organization, when confronted 
with chaos, has the potential to be highly adaptable. After an organization faces a disaster, it 
is unlikely to implement the same emergency response plan that was so carefully developed 
and rehearsed during the proactive phases. Instead, the organization exhibits signs of fractals, 
bifurcations, and self-organization that allow it to adapt to the problem at hand. This process 
reduces the predictability that an organization will succeed or fail in its response. It is 
interesting to note that Koehler and his colleagues state that the organization goes back to its 
original form after the disaster is over. They do not indicate that the organization has any 
lasting changes that would be the result of learning. 
 Koehler et al. (2001) called this process of adaptation morphogenesis. This term 
explains how an organization breaks down its previous form of order and reorganizes in 
response to a substantial stimulus, such as a disaster. The authors argue that an emergency 
management organization cannot effectively deal with a disaster unless it goes through this 
metamorphosis. The change is constrained by the organization’s understood mission and 
roles and the scope of the disaster. The disaster becomes the bifurcation point that 
reorganizes the system. Therefore, the policies and procedures from the proactive phases are 
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no longer applicable to the system after it bifurcates. The dynamic nature of an organization 
responding to a disaster complements the HRO concept in which the organization is flexible 
and willing to change the rules to respond to a change in the environment. 
 Chaos and disorder can be liberating for a public agency if the adaptation is well 
executed. This allows employees to be creative, autonomous, and to set aside outdated 
formalities while seeking new approaches to problems. Kiel (1995) claimed that this 
liberation creates variation in an organization, which in turn signals learning. Although 
Koehler and his colleagues (2001) left learning out of their explanation, Kiel filled this gap to 










RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS 
 
 
 The literature review found in Chapter I reveals the inadequacy of the prevailing 
crisis communication research in addressing the unique needs of the public sector. In sum, 
the existing crisis communication literature focuses on how a crisis affects an organization 
rather than a general public. The research is biased toward the operational environment of the 
corporate sector, which includes missions and goals that differ from government agencies. 
Also, the definitions of public, crisis, and crisis communication in the literature are 
incongruent with the way crisis-mandated government agencies define these terms. The 
public sector’s organizational mission, environment, and terminology must be incorporated 
into research to produce findings relevant to this important area of crisis communication.  
 One solution for filling the gaps in public sector crisis communication research is to 
incorporate the worldview of chaos theory and the concept of high reliability, as discussed in 
Chapter II. Chaos theory offers a systematic approach to deconstructing a crisis event to 
enhance understanding of how the crisis evolved, while high reliability provides a framework 
for observing the organizational characteristics that allow an agency to respond to chaotic 
conditions. The resulting theoretical model will be tested for its application to government 
communication during public crises within the specific parameters of the public sector 
environment. Therefore, this study builds on the existing literature in public administration, 
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public relations, and high reliability research to develop a middle-range theory specific to 
public sector crisis communication. 
  
Research Questions 
 This study builds upon three fundamental questions. The questions address the 
organizational characteristics of state government public information offices in crisis-
mandated agencies. 
1. What are the organizational characteristics of a particular state emergency 
management agency’s public information office? 
This question allows an examination of the routines, structure, policies, and 
procedures of one public information office that will reveal how the staff members generate 
communication regarding crisis events. This question fills the gaps in crisis communication 
literature in which government agencies and their public information organizational practices 
have been left out of the research. 
2. Do emergency management agencies in other states demonstrate similar 
characteristics? 
This question permits triangulation of findings based upon similar state agency units 
operating under comparable environmental parameters with compatible goals. 
3. How well does high reliability organization theory explain the observed 
characteristics and behaviors of state emergency management agencies’ public 
information offices as they respond to chaotic situations? 
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 This final question explores the applicability of HRO theory to emergency 
management public information to determine the suitability of this theoretical explanation to 
the observed phenomenon in this study. 
This dissertation employs qualitative research methods to explore these three 
questions. The following section describes the participant observation and in-depth interview 
methods selected for this study. 
 
Methods of Data Collection 
 I conducted a participant observation study of the public information office at one 
state’s emergency management agency (SEMA) for a total of six weeks and then interviewed 
public information officers from emergency management agencies in five different states. 
Organizational studies by Karlene Roberts (1989; 1990a; 1990b) and Karl Weick and 
Kathleen Sutcliffe (2001) influenced my methodological choices. These researchers spent 
months observing activity on Navy aircraft carriers and interviewing everyone from the 
captain to the cook to learn how this group of men (predominantly) operates in a safe fashion 
under chaotic conditions. Through their extensive observations and interviews, these 
researchers developed characteristics of high reliability organizations (HROs) that described 
how the aircraft carrier operations avoided calamity and achieved their highest goal of safety.  
 Roberts was initially influenced by the work of organizational scientist John 
Campbell (1977). Campbell challenged researchers to develop theories of organizational 
effectiveness using the participant observer method. Through participant observation, a 
researcher can immerse herself in the setting and develop the trust of the participants (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2003). Although participant observation is perhaps the most demanding and time-
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consuming of all the qualitative methods, it helps the researcher develop a deep 
understanding of the topic of interest and leads to rich, descriptive detail in the analysis 
(Angrosino & Mays de Perez, 2003; T. W. Lee, 1999).  
 During my participant observation, I assisted the members of the public affairs office 
(PAO) by helping with special projects, mailings, proofreading, and phone calls. I took 
extensive field notes daily, conducted casual interviews with participants for clarification or 
explanations, made sketches of the setting, outlined routines, and began to generate thematic 
categories that help explain how this agency conducts crisis communication. I followed the 
advice of Lee (1999) and began to analyze the data and develop initial findings after five 
weeks before returning for another week to test, verify, and further develop my findings. 
Although Denzin and Lincoln (2003) suggest that most participant observations can take 
months or years, the six-week timeframe was sufficient for this research study and fit the 
realistic constraints imposed by my dissertation schedule. I reached data saturation when I 
began to notice in my fifth week that daily observations became repetitive and did not 
disclose any additional information. 
 Triangulation is one method of validating qualitative data (Creswell, 2003; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2003; Trochim, 2001). Therefore, I utilized a second research method and 
conducted in-depth interviews of public relations managers at other state SEMAs. These 
interviews are relevant to my findings because they were conducted with state agencies that 
have similar missions and environmental constraints as the SEMA that I observed. I followed 
McCracken’s (1988) guidelines for the long interview, which entail four steps. The first was 
the literature review, in which the topic of crisis communication was researched thoroughly, 
research questions were developed, research gaps were identified, and potential categories of 
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data were initiated. Second was the review of the cultural characteristics. For my study, this 
involved a thorough reading of the literature on the public sector environment and how that 
may affect the public relations function. The third step was categorizations of the cultural 
characteristics, in which the questions for the interview guide were developed. McCracken 
explained that the interview should consist of “grand tour” (p. 35) questions that are open-
ended and will spark conversation; floating prompts that are derived from the participant’s 
own words and used for follow-up questions; planned prompts which help keep the 
conversation going in the right direction for the researcher; and auto-driving techniques, in 
which the researcher would show the participant a visual or textual prompt as another way to 
spark a conversation. McCracken emphasized that the interview should be free-flowing yet 
controlled to be sure that the researcher’s questions are addressed. The final step was the 
analysis phase, in which the utterances were transcribed and separated as individual 
observations that were then categorized thematically and analyzed in terms of connections, 
similarities, and differences. The result is a comprehensive list of the characteristics that 
describe how this SEMA conducts routine and crisis communications.  
 The interview guide I used for this research had two primary statements: “Describe 
for me what you do in a “normal” day in the public affairs office,” and “Describe for me 
what you do in an “abnormal” day in the public affairs office.” These statements were 
intended to get the participants to discuss the routines in the public information office. 
Probes, such as “How do you do that?" “What is the approval process like for items such as 
news releases or information requests?” and “In what way are the procedures different, if at 
all, during a crisis situation?” were geared to reveal how the staff transition from routine 




 For the participant observation study, I selected a state emergency management 
agency that responds to a wide variety of natural and manmade disasters. This particular 
agency, which will remain unnamed because of promises of confidentiality, granted me full 
access to the public information office for the duration of my study. All individuals who 
participated in the interviews or the observation study were assigned pseudonyms. The 
participants in the in-depth interviews were public information officers from five different 
state emergency management agencies: two Southeast states, one Northeast state, one 
Midwest state, and one western state. Four interviews were conducted over the telephone 
averaging 38 minutes each. One interview was conducted over email to accommodate the 
participant’s schedule. The agencies were selected to provide geographical diversity across 
the United States. This was important to develop an understanding of the organizational 
factors involved in crisis communication that are not based on response to similar crises. The 
sample of five follows recommendations for interview sample size by McCracken (1988). 
This small number allows for deeper exploration of crisis communication practices in each 
state. However, I also considered Glaser and Strauss’ sampling criterion of “theoretical 
saturation,” in which new data no longer emerged from the interviews or observations (1967, 
p. 61). 
 I conducted a pilot study in the spring of 2005 to test my interview guide and to 
identify potential problems that may result from the participant observation. I selected a state 
department of transportation for the pilot study because it operates under similar 
environmental constraints, it manages a variety of crises from major interstate accidents to 
potholes, and it maintains close communication with the media and the public. I chose not to 
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use an emergency management agency because the total population is small (50 states), and I 
did not want to eliminate a potential interview subject from the sample pool. I conducted one 
in-depth interview with the public information director and completed a two-day participant 
observation study of the public information office.  
 For the pilot study, I contacted the public information director by email and phone to 
explain the study and determine her interest in participating. The only concern that the 
director expressed was for my potential exposure to personnel issues. I explained that 
personnel matters were not intrinsic to my study and that I would leave the room, turn off 
recording devices, and cease taking notes if these issues arose during my observation. The 
director was satisfied with those conditions and agreed to participate in the study.  
 The director and her staff were all informed about the parameters of the study and 
given an informed consent form to read and sign, which was approved by the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill Institutional Review Board. All members of the public 
information office were told that their participation was voluntary and that neither their 
names nor the name of the agency would be identified in the report. The agency was only 
identified as a state transportation department, and each participant was assigned a 
pseudonym. No one outside of this study had access to materials, and all notes, audio 
recordings, and transcripts were password-protected on a computer or locked in an office. 
Once consent was obtained, the interview guide was used for the in-depth interview with the 
public information director. The two-day observation period began after the initial interview. 
A total of nine staff members participated in casual interviews throughout the observation 
period. In addition, I had a follow-up visit with the director after the study was completed for 
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clarification and validation purposes. I examined the data using the methods of analysis 
discussed in the following section. 
 The pilot and dissertation research were approved by the UNC-Chapel Hill 
Institutional Review Board, JOMC 05-018 (see Appendix II). The same contact letter (see 
Appendix III), consent form (see Appendix IV), and interview guide (see Appendix I) that 
were used for the pilot study were used for the dissertation. 
 
Data Analysis 
 For this study, the first steps were to transcribe the in-depth interviews and write 
detailed field notes from the observations. I transcribed the interviews verbatim from a digital 
recording device, and I wrote field notes at the end of each day of observation. For the data 
analysis, I used the matrix method developed by Miles and Huberman (1994). This method 
included data reduction, data display, drawing conclusions, and validation. Data reduction 
entailed reducing the miles of transcripts and field notes to words, phrases, and ideas that 
could be organized in meaningful ways. I developed matrices, which allowed for the creation 
and categorization of variables that could be analyzed for thematic connections, process 
connections, counting of phrases or words, and identification of patterns. Once the matrix 
display was done, I was able to draw conclusions about the derived variables, themes, and 
patterns. I had two matrices in my final analysis: the first from the participant observation, 
and the second from the in-depth interviews with public information directors from other 
states. The resulting matrices were compared and contrasted for validity as part of the 
triangulation of findings.  
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 I used analytic induction to draw comparisons between the high reliability 
organization theoretical framework and my observations of a SEMA public affairs 
organization in action. Analytic induction is a formal means of analyzing qualitative data. 
For my research, I proposed that HRO theory would explain the routines, policies, and 
procedures evident in state emergency management crisis communication efforts. Using the 
matrix method, I compared my findings from the first case, the participant observation, with 
the known variables of HROs. Next, I compared the findings from my second case, the 
collective data from the phone interviews with other state emergency management agencies, 
with the HRO variables. The two cases were analyzed independently for fit in the theoretical 
framework, and then compared and contrasted for differences in the cases that would present 
new variables for consideration. This multi-step method of analysis allows one to continue 
until a case is found to falsely correlate with the presumed explanation, and then to either 
refine the sample or refine the explanation until a common denominator is reached that 
connects all of the cases (Ryan & Bernard, 2003). 
 
Reflexivity and Reactivity 
 Both Creswell (2003) and Glesne (1999) agree that the interpersonal nature of 
qualitative research requires that the researcher examine how her presence can affect her 
interaction with participants and her interpretation of the data. Essentially, the researcher 
herself becomes the research instrument. I approached this research with great familiarity of 
some areas, and little familiarity with others. As a former state government PIO, I have 
knowledge of the environment in which the public relations work takes place, but I did not 
have professional experience in an emergency management agency. My ability to “speak 
72 
 
their language” from my career in government gave me credibility with the participants, 
while my inexperience with emergency management allowed me to ask naïve questions that 
garnered detailed responses from the PIOs. For example, the SEMA staff members were very 
willing to decipher acronyms or define terms when I asked for explanations, but they were 
comfortable using general state government jargon in our conversations. 
 The PIOs welcomed me as part of their staff during my observation period, giving me 
an office with a computer and including me in all staff business. I reciprocated by stuffing 
envelopes for large mailings, proofreading news releases, and assisting on projects. After just 
a few days of observing the SEMA staff, I discovered that they began to feel comfortable 
opening up to me. Several of the PIOs talked to me off-the-record about job-related issues, 
and two asked me for career advice. One spoke to me privately about her dissatisfaction with 
her job, and on my final day at SEMA told me in confidence that she was going to resign. 
Although at times I felt uncomfortable playing the role of confidante, I chose to handle the 
private conversations with empathy and did not initiate these conversations on my own. I 
never discussed this information with other SEMA members, and therefore maintained their 
trust throughout my six-week stay. There were few occasions when the PIOs asked me to 
leave the room or stop taking notes during a discussion, and I never felt that they altered their 
behavior in my presence.  
 I felt an unexpected sadness when I said my good-byes to the staff. The five PIOs had 
treated me as a colleague, and I enjoyed the time I spent with them. I realized that the 
training and exercises that the staff went through were not only a bonding experience for 
them, but also for me, since I was part of the ups and downs, excitements and 
disappointments, successes and failures. This emotional connection added to my experience 
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and gave me a better perspective on the day-to-day life in the public information office than 
if I had been studying them from a distance. 
 While I had less of an emotional connection with the SEMA PIOs during my phone 
interviews, I found that my background as a government PIO gave me instant credibility with 
the participants, and that once again my naivety with emergency management allowed me to 
ask the appropriate probes and get the detailed responses I needed. As a result, the interview 
participants were very willing to help, and I enjoyed the conversations with them. 
 
Summary 
 This chapter presented the research questions that guided this study, described how 
the data collection was conducted using qualitative research methods, and explained how the 
data were analyzed. This chapter also discussed my role as a participant observer and 










RESULTS FROM PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
 
 
 During my six-week participant observation in January and February of 2006, I had 
the opportunity to watch the public affairs staff from one state’s emergency management 
agency in action as they went about their daily duties, trained in a new, state-of-the-art 
emergency operations center (EOC), participated in a statewide terrorism drill, worked on 
long-term projects, and prepared for an annual radiological exercise. After just a few days of 
observing the public affairs staff in action, I realized that they operated differently while 
doing daily, routine tasks, than they did while responding to a crisis. The policies, 
procedures, and routines that the staff followed while conducting normal public relations 
activities changed when a crisis threatened or emerged. Therefore, the following discussion 
of observed organizational characteristics of a SEMA public affairs office (see Table 4.1) is 
delineated according to the prevailing dynamics: routine, transition to crisis, and crisis.  
 
Background on the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) 
The mission of this state’s emergency management agency is to coordinate the state’s 
emergency preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts with the ultimate goal of 
protecting lives and property. The coordination efforts include working with localities, 
federal agencies, other state agencies, and other states as needed to respond to emergencies. 
The most common emergencies that SEMA responds to are weather-related emergencies, but 
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terrorism preparedness and response have become a high priority since September 11, 2001. 
There are approximately 120 full- and part-time employees agency-wide and an additional 
150 reservists and trainers with expertise in a variety of areas who are called in when needed. 
The agency leadership includes 11 individuals at the director level and above: the state 
coordinator of emergency management, deputy coordinator, deputy state coordinator for 
administration, director of local support services, director of technological hazards, chief 
financial officer, director of operations, director of preparedness, director of recovery and 
mitigation, director of human resources, and director of public affairs.  
The Public Affairs Office (PAO) has three full-time employees and two unsalaried, 
part-time employees. I used pseudonyms for all PAO staff members to preserve their 
confidentiality. David is the director of the public affairs office. He has taken graduate 
courses in mass communication and is accredited by the Public Relations Society of 
America. David oversees the office’s budget, staff, strategic planning, and project 
management. He is the primary media contact and spokesperson for the agency. As a 
member of the agency’s leadership, David consults regularly with top management and 
advises them on issues related to public information, media requests, campaigns, and hot 
topics that could affect the agency. He attends the weekly leadership meetings, 
communicates regularly with the deputy state emergency coordinator in person or by email, 
and has a close relationship with the governor’s communication staff. David shares the 






Summary matrix of environmental and organizational characteristics in SEMA public affairs. 
 
Mode Characteristics Example Significance 
Reliance on 
technology 
PAO staff members 
communicate with email, 
BlackBerry, cell phones, and 
emergency management 
intranet; News-quality cameras 
at EOC  send footage via 
satellite directly to media or 
other agencies. 
PAO staff members' 
dependence on technology 
helps them communicate with 
other parties but can also be 
detrimental when 
communication systems fail. 
Reliance on the 
news media 
PAO  develops relationships 
with reporters, pitches 
preparedness stories, and 
disseminates information to 
the media during emergencies. 
SEMA public affairs does not 
have the resources to reach the 
public with preparedness or 




Uses training and 
communication with state and 
local agencies to reinforce the 
concept of a statewide team 
that responds to emergencies. 
No single agency can respond 




SEMA employees do not 
expect a 9-5 work schedule 
every day and are ready to 
respond to a crisis. 
This mindset helps employees 
keep the agency mission at the 







PAO monitors daily news 
stories; SEMA leadership 
consults regularly with the 
PAO director. 
The PAO is able to respond to 
media inquiries; PAO keeps 




"Any exercise helps us be 
more prepared for any 
emergency that comes along. 
Since 9/11, we have been 
raising the bar to be better 
prepared."  
PAO staff prepares materials 
for a variety of potential crisis 
events and sharpens 
communication skills. 
R
outine  Lack of concern about routine 
duties 
PAO director is largely 
unprepared for upcoming 
meetings and seems to only 
concentrate on one issue at a 
time. 
PAO staff demonstrate little 
concern for negative 





Table 4.1 (continued) 
Lack of leadership 
on  projects and 
outreach 
programs 
No one was in charge of the 
invitations for the grand 
opening of the EOC, and 
mistakes were not discovered 
until the last minute.  
Individual staff members do not 
take responsibility for successful 




on the PAO 
function by other 
SEMA 
departments 
PAO was not informed of the 
state employee terrorism 
preparedness program launch. 
The PAO missed an opportunity 
to issue a proactive news release 
and generate positive news. 
PAO has little 
independence on 
agency projects 
Webmaster had to coordinate 
a 13 person committee for the 
Website redesign; When they 
were all called out for a crisis 
response, the work came to a 
standstill. 
Routine projects can be delayed 
by the agency bureaucracy. 
R
outine 
PAO written job 
descriptions  
Several PAO staff said that 
their job descriptions are 
inaccurate, vague, or useless. 
PAO staff are unclear about their 




on the PAO 
during radiological 
exercise 
"This drill is much bigger for 
the public affairs office than 
any other division at (SEMA). 
We have a much busier role in 
this exercise than anyone else 
and are heavily scrutinized by 
the FEMA evaluators." 
Poor performance can result in a 
low grade and corrective orders 
from FEMA. 
Rumor control All rumors are followed up on 
and then clarified in media 
conferences and news 
releases. 
The media (and public) get 




other units during 
a crisis. 
Sirens, news releases, and 
EAS message must be 
carefully coordinated and 
timed. 
The media (and public) get 





given to mundane 
details during 
exercise 
Basic information such as 
phone numbers were not 
verified before using in news 
releases. 
These mistakes required 
correction by the FEMA 
evaluators and could cause 
confusion among the public 










SEMA works closely with state 
police, transportation, national 
weather service, and other 
agencies as the event 
requires. 
SEMA is a coordinating agency, 
while other local and state 




PIOs from other 
agencies 
"They bring different 
knowledge and capabilities 
depending on what agency 
they are from, and we use their 
skills." 
SEMA does not have enough 
public affairs personnel on staff to 
manage a disaster event on its 
own. 
Strong chain of 
command 
SEMA employs the joint 
information center (JIC) 
structure. 
The JIC structure eliminates 
confusion by addressing training, 





PAO office is located near the 
EOC, the director of 
operations, and the executive 
briefing room; The PAO staff is 
always included in decisions 
and activity reports. 
The public affairs office is 
informed of all activities during a 
crisis event and can distribute up-




Mutual aid agreements provide 
personnel and resources from 
states that are not directly 
affected by a disaster; SEMA 
also gets help from other state 
agencies. 
SEMA does not have the 
resources on its own to respond 
to a major disaster. 
Change in venue When the EOC is activated, all 
functions performed by the 
PAO are done at the EOC so 
they are in close contact with 
all involved players and 
decision makers.  
There is a clear distinction among 
the PAO staff regarding disaster 
mode and routine mode. 
Change in 
priorities 
"We ignore everything else 
that is going on. Everything 
else pretty much goes to the 
back burner. We've had to 
cancel events because of 
storms." 
The PAO can dedicate its entire 






Leadership over SEMA shifts 
from Public Safety Secretary to 
the Governor in a crisis. 
This shift improves the line of 
communication to the top state 
leader, ensures availability of 
needed resources, and speeds up 






 Philip, the agency’s outreach coordinator, also serves as a secondary spokesperson for 
the agency. Philip promotes and coordinates the agency’s emergency preparedness efforts, 
which include weather safety and terrorism preparedness campaigns for local governments, 
state agencies, civic groups, and the general public. Jack is the agency’s Web master, but his 
official title is public relations coordinator. Jack develops and updates the SEMA Web site, 
intranet, and the external Web site for all emergency managers in the state. Although his 
primary responsibilities are Web development, Jack also uses his communication skills for 
copyediting, broadcasting the Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages, and occasional 
media interviews.  
Zahra, a part-time public relations specialist, is the writer for the public affairs office. 
She writes agency news releases, Web site content, newsletters, and preparedness campaign 
materials. Zahra also does event planning and helps cover for the public relations assistant, 
Leslie, when she is out of the office. Leslie, who, like Zahra, also works about 30 hours a 
week, primarily does administrative support for the public affairs staff. She routes media 
calls to David or Philip, and each morning she collects news stories of interest to the SEMA 
staff and distributes them via email. 
As with all state employees, the director, outreach coordinator, PR coordinator 
(Webmaster), PR specialist (writer), and the PR assistant have written job descriptions that 
explain their roles in the agency. Some are quick to point out, however, that their job 
descriptions for everyday tasks are inaccurate, vague, or useless. Jack, the Webmaster, said, 
“I think they [David and the agency leadership] are still trying to figure out how to best use 
me.” Zahra, the PR writer, said that her job description listed responsibilities such as media 
monitoring that she never does unless a coworker is absent. Leslie, the PR assistant, who had 
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been on the job for about one month, said that her written job description does not reflect 
what she was told to do after she was hired. She feels that her actual work includes more 
administrative responsibilities than were indicated during the hiring process. David, the 
director, admitted that he has not done very much training with the staff on their roles and 
responsibilities, but added, “Most of them, they know their role. That’s part of their job 
description. They know what their job is pretty much from just one-on-one discussion.” 
As a whole, the public affairs staff is relatively inexperienced in government crisis 
communication. Of all the PAO staff, David has the longest tenure of nearly three years, and 
worked previously for the state department of transportation. Jack has been with SEMA for 
19 months, Zahra for 16 months, Philip for 6 months, and Leslie for just 1 month. David is 
the only staff member who worked in public relations prior to joining SEMA, although 
Leslie and Zahra both have degrees in mass communication.  
 In sum, the PAO’s small staff of three full-time employees and two part-time 
employees has modest experience in emergency management. Some of the staff expressed 
concern over the vagueness of their job descriptions. The next section discusses the work that 
the staff members do on a daily basis in the public affairs office. 
 
Routine Public Affairs Tasks 
 For the public affairs office in this state’s emergency management agency, a routine 
day is one in which there are no hurricanes, hazardous materials incidents, or terrorist threats. 
The day-to-day schedules are shaped around training, media inquiries, drills, preparedness 
campaigns, and current projects.  Each day’s schedule differs based on the tasks at hand, and 
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no two days are the same. “There are no set things,” said Zahra, the PR writer. “I’m doing 
whatever project’s on top of my pile, whatever deadline is coming up.” 
 On my first day at SEMA, David held a staff meeting, the only one during my six-
week observation period. The agenda covered several activities that would take place over 
the coming months, including a graded nuclear power plant exercise, the grand opening of 
the new state emergency operations center (EOC), the campaign for tornado preparedness 
month in March, and a Basic PIO course for local and state public information officers. 
David discussed the need to develop news releases, talking points, and other materials for 
these events, as well as upcoming training sessions for all local and state PIOs involved in 
the nuclear exercise. Although many of these activities occur regularly, most of the staff were 
hired since the last events were held, so David suggested that they check files from past years 
to see what needed to be done. Later that day, I attended the senior staff meeting with David. 
This weekly meeting offers a chance for all members of the agency leadership to report on 
current topics and learn what other divisions of the agency are working on. David gave an 
update on public affairs activities, highlighting preparation for the grand opening of the 
emergency operations center and PIO training for the nuclear exercise. 
 One function that takes place routinely is media monitoring, a strategy of issues 
management. Each morning, Leslie, the PR assistant, scans the state and national news Web 
sites and produces “Headlines,” a collection of news clips related to state politics or 
emergency management issues, and distributes them by email to all SEMA employees. If 
Leslie is not in the office, Zahra is responsible for collecting and distributing the news clips. 
David, the director, usually arrives at work first, around 7:30 each morning. He does his own 
scan of the media to look for hot issues that may have a direct impact on the agency and 
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alerts the agency leadership. “If there’s something in the news, I can do it before we get clips 
off,” he said. “I let my bosses know that there’s an issue out there or something that we need 
to be ready for.” 
 Issues management is a priority for all of the PAO staff. In addition to watching the 
news and alerting agency leadership of potential issues, the PIOs also track media inquiries, 
emails to the agency Web site, and information posted on Web EOC, an online community 
that is used by emergency management personnel across the state. Everyone in the agency 
pays attention to signals from a potentially volatile issue – the weather. Employees from 
around the state distribute regional weather forecasts to all employees by email so that 
everyone is aware of potential weather threats and can prepare to respond if needed. SEMA 
employees anticipate that any change in the weather can create a problem for travel, public 
safety, or public services. Based on the information they receive from these sources, David 
consults with the agency leadership before deciding whether to generate news releases or 
media calls regarding hot issues.  
In addition to monitoring the news, the public affairs staff also works to strengthen 
relationships with local and state reporters. The PAO relies on the media to communicate 
information to the public during an emergency, so the staff works to develop relationships 
with local and state media during routine times. For example, after a major hurricane, 
localities tried to contact radio stations at night to broadcast advisories for the public to boil 
all water used for drinking and cooking. No one was available to answer phones at the radio 
stations after hours, and the local and state PIOs did not have home contact information for 
station employees. David has been working with the state association of broadcasters since 
that event to develop contact lists for after-hours emergencies.  
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 In sum, issues management and media relations quickly emerged during my 
observations as key routine public information practices. Staff perform these tasks on a daily 
basis. The next section discusses some of the long-term projects that I observed the PAO 
staff working on during my six-week visit. 
 
Long-Term Projects 
 Most of the long-term projects that the PAO staff works on are seasonal preparedness 
campaigns that take place annually. Examples include severe winter weather awareness, 
tornado awareness, hurricane preparedness, and national preparedness month, which has a 
terrorism theme. Other long-term projects include agency special events, training 
development, and grant writing and research. 
 During my six-week observation the staff was organizing a special event, the grand 
opening of the new, state-of-the-art emergency operations center. No one on the SEMA 
public affairs staff appeared to be in charge of this project, and when the staff met to stuff 
envelopes for the event invitations, they discovered they had about 200 fewer invitations than 
they needed for the number of names on the mailing lists. Zahra became defensive and said 
that she ordered the number of invitations that she was told were needed, but as David 
thumbed through the labeled envelopes, he realized that many of the names were not on the 
original list. The PAO staff had been given printed sheets of labels from several departments 
within SEMA, and no one had checked for duplication or accuracy. David made the decision 
to have his staff order more invitations rather than delete the extra names. As a result, more 
people were invited to the grand opening than could reasonably fit at the location, forcing 
David and his staff to reconsider the schedule of events. The event took place one month 
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after my observations ended, so I did not have the opportunity personally to see the results. I 
followed up with Zahra about the event, and she said the staff was pleased with the results. 
Fewer guests came than they had projected, so there was ample room for everyone in the 
facility. 
 The staff also made plans for Tornado Awareness Week, which would take place in 
March. Once again, there appeared to be a lack of leadership on this long-term project. 
Philip, the outreach coordinator, would normally be in charge of these seasonal awareness 
campaigns. Because he was overwhelmed with planning for the EOC grand opening, Philip 
began to lobby for Zahra to take over the tornado week planning. David did not make any 
firm decisions about who was in charge, and Zahra indicated that she would work on the 
project, but that she was “not in charge.” This event also took place after my observation 
period. 
In sum, the public affairs staff is responsible for a wide range of routine projects, but 
there appeared to be some conflict among the staff regarding who was in charge of certain 
activities. Most of the projects relate to emergency preparedness efforts, which are detailed in 
the next section. 
 
Statewide Preparedness Efforts 
The public affairs office helps fulfill the agency’s responsibility to train and prepare 
state agencies, local governments, and the general public for disaster preparedness through 
public information campaigns, news releases, information posted on the agency Web site, 
and training for PIOs across all branches and levels of government. The efforts made during 
routine times are intended to ensure that the response to future disasters will be cohesive and 
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organized. The public affairs staff works with PIOs from other state entities, such as the state 
police, transportation, health, and agriculture, to reinforce the idea that emergencies are not 
just managed by SEMA, but by the state as a whole. To succeed, all PIOs from state and 
local agencies must share the same goal of working to protect citizens and their property 
through coordinated emergency management. Intergovernmental relations is central to 
SEMA’s mission; as a coordinating agency, SEMA cannot respond to an emergency on its 
own, but rather pulls together the personnel and resources of state and local agencies. David 
explained how intergovernmental relations affect his day-to-day work: 
 Everything we do within this agency is bringing other people together 
to work on these issues [emergency preparedness and response] because these 
issues are not single-agency kinds of things. They affect so many people at the 
state and local level. So we are constantly trying to bring people together and 
get consensus, and move things forward, and that’s really how this agency 
operates. And then during a disaster or an emergency, we bring them in 
because they are the team that can make things happen; we just happen to 
manage the process in a lot of ways. 
 
 Inter-agency cooperation is not always successful, however. During my first week of 
observation, David discovered that a major initiative to train state employees on terrorism 
preparedness had launched about two months earlier. David said he knew that the program 
was being developed but was not informed that the program had been finalized and that 
classes were being held around the state. As a result, David felt it was too late to issue a news 
release that would have generated positive press for the agency or to assist in promoting the 
program to employees. David indicated that this was one of many lost opportunities that 
occur when other departments or agencies overlook the public relations component. 
During my six-week observation, the PAO staff as well as other state and local PIOs 
participated in two formal training sessions related to the impending radiological exercise as 
well as several informal training sessions to familiarize themselves with the new EOC. In 
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addition to training for specific exercises, SEMA offers a basic PIO course for all state and 
local agency personnel who are interested in general public relations and media relations, and 
many PIOs also take advanced courses in crisis management through FEMA. The PAO staff 
also participated in a statewide terrorism drill in January that simulated a terrorist attack on a 
university campus. PIOs from other state agencies were able to train in the new EOC for the 
first time while practicing emergency response measures related to public information. 
 For most of January, the public affairs staff was busy coordinating the training and 
preparation for all PIOs who would participate in the radiological exercise, which took place 
in early February. The formal training for the radiological exercise included a session with all 
state and local PIOs who would be involved and a tabletop exercise, or dry run, of all the 
elements that would be required by FEMA evaluators. David, the PAO director, was 
generally unprepared for the meetings and training sessions. David did not provide handouts 
or notes and spoke off-the-cuff during the session, which had about 50 state and local 
emergency management staff in attendance. When asked for a show of hands, about half of 
the PIOs responded that they had never been involved in a nuclear station exercise. As a 
result of David’s unorganized presentation and the inexperience of his audience, questions at 
the end of the 30-minute talk indicated that the PIOs had more questions and concerns about 
the upcoming exercise. The questions included the following: How many FEMA evaluators 
will be monitoring the exercise? What will they be looking for? Do I talk to them during the 
exercise, or pretend they aren’t there? Do I get to repeat a step if I make a mistake? How do 
we make them aware of steps we are taking when the evaluator isn’t looking? The confusion 
was related more to the expectations of the drill rather than to the PIO duties. SEMA 
87 
 
employees from other departments who have participated in drills before stayed to answer 
these questions. 
 Preparedness and outreach efforts also include working closely with non-government 
organizations, often with mixed results. One example is the Business Outreach Committee, a 
group of nonprofits, businesses, and associations that work with SEMA to help small 
businesses develop continuity and disaster recovery plans. I attended one of its meetings 
while the committee was still in the early phases of development. In addition to the SEMA 
PIOs, the members included representatives from the local American Red Cross chapter, a 
law firm, an insurance company, and an association of continuity planners.2 Working with 
such a diverse group of people did not prove easy, however. It quickly became apparent to 
me that each member had her own agenda for the committee’s work. There was obvious 
conflict as the other members of the group disagreed with the PAO staff on developing logos 
and materials for the program. Each person wanted her area of interest highlighted in the 
materials, such as the importance of getting comprehensive business insurance or learning 
how to recover after a disaster. None of the other members were graphic designers or public 
relations writers, so the PAO staff became angry that the group did not value their expertise 
in making these decisions. For the duration of my stay, the committee continued to disagree 
on revisions, and the PAO staff began discussing the idea of dissolving the group because of 
its inability to make progress.  
 Statewide preparedness efforts require that the SEMA public information staff work 
with other government agencies, nonprofits, and private businesses to develop successful 
                                                 
2 In continuity planning, businesses develop strategies for recovering from a disaster while keeping 
interruptions to operations at a minimum. These plans may include provisions for payroll, data storage, and 
alternative office space until the business can resume normal operations. 
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campaigns that are salient to a variety of groups. The next section discusses some of the 
resources and procedures that the PAO staff use to accomplish their routine tasks.  
 
Resources and Procedures for Getting the Work Done 
With so many players involved in the statewide emergency management efforts, the 
PAO relies heavily on technology, such as BlackBerry wireless communication devices, text 
pagers, cell phones, and Web EOC, an online community for emergency management 
personnel across the state. During my observation, Philip, the outreach coordinator, was 
following the BlackBerry patent infringement lawsuit3 and researching options for getting the 
same features from other devices should BlackBerry lose in litigation. He explained that 
without the devices, it would make it much more difficult to coordinate public information 
during an emergency.  
The PIOs’ reliance on technology, including BlackBerry devices, text pagers, and 
Web EOC, results in up-to-the-minute access to situation reports, news, weather reports, 
email messages, and reports from the field. Minutes from the agency senior staff meetings, 
reports from the 24-hour communications center at the state EOC, and regional weather 
conditions from emergency managers around the state are sent via email to every SEMA 
employee. The PIOs also recognized the importance of using technology to connect with 
people outside of emergency management. During my observation, David, the PAO director, 
and Jack, the Webmaster, started discussions on how to monitor weblogs, known as blogs, 
during disasters to collect information from the affected communities and make them aware 
of available assistance. David mentioned that blogs became a useful communication channel 
                                                 
3 The holder of the software patent for the BlackBerry wireless communication devices patent dropped a patent 
infringement lawsuit in March 2006, avoiding a court-issued disruption in service to millions of BlackBerry 
users (Austin, 2006). 
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for communities shut off from the rest of the world after Hurricane Katrina. The media 
noticed the blogs, and that attention, in turn, helped government agencies locate where help 
was needed. David realized that SEMA’s awareness of blogs can also help address rumors 
and misinformation by relaying accurate information during a disaster. 
Technology is also key to SEMA’s media relations. The PAO maintains a media 
email list that allows the staff to select localities within the state to issue news releases and 
media advisories. They also post all news releases on their Web site and have a subscription 
listserv for news releases and electronic newsletters. David and Philip rotate being on-call 
after business hours, and reporters know how to reach them by cell phone or pager. Once 
again, the SEMA believes that the BlackBerry devices proved useful for sending documents 
or written statements to the media and also allow the PIO staff to route releases to David or 
Philip for approval when they are out of the office. 
Although the public affairs office has the tools to communicate readily and 
efficiently, they still must adhere to agency procedures related to information release. The 
PIOs must go through a regimented approval process before distributing news releases or 
other printed materials or before answering media inquiries. Zahra, the PR writer, called the 
agency approval process “a nightmare.” Zahra is the primary news release writer and the 
only writer for the agency’s newsletter, which is distributed twice monthly by email. She 
explained that approvals extend from subject matter experts up to the agency leadership: 
 I start off with a first draft and send it to all the stakeholders. Then you 
send back the edits, incorporate those edits, send it back out. I try to only do 
that once, but sometimes someone further down the chain will say, well, no, 
you need to include this, which starts that process all over again. So after that 





This layered approval process also applies to the agency Web site. Jack, the 
Webmaster, must gain approvals on all new Web content. He also has to work with a 13-
member committee at the agency when redesigning the Web site, a task complicated by the 
fact that many members were called away to respond to emergencies, thus delaying the 
process.  
The SEMA public affairs office relies on other government agencies, technology, and 
formal approval processes to accomplish its mission. These resources become even more 
important during an emergency, as will be discussed in the following section on the transition 
to crisis.  
Transition from Routine to Crisis 
The state emergency management agency’s primary mission is to protect lives and 
property in an emergency, therefore, the completion of routine tasks is dependent on a lack of 
a crisis. When a crisis emerges, the public information staff sets aside all daily tasks and 
long-term projects so they can concentrate on the emergency at hand. The PIOs made several 
references to how they distinguish routine working conditions from disaster response. David, 
the director, often referred to “disaster mode” as being different from routine operations in 
terms of staff roles, intensity, and even the location where the PIOs worked. The Webmaster, 
Jack, differentiated his workload as “regular mode” versus “disaster mode.” All of the PIOs 
recognize a difference in job priorities when a crisis emerged.  
 “We pretty much ignore everything else that’s going on and push it [routine work] to 
the back burner when something happens,” said David. “I’ll ignore emails I get from people 
that are about other issues because I am focused on [the crisis]. We’ve had to cancel events 
because of storms.” Zahra, the PR writer, said, “In an emergency, everything goes off the 
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table, and I’m dealing with whatever press releases or information they need gathered.” 
Philip, the outreach coordinator who primarily works on long-term campaigns, explained, 
“Oftentimes that work is largely eclipsed by whatever the crisis of the moment is, and that 
crisis can be a real-world emergency like a Katrina, or it can be something that is more of a 
work-related fire.” Examples of Philip’s work-related fires included event planning for the 
grand opening of the new EOC, preparation for upcoming disaster exercises, and the recent 
news that the Department of Homeland Security would change its process for awarding 
grants. Philip described how the transition from routine to disaster mode is not always easy 
for the PIO staff: 
 The biggest challenge in a lot of people’s jobs here is that we all have 
day-to-day duties that need to get done, but once an emergency flares up, that 
all goes out the window, and we all have to respond to that emergency. 
Responding to that emergency can take weeks, sometimes months, of your 
time. Once that emergency is over, those day-to-day duties that you’ve been 
neglecting still need to get done. All of those things can rise up and make the 
day-to-day preparedness outreach not always the front burner topic. 
 
SEMA’s level of authority increases when a crisis emerges, especially when 
the governor declares a state of emergency. During routine times, the agency reports 
to the secretary of public safety. During a disaster, however, the agency reports 
directly to the governor, and the public safety agencies play a support role for SEMA. 
The direct link to the state’s highest executive office empowers the agency to make 
decisions and recruit personnel and resources from other state agencies. For public 
information, David has the authority to pull in PIOs from other state agencies to help 
in the EOC or on the scene of the emergency. David becomes their manager for the 
duration of the emergency, and the PIOs essentially work for the state as a whole 
rather than their home agency. 
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As the public information staff members shed their routine responsibilities and 
transition to disaster mode, they take on new roles. The next section discusses the 
organizational differences that emerge when SEMA activates a Joint Information 
Center. 
 
The Joint Information Center 
As the PIOs drop their daily responsibilities and transition to disaster mode, their 
roles and job titles also change. Each staff member has an assigned responsibility in the 
emergency operations center (EOC) and takes on new duties once an emergency is declared. 
Once a disaster exceeds the scope of a single local jurisdiction, the state can be asked to step 
in and assist. At this point, the PIOs from state and local government entities come together 
in a joint information center, or JIC, which becomes the public affairs component of the EOC 
(see Appendix V for a detailed description of the JIC concept). A JIC is typically located in 
the EOC facility, but may be positioned near the disaster scene as a primary or a satellite JIC 
if needed. The purpose of a JIC is to pool communication resources, coordinate the release of 
information for consistency, and create a single voice for the state to respond to a disaster, 
rather than many voices speaking for individual agencies. As demonstrated in the 
organizational chart (see Figure A1, Appendix V), a JIC structure has the potential to include 
dozens of individuals. A JIC can be as large or as small as the situation warrants. The five 
PAO staff members from SEMA cannot fill all of the roles on their own, so they call PIO 
reservists, as well as PIOs from other state agencies, to fill specific positions based on their 
knowledge and experience.  
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 During my six-week observation of the SEMA public affairs office, there were no 
actual disaster events to which the staff had to respond. I was able to observe the staff as they 
participated in the next-best thing – an exercise for a radiological emergency that was graded 
by FEMA. The federal government mandates that all nuclear power plants in the United 
States practice this particular drill every other year, and with two nuclear stations in the state, 
this drill becomes an annual exercise for SEMA. The consequences for this exercise are high, 
as a poor grade could result in sanctions or even closure of the power plant. The public 
affairs staff responds to this exercise using the same JIC procedures and organizational 
structure that they would use for an actual emergency. During the radiological exercise, 
which is discussed in detail in the next section, the following roles were filled in the JIC:  
lead PIO, JIC coordinator, media relations, public inquiry center operators, internal liaison, 
external liaison, writer, administrative assistant, and field PIO.  
David, the PAO director, wore many hats during the radiological exercise: lead PIO, 
JIC coordinator, and media relations contact. For smaller activations of the JIC, it is common 
for one person to handle multiple responsibilities. As the lead PIO, David advises the EOC 
leadership on public information matters, summons reservists and other state PIOs to join the 
JIC, and oversees all JIC activities and personnel. The JIC coordinator duties include 
management of logistics and work assignments. David’s responsibilities as the media 
relations contact include fielding all calls from the media, initiating calls to the media when 
needed, and scheduling interviews. During an event of larger magnitude or greater duration, 
several people may fill these three roles. 
The staff called in two SEMA reservists who have training and experience in 
answering calls on the disaster hotline to work in the public inquiry center (PIC), which was 
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located in a customer service area at the power company’s headquarters. The PIC operators 
provide information to the public, including the current status of the emergency or any 
evacuation orders. They also take note of the types of questions and comments that they 
receive from the public and identify trends in citizen concerns or rumors that the PIOs can 
address in news releases, press conferences, and media interviews. The two reservists kept in 
close contact with the PIOs throughout the exercise to share information. 
The JIC also included one internal and one external liaison at the EOC. The internal 
liaison was a reservist who has experience in disaster response. He spent most of the day 
floating between the public affairs office and the EOC, listening in on discussions, and 
attending the status briefings. He would report to David any information that he felt was 
relevant to the public information function, and he also gave the JIC update during the EOC-
wide situation briefings. A PIO from the state department of health filled the external liaison 
role. This exercise was her first introduction to the EOC. Her responsibility was to 
communicate with PIOs at the local level throughout the exercise to keep them informed, 
collect and review their press releases for message content and accuracy, and answer their 
questions or concerns. Much like the public inquiry center operators, the external liaison 
notified David of any rumors or consistent issues that she learned about talking with the local 
government agencies. 
Zahra served as the JIC writer for the exercise. Aside from the frenzied pace, her 
responsibilities were very similar to her day-to-day duties at SEMA. Zahra prepared a set of 
news release templates in advance of the radiological exercise that covered nearly every 
possible scenario that they could respond to. During the exercise, she gathered information as 
the scenario advanced, consulted with David, and filled in the appropriate news release or 
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emergency alert system (EAS) message templates. Leslie, the administrative assistant, 
simulated the distribution of the news releases to the media, answered the phones in the 
public affairs office, and logged news releases and other vital information on Web EOC. 
Philip, the outreach coordinator, served as the field PIO at the power company 
headquarters, which is about 20 miles from the state EOC. As the SEMA representative for 
media interviews and press conferences, Philip addressed any issues related to the state’s 
response to the emergency at the nuclear power plant. He worked in conjunction with the 
power company’s communication manager to collect information and maintained constant 
contact with his colleagues in the JIC. He also routed news releases to the communication 
manager for review by power company officials. Although the JIC does not require approval 
from the power company before releasing information, the PIOs follow this procedure follow 
during drills and emergencies to ensure accuracy and consistency of the information released 
to the public. 
The team did not fill the Webmaster role during this particular exercise because that 
component was not graded by the FEMA evaluators, so Jack assisted the JIC team on several 
other tasks. He helped with writing, proofreading, research, and “gophering” between the JIC 
and the EOC leadership. He also recorded the broadcast message for the emergency alert 
system, a responsibility not listed in the SEMA PIO guide or in the JIC organizational chart. 
David indicated that this responsibility normally goes to the director of the EOC’s 
communications center, but he was not sure why the public affairs group was asked to record 




Although a JIC was not activated for a real emergency during my stay with SEMA, 
my observations of SEMA employees responding to a contrived nuclear power plant disaster 
illustrate the roles that the PIOs assume during an actual crisis. The next section describes 
public information activities in crisis response. 
 
Crisis Response in the Public Affairs Office 
It’s 8:35 a.m. at the State Emergency Management Agency. Suddenly there is a 
cacophony of chimes, buzzes, and beeps coming from employees’ BlackBerry devices and 
text pagers.  
Notification of unusual event. There has been an earthquake reported in the vicinity 
of the nuclear power station. 
This is all the initial information they have, but the SEMA public information officers 
collect their radiological public information guides, state maps, and other materials they may 
need and await to be notified of the alert level, the next emergency action level for nuclear 
power station emergencies, that will signal their call to report to the state’s emergency 
operations center. 
This emergency was not unexpected. The PIO staff prepared for this graded 
radiological exercise for more than a month. During the next few hours, evaluators from the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) scrutinized the PIOs, other SEMA employees, local emergency management 
coordinators, and the private company that operates the power station as they simulate their 
response to a major disaster at the nuclear power plant. 
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 Of all the PAO staff, only David had fully participated in a radiological exercise; Jack 
had just joined the agency during the last drill and was primarily an observer. This exercise 
also included PIOs from the state health department, SEMA reservists who are called in only 
during emergencies, city and county government personnel, fire and police department 
spokespersons, and employees from the privately owned power company that operates the 
nuclear station. Although all of the participants knew the date of the exercise, they did not 
know the scenario and consequent interactions in advance. For this drill, the players 
simulated a response to an earthquake that struck in the vicinity of the nuclear power station, 
damaging the facility and leaking radiation into the environment. The state and local PIOs, 
who were located variously in the state emergency operations center, the power company’s 
headquarters, the power station, and various local government offices, had to adjust to the 
situation as it unraveled and maintain a coordinated response as they issued news releases, 
broadcasted emergency alert system (EAS) messages, and conducted press briefings, all 
under the watchful eyes of FEMA evaluators. All of my observations took place at the state 
EOC. 
 It was crucial for the PIOs to coordinate all information that was for public 
dissemination, so David activated the joint information center (JIC). He contacted three 
reservists and two state PIOs from the health and transportation departments and told them to 
report to the EOC. Inaccurate and inconsistent information, or poorly timed dissemination of 
accurate information, can have catastrophic results on a community that is struck by a 
disaster if the team members do not adequately coordinate their duties. For the radiological 
exercise itself, mistakes can have serious consequences on the state’s and the power 
company’s authorization to operate the nuclear power generation facility. David felt the 
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pressure on the public affairs staff to perform well during the exercise, saying, “This drill is 
much bigger for the public affairs office than any other division at [SEMA]. We have a much 
busier role in this exercise than anyone else, and are heavily scrutinized by the FEMA 
evaluators.” David and his staff knew that any mistakes they made would reflect on the entire 
agency.  
 The PIOs also were aware that the response effort was much larger than their staff of 
five. No single agency can respond to a disaster like this earthquake scenario on its own, and 
the larger the crisis, the larger the team of public information officers that is called from the 
reserves and other agencies. SEMA does not get involved in a crisis until the situation gets 
too large for one locality to respond to and the local governments request state assistance. 
Once SEMA is activated, the political boundaries disappear, and the state as a whole 
responds to the crisis. David recognized the expertise that employees from other agencies, as 
well as the reservists, brought to the public information team, saying, “They bring different 
knowledge and capabilities depending on what agency they are from, and we use their 
skills.” He relied on PIOs from the departments of health, transportation, public safety, and 
other responding agencies when he needed to consult with subject matter experts during the 
exercise.  
 This section described how the public affairs office initiated their emergency 
response mode during the radiological exercise. The following section explains the public 





Responding to a Radiological Emergency 
 Once the disaster scenario had escalated from unusual event status to the alert level, 
which took about 15 minutes in this expedited simulation, all of the PIOs piled into waiting 
state vehicles and made the seven-minute drive from SEMA’s headquarters to the state 
emergency operations center, which is located on the grounds of the state police headquarters 
and training academy. By 9:00 a.m., the governor had already declared a state of emergency. 
The PIOs checked in at the secured entrance to the EOC just after 9:00 a.m. and worked their 
way to the public affairs office, where a FEMA evaluator waited for their arrival. As 
illustrated in Figure 4.1, the public affairs office is across the hall from the EOC’s bullpen, 
where most of the work takes place, and in close proximity to the information and planning 
room, the operations director’s room, and the executive briefing room, where the governor 
would be located. The EOC leaders make major decisions in these areas during an 
emergency, and the PIOs have easy access to meetings and individuals for gathering and 
confirming information. Figure 4.2 depicts the staff seating chart and equipment found in the 
public affairs office in the EOC.  
 This emergency scenario was the first time that SEMA had used the recently 
constructed EOC facility other than for training. This state-of-the-art facility has technology 
designed to improve communications within the EOC, around the state, and with federal 
entities, such as the Department of Homeland Security. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 depict many of 
the technological features that the old EOC did not have, including flat screen television 
monitors that receive news stations from around the state via satellite, two large projection 
screens in the bullpen, and an eight-deck digital recorder station that allows the PIOs to 
monitor and record news stories. All of the computers throughout the EOC are connected by 
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a network, and at any time, the communications center manager can display images from any 
of the computers on the projection screens for viewing. Other features include a microphone 
system that can broadcast into all rooms in the EOC so that everyone can hear important 
announcements or status reports, and electronic white boards that connect to the computer 
network. A surveillance camera mounted on the ceiling in the bullpen can send images of 
activity to other rooms, such as the public affairs office or the executive briefing room, and 
also can record video for distribution to the media. The PAO also has a hand-held, news-
quality camera for recording footage for the media, and the media work room has camera 
jacks that connect to outside podiums for news satellite trucks. 
 Upon arrival at the EOC, the public affairs staff settled into their assigned cubicles 
and began to respond to the situation. They were joined by a PIO from the state health 
department and one reservist who each were assigned duties for the exercise. It was 
important for the staff to be constantly aware of which of the four emergency action levels 
(notification of unusual event, alert, site area emergency, and general emergency) they were 
responding to, as each step required specific actions by the public affairs team. The action 
levels were posted on Web EOC, which could be viewed on any computer in the EOC, 
projected onto the large screen in the bullpen, and sent to every SEMA email and BlackBerry 
account. For each level, the PIOs had to issue a specific news release, hold a media briefing, 
or broadcast an emergency alert system (EAS) message. For example, the team distributed a 
news release as the situation progressed through each level to explain what was happening in 
each phase. The general emergency news release would be accompanied by details regarding 
protective orders (i.e., related to contaminated food, water, or livestock) or evacuation orders. 
The PIOs also had to time the simulated calls to the governor’s office, the local radio 
101 
 
stations, and the power company to coincide with the events in the scenario. All of the PIOs 
had a good understanding of the various alert levels and completed their responsibilities in a 
timely and accurate manner. In addition to monitoring the changes in alert levels, the PIOs 
simulated monitoring the newscasts from local television stations to ensure media reported 
accurate information, listened in on meetings in the executive briefing room and in the EOC 
bullpen, and stayed in constant contact with the EOC’s operations director. The FEMA 
evaluator observed every action and read each news release to see that the team met all the 
requirements for each phase. 
 Each news release had to go through a lengthy approval process before distribution, 
and David oversaw each action made by his employees, often to the frustration of the PR 
writer. Zahra usually had the news releases written and ready for approval before David 
could tell her to do them, but his apparent lack of trust in her ability to get the work done 
quickly and accurately led to a brief shouting match between the two of them. Zahra later 
explained that she felt confident in her own ability to analyze and respond to the situation, 
and that David’s micro-management slowed her down and prevented her from being able to 
manage the approval process efficiently. 
 Many of the PIO actions, such as the distribution of news releases and the broadcast 
of the EAS message, were timed and carried out under noisy and crowded conditions. The 
EOC’s operations director stayed in constant contact with David, often consulting with him 
on what measures needed to be taken next. The scenario escalated from one emergency 
action level to the next in a matter of minutes, and the PIOs had to complete their responses 

































































































 The exercise, which lasted about five hours, was fast-paced from beginning to end, 
leaving little time for the players to take a lunch break or reflect on what they had done. The 
need for accuracy, timeliness, and consistency of public information under volatile 
conditions is magnified as the situation escalates and lives are endangered. For example, 
when the governor recommended that farmers put dairy animals in shelters to protect them 
from the radiological fallout, the PIOs realized that they had not issued any recommendations 
for public safety up to that point and feared that citizens would think that the governor was 
more concerned with cows than people. The PIOs enlisted the help of the agriculture 
department to explain how dairy animals are more susceptible to long-term radiation 
contamination and that farmers needed to house their livestock before conditions worsened to 
the point that they needed to seek shelter themselves. Once the PIOs were able to satisfy the 
public safety concerns, they could express those in the news releases while staying on 
message with the current alert level. 
 After the final emergency action level, a general emergency, was declared, the 
sounding of the nuclear emergency sirens, the distribution of the press release, and the 
broadcast of the EAS message had to be done within 15 minutes and in the appropriate order. 
When residents in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant hear the sirens, they are to tune in 
to certain radio stations for instructions. Therefore, the team cannot broadcast the EAS 
message before the sirens are activated. As soon as David and Zahra learned the specific 
evacuation orders, Zahra immediately wrote the news release, using a template that contained 
all of the possible zones that surround the nuclear plant. After she completed the information 
and posted the zones that were identified for evacuation, which took a matter of minutes, she 
sent the draft by email to Philip, who was stationed at the power company’s headquarters, for 
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the first round of approvals. Once Philip got back to her with a verbal approval, she gave a 
hard copy to David, who passed it to the operations director for approval. In the meantime, 
Zahra also wrote the EAS message for broadcast, and she gave the text file to Jack on an 
external jump drive. They sent the EAS message from a computer in the communications 
center and did not want to waste time trying to find the file on the network. David came back 
into the public affairs room with signed approvals on the news release, and he and Jack 
headed to the communications center while Zahra and Leslie, the PR assistant, posted the 
news release on Web EOC and simulated distribution to the media.  
 When Jack, the Webmaster, and David, the PAO director, entered the 
communications center, it was very crowded and noisy, as other SEMA employees had to do 
their parts during this 15-minute, timed phase as well. For example, they had to inform all of 
the local communities near the power station of the evacuation measures before they could 
releases the EAS message, and the sirens had to be manually sounded after the EAS message 
was released. All of these activities happened from the communications center. Jack loaded 
the text message onto a computer and began to set up the software to send the text and the 
audio recording to the first radio station on the EAS network, and David attempted to quiet 
the chatter around him so he could start the recording. Using a small microphone, Jack 
carefully recorded his message, while David and the operations director looked over his 
shoulder to confirm the accuracy of each word. Then, with about four minutes remaining on 
the clock, Jack replayed the message, and once everyone was satisfied that it was correct, he 
sent the message to the radio station. Within minutes, the radio stations along the EAS 
network sent back confirmations that they had received the message. Jack and David 
breathed a sigh of relief that they completed the alert with time to spare, but then David 
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suddenly became concerned that all of the radio station employees may not have gotten the 
message that this was an exercise and that they should not broadcast the messages. The 
operations director chuckled at the thought of an Orson Welles-type event happening, but he 
quickly sobered at the thought of such a huge mistake. Jack, David, and the operations 
director were visibly nervous for the next few minutes until it became clear that the radio 
stations did not actually broadcast the evacuation orders to the public. 
 Throughout the morning, the PIOs were concerned with doing everything by the 
book, literally, as they following the radiological exercise manuals for each phase of the 
event. At times they double-checked with each other to make sure they were carrying out 
their respective responsibilities correctly. David, the PAO director, said that his anxiety was 
actually higher during an exercise than a real disaster, such as a hurricane, because of the 
faster pace and the constant scrutiny by FEMA evaluators. This evaluation added pressure to 
do everything perfectly in a timely manner created stress among the PIOs and gave the 
scenario a dose of reality. As the crisis evolved, rumors that people saw smoke and flames 
coming from the nuclear facility circulated among the local emergency management offices 
as well as the power company. As the PIOs received word of the rumors in the EOC, they 
checked with their sources in the field to confirm the facts, alerted the public inquiry center 
that takes calls from the community, and addressed the false rumors in media briefings. No 
matter how insignificant the rumors appeared to be, the PIO staff worked to squelch the 
misinformation to avoid panic and confusion among the media and the public. The PIOs 
committed a significant error early in the day, however, when they published incorrect public 
phone numbers for the disaster hotline in the first news release. No one had taken the 
initiative to call the phone number and verify it before publishing it in the release. Everyone 
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said they trusted the source of the phone number, and no particular person was in charge of 
verifying that information. Later in the day, an evacuation news release and the EAS message 
listed a city that was not slated for evacuation. The PIOs had taken the information from the 
operations director without comparing it to the maps posted in the executive briefing room, 
where the governor decided evacuation orders. Once again, the PIOs had relied on 
trustworthy sources of information and did not attempt to verify the facts. 
 The exercise guidelines allowed the PIOs to correct mistakes and repeat simulations 
of key procedures for the FEMA evaluator. After David discovered the mistake in the 
evacuation orders, Zahra quickly issued a revised news release, and Jack re-recorded the 
EAS message for distribution by radio stations. David assigned Jack the task of calling all 
phone numbers used in public documents to verify them, and Zahra wrote a revised news 
release that highlighted the corrected disaster hotline number.  
 By 12:40 p.m., the disaster scenario had advanced through all the emergency 
response phases, and the public affairs staff began to wonder how many more hurdles the 
FEMA evaluators would throw at them before the exercise ended. Within a few minutes, the 
acting governor left the EOC, signaling that the situation was under control, and the 
debriefings began. The PIOs seemed a bit exasperated that the exercise came to a halt 
without resolving some issues. Philip, who was serving as SEMA spokesperson at the power 
company headquarters, was still confused about the error in the evacuation news release and 
felt that he had not adequately corrected the situation on his end. Jack, the Webmaster, 
imagined the “thousands of people evacuating from around the power plant and being left 
stranded on the interstate,” remarking that he thought the entire situation would have been 
resolved before the exercise concluded. Zahra said she was disappointed that David abruptly 
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left the JIC to attend leadership debriefings without first giving his staff feedback on their 
performance. After such a frenzied day, the team members were still pumped with adrenaline 
and suddenly had nothing to do. Zahra pulled a travel Yahtzee game out of her purse and 
said, “OK, everyone, let’s play.” The PIOs spent the next half hour unwinding and having 
some laughs until David returned and sent everyone back to the office. 
 The five-hour radiological exercise had a realistic feel because of the fast-paced 
simulations. The public affairs staff shined during some moments, including when they beat 
the clock while recording and distributing the EAS message, and they faltered during others, 
such as when they made significant mistakes in two news releases. The following section 
summarizes the feedback provided by the players as well as formal evaluation by the FEMA 
radiological emergency preparedness office. 
 
Participant Feedback and Formal Evaluation 
 The day after the radiological exercise, I met with the PIOs to talk about the 
preceding day’s events, ask questions, and verify some of my observations. The staff 
members were generally pleased with their performance and thought that they executed the 
exercise well. Zahra, the PR writer, said that the new EOC facility made it easier to contact 
the people she needed to talk to, and that the public affairs office was not as chaotic and 
crowded as in the old facility. She said that during a recent hurricane, eight PR staff members 
were crammed into a tiny office in the former EOC that only had two desks. One person 
opened up a file drawer and used it as a table for his laptop. Zahra said that the technology 
and organization of the new facility made her job much easier. 
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 Jack agreed that the new facility was a factor in their success, but added that 
preparation was key for this complex drill. “Things went really well,” he said. “I was 
surprised how calm it was. I think we were just really prepared.” In the days before the drill, 
Jack had practiced the many steps involved in recording and broadcasting the EAS message. 
On the day of the exercise, he actually completed the message in less time than in practice, 
even though he worked under pressure in a noisy and crowded environment.  
 Leslie, the PR assistant, spent the days leading up to the exercise collecting names 
and contact information for the PIOs in the city and county government agencies. She said 
that some localities did not have a designated PIO, and that the contact information given to 
her by these localities changed on a daily basis. Up until the morning of the exercise, Leslie 
continued to receive corrections on the contact lists, which made her task of keeping the 
localities up-to-date throughout the exercise a difficult one. Leslie said that posting the news 
releases on Web EOC, rather than making hard copies or sending emails, was very efficient 
and created a history of events for anyone to follow throughout the day. 
 Philip, the outreach coordinator, spent the day of the exercise acting as the SEMA 
spokesperson at the power company headquarters, which was about 20 miles from the state 
EOC. He later explained to me that the separation from his colleagues during the drill was 
exacerbated by the fact that cell phones and other wireless devices did not work in the power 
company’s emergency operations center, which was located in a basement. He had to leave 
the EOC area, go to another room, and borrow a computer to check his emails. He also called 
the PIOs at the state EOC constantly throughout the day to gather information. Philip said the 
lack of access to communication resources delayed his response time for approval of news 
releases, and when he held mock news conferences, he didn’t always have the most up-to-
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date information. Normally, he would have held the press conferences on the grounds of the 
state EOC, but the power company communications staff was nervous about participating in 
such an important drill in a brand-new, untested facility.  
 Philip said that the lack of contact with his colleagues not only delayed his receipt of 
vital information, but also led him to second-guess some of his decisions. These issues led to 
mistakes that FEMA evaluators noticed. One error resulted directly from the information 
delay between the two EOCs. Philip did not get a copy of the news release announcing 
protective actions that farmers should take with their dairy animals before he went into a 
news conference. As he started reading his prepared statements, someone handed him a copy 
of the release, but he did not have the time to read it and include it in his comments. Because 
of the fast pace of the scenario, he never had the opportunity to discuss the protective actions 
in his news conferences. Another mistake occurred when Philip second-guessed his own 
knowledge of radiological emergencies during a simulated interview with a reporter. The 
reporter, who was in reality was a radiological expert with the power company, asked Philip 
if the state was recommending that residents of nearby communities take “K1” to prevent 
radiation poisoning. The medication that is used to protect the thyroid from radiation is 
potassium iodide, or KI, not K1. Even though Philip noticed that the “reporter” used the 
wrong term, he assumed that the radiological expert knew what he was talking about, and 
referred to K1 in his answer. He later realized that he was being tested on his subject 
knowledge and should not have let the player’s true credentials affect his judgment, 
especially on jargon that a reporter could have used incorrectly during an actual emergency. 
Philip believed that having closer contact with his colleagues during the drill may have 
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prevented these errors, and added that he looks forward to having all of the players located in 
the same building during the next radiological exercise. 
 David, the PAO director, restricted his comments to how they could change the 
public information procedures for future drills or disasters. He told the staff to notify the 
localities when they made changes in news releases, rather than simply sending a new 
version via email that they may not realize is different. He put Jack in charge of verifying all 
phone numbers printed in news releases and media advisories, and he told all staff to help 
confirm key information, such as evacuation zone numbers, before recording the EAS 
messages.  
 I accompanied David when he attended the public meeting that announced the results 
of the exercise. Although invited, no media or members of the general public attended, so the 
meeting served primarily as a post-exercise critique for the various players to get feedback 
from FEMA and the NRC. The FEMA exercise coordinator reinforced the importance of the 
radiological exercise, stating, “Any exercise helps us be more prepared for any emergency 
that comes along. Since 9/11, we have been raising the bar to be better prepared.” 
 The exercise summary explained that there were 61 evaluators involved in the day-
long exercise, judging 265 criteria observed from 47 locations. The event took place in 
multiple counties and cities, and included employees from the power plant, the power 
company headquarters, local fire departments and rescue squads, state police, hazardous 
materials (hazmat) teams, the governor’s office, several state agencies, a trauma hospital, and 
SEMA. Overall, each performance area received high marks, and the FEMA exercise 
coordinator stated that the evaluation team found no significant problems related to health or 
safety issues. The coordinator praised the public information component for effectively 
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coordinating communication between the state EOC and the power company, although Philip 
had indicated it had been a struggle to do so. The coordinator singled out PIOs for their 
ability to handle the complex crisis response actions. The only area that received a poor grade 
was the distribution of the erroneous EAS message, which the report noted was 
redemonstrated successfully. Many of the errors that I had noted during the exercise, 
including the two news releases that had errors and the mistakes that Philip had at the power 
company headquarters, were not noted during the briefing. I was not able to see a final 
written report, because the exercise team had not completed it before my research ended. 
David seemed very pleased with his team’s performance and received compliments from the 
SEMA leadership after the meeting.  
 Overall, the public affairs team had a successful exercise. The staff members reflected 
on the day’s events, took note of what worked and did not work, and resolved to avoid the 
same mistakes in the future. Although the PIOs committed some errors during the exercise, 
the FEMA evaluators acknowledged that the staff corrected those errors to their satisfaction. 
The public affairs staff celebrated their accomplishment only briefly, realizing that the next 
disaster exercise was just a few months away. 
 
Summary 
 I was able to observe the organizational attributes of SEMA’s public affairs office 
during both routine conditions and while responding to a disaster scenario during a 
radiological exercise. Table 4.2 summarizes the observed characteristics. The categories that 
emerged were organizational structure, accountability, relationships, priorities, resources and 
training, and evaluation. These groups of attributes differed depending on whether the public 
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affairs office was operating under normal conditions or crisis conditions. Structurally, when 
SEMA goes into disaster mode, the public affairs team increases its number of personnel, its 
authority over other governmental entities, and its scope of responsibilities. The PAO 
experiences a change in physical location, job descriptions, authorization procedures, 
priorities, and in its relationship with other government agencies. During crisis mode, the 
team members are more prepared and detect and correct errors faster than in routine mode. In 
addition, evaluation, which was nonexistent during routine times, becomes an important 
element after a crisis. Many of these changes may result from the greater consequences of a 
crisis situation and to the greater visibility of the public affairs staff during a crisis. 
 The changes in attributes that result from the public affairs office transitioning into 
crisis mode are significant because they suggest that the organizational attributes from 
routine mode are insufficient for responding to a disaster situation. The organization, 
therefore, adapts and takes on new characteristics for the duration of the crisis response. The 
next chapter discusses the results of interviews with SEMA PIOs in five states and compares 




Observed organizational attributes in SEMA’s public affairs office. 
Routine Mode Disaster Mode 
Structure 
SEMA PAO team has five staff members The JIC potentially has dozens of team members from reserves and other agencies 
PAO job titles are designed for general PR 
responsibilities 
JIC job titles are designed for disaster 
management responsibilities 
PAO is located in SEMA headquarters JIC is located in EOC 
Accountability 
PAO staff members have loosely defined 
responsibilities 
PAO staff members have clearly defined 
responsibilities 
SEMA reports to the secretary of public safety SEMA reports directly to the governor 
Approval process is slow and multi-tiered Approval process is multi-tiered yet expedited. 
PIOs have little individual autonomy PIOs have little individual autonomy 
Relationships 
PAO has strong relationship with media PAO has strong relationship with media 
PAO has strong relationship with other state, 
local, and federal agencies PAO oversees other state and local agencies 
PAO director is part of SEMA leadership, yet is 
ignored on some issues 
PAO director is an important advisor to the EOC 
management, and the PIO role in crisis is highly 
visible 
PAO works in collaboration with other state 
agencies to train and prepare for emergencies 
PAO has access to other state agency personnel 
and resources and manages the statewide public 
information efforts 
Priorities 
Everyday tasks can be interrupted and put on 
hold for “work-related fires” Disasters take priority 
Structured for issues management Structured for issues management and rumor control 
PIOs’ workload is built around long-term 
projects PIOs have short response times 
Lack of preparation or attention to detail Well-prepared and overzealous about details 
Slow to discover and correct errors Quick to discover and correct errors 
Resources and Training 
Reliance on technology for communication Reliance on technology for communication 
Multiple channels for internal communication Multiple channels for internal communication 
Reliance on media for information dissemination Reliance on media for information dissemination 
Coordinates statewide preparedness efforts Relies on statewide agencies for response 
Training and rehearsal for a variety of 
emergencies Every disaster response is a learning opportunity 
Evaluation 











RESULTS FROM INTERVIEWS 
 
 
 I interviewed five public information officers from different state emergency 
management agencies (SEMAs) in February 2006. The interviews served as a means of 
triangulating the results from my observations to look for discrepancies and similarities. 
Based on what I learned from my observations, I developed categories for further exploration 
with interviews. The interviews augmented my findings from the observations and provided 
another method to continue studying this type of organization.  
After conducting the five interviews, a common theme began to emerge: the response 
to every crisis is the same. The five PIOs, to whom I assigned the pseudonyms of Isabella, 
Mike, Gretchen, Lou, and Peggy, each has different stories to tell about their experiences in 
emergency management and how their agencies respond to crisis. Although the agencies’ 
structures or duties vary, the SEMAs shared some organizational attributes as well as an 
overarching goal of protecting lives and property from disasters and terrorist acts (see Table 
5.1). In addition to slight organizational differences, the agencies report to two different types 
of state entities. Three of the agencies report to their state’s version of a department of public 
safety, and two report directly to the governor’s office. In all but one agency, the public 
affairs office (PAO) reports to the agency director or to a departmental manager within the 
agency. The lead PIO in one SEMA, Peggy, is a press secretary appointed by the governor 
and assigned to manage the public information function for emergency management. 
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Because of this structure, Peggy has a much closer alliance with the governor and his staff 
than with the SEMA director. The smallest PAO team has two staff members, three have 




Summary matrix of environmental and organizational characteristics in five SEMA public 
affairs offices. 
 
Mode Characteristics Example Significance 
Reliance on 
technology 
"We depend on 
BlackBerries for quick 
approvals of news 
releases. Our releases are 
never held up. Technology 
has made everything so 
fast." 
PAOs' dependence on technology 
helps them communicate with other 
parties but can also be detrimental 
when communication systems fail. 
Reliance on the 
news media 
Activities center around 
the media during a crisis; 
good relationships with 
media pay off in stressful 
situations. 
SEMA PAOs do not have the 
resources to reach the public with 
preparedness or emergency 
messages on their own. 
Coordinating 
agency 
"We're a support agency." 
"Our mission is to 
coordinate a response and 
establish control." 
Disaster preparedness and 





"It's a normal day (a gas 
explosion has just 
happened). There's always 
some knucklehead…" 
Crises are not unexpected or 






Each PAO has established 
procedures that may 
include agency heads, the 
governor's office, and 
subject matter experts. 
Multi-layered approval process can 
prevent timely release of 
information,   but the approval 





Table 5.1 (continued) 
 
Mode Characteristics Example Significance 
Training and 
exercises 
All PAOs participate in 
training and exercises. 
The training and drills help the 




Job descriptions Some PAOs have job 
descriptions that are 
related to areas of 
emergency management 
rather than technical 
function (i.e., Webmaster 
or writer). 
These specific job responsibilities 
help PIOs develop relationships in 
the emergency management 
community and be prepared to 




PAOs work closely with 
state, local, and federal 
agencies as well as non 
profits to respond to crisis 
events. 
The PAOs learn about disaster 
preparedness and response from 
experts in other agencies. 
Reliance on 
reservists and 
PIOs from other 
agencies 
PIOs from other agencies 
not only provide additional 
personnel but also create 
liaisons with their home 
agencies 
PAOs do not have enough public 
affairs personnel on staff to manage 
a disaster event on its own. 
Strong chain of 
command 
The SEMAs employ the 
joint information center 
(JIC) structure. 
"The response is the same no 
matter what the disaster is." 
Change in 
responsibilities 
"During a disaster we all 
go into disaster mode 
where we all know our 
jobs, and it's like a 
machine, and it works." 
There is a clear distinction among 
the PAOs regarding disaster mode 
and routine mode. 
Change in 
priorities 
Some PAOs drop routine 
tasks to address the crisis, 
but one state PAO must 
negotiate routine 
workloads during the crisis 
response. 
The PAOs recognize the need to 
reallocate resources and personnel 





Some SEMAs routinely 
report to the governor, but 
others change from 
reporting to a state 
secretariat to the governor 
in an emergency. 
All SEMAs use the "shortest line to 





 The following section discusses the organizational characteristics that I was able to 
discern from my interviews with the five SEMA public information officers. As in the 
previous chapter, the discussion is separated according to routine, transition to crisis, and 
crisis. These working conditions emerged from the participant observation research and were 
used to organize the interview results to generate comparisons.  
 
Routine Public Affairs Tasks 
 I asked the five PIOs to describe to me what they did in a “normal” day. They were 
unanimous in saying that there is no “normal” day; however, at least one PIO said that a day 
full of emergencies is routine. I interviewed Peggy while a gas explosion was being 
investigated in her state, and she explained that the difference between a normal incident and 
a disaster is the scale of the event. “Today, it’s a normal day,” she said. “We always have 
some knucklehead trying to get into a nuclear power plant, or trying to blow something up 
every day. It just depends on how large it is.” Gretchen said there is no typical day in her 
PAO. “No one day is like the other. You never know what’s going to happen.” Gretchen 
considers routine duties to be proactive, whereas a crisis response is reactive. “We are more 
proactive in preparing the community for a disaster,” she said. “So we’re encouraging people 
to have a disaster supply kit and raising public awareness.” Other PIOs, however, suggested 
that their day-to-day work is more reactive as they respond to media inquiries and take on 
projects handed down from agency leaders or the governor’s office. Routine responsibilities 
tend to include typical public relations tasks, such as publications, long-term projects, media 
relations, and news releases. All of the PIOs agreed that crisis conditions signify that the state 
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has activated its emergency operations center or an equivalent field location to form a 
concerted response to a major crisis or disaster event. 
 Daily public information tasks include media relations, Web site management, 
publication development, public awareness campaigns, responding to citizen inquiries, and 
writing speeches for agency leaders. Other duties that the PIOs mentioned are grant writing, 
video production, writing articles for local magazines and newspapers, planning annual 
public safety conferences, and participating in training sessions. All PIOs play a part in 
statewide disaster preparedness. Lou provided this description of what he considers to be a 
normal day at his agency: 
 We respond to media on a variety of issues. That can include anything 
from a telephone conversation or interview to doing something on air, on 
camera, live, or recorded. I also work to get information out on our Web site 
and help coordinate any public things that we do. And I also work with our 
agency and other agencies to continue to prepare for if we have a big incident. 
(Lou, SEMA PIO) 
 
 Peggy, a press secretary, does more work for the governor’s office than the other 
PIOs because she works directly for him as a political appointee. She writes talking points for 
the governor, prepares the agency’s budget testimony for the senate and house committees, 
writes proclamations announcing various emergency preparedness weeks, and is planning a 
statewide homeland security conference. She and her deputy press secretary also do all the 
agency news releases, internal communications, and Web site maintenance. Peggy 
emphasized that she is the only person from SEMA who is allowed to talk to the media or do 
anything for public dissemination. Unlike some of the agencies that have more than one 
individual who is trained to serve as spokesperson, Peggy’s agency has one individual 
selected by the governor to represent the agency to the media. 
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 In contrast to the two PIOs in Peggy’s agency, Gretchen’s agency has six employees 
in the public affairs office. Gretchen and her colleagues have more specialized job 
descriptions than the other agencies: 
 Every person here in public affairs is dedicated to a different function. 
I do our publications; we have a quarterly magazine that goes out. I have a 
colleague that does the radiological preparedness [drills], so he goes down to 
the nuclear power plant exercises. We have a constituent services coordinator. 
She handles inquiries from the public and legislative people. We have a 
legislation liaison that works to develop legislation, we have a public affairs 
director, and a web coordinator who handles our web site. So we all have our 
specialties here. (Gretchen, SEMA PIO) 
 
Gretchen said that this PAO structure helps them to develop good relationships with 
other agency divisions, state legislators, the governor’s office, the media, and the public at 
large. Participants also identified planning statewide preparedness initiatives as a routine 
activity. These duties are described below.  
 
Statewide Preparedness Efforts 
 Emergency preparedness initiatives are integral to the states’ emergency management 
missions. Isabella explained that the primary mission of public affairs is to “provide 
information to the public that will help them be better prepared for emergencies and 
disasters.” For all of the state PIOs, their primary responsibility during non-emergency times 
appears to be coordinating disaster preparedness programs. These include seasonal disasters, 
such as tornadoes, hurricanes, and flooding; geological disasters, such as earthquakes and 
mudslides; and manmade disasters, including acts of terrorism and “white powder” incidents 
that may or may not be a bioterror agent such as anthrax. Newly diagnosed transmittable 
diseases were a hot topic at the time of my interviews in at least one of the states. Mike was 
coordinating a pandemic avian influenza summit with the governor’s office, and many of his 
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media calls were related to that topic as reporters worked to better understand the possible 
ramifications of this disease, should it reach the United States. 
 Lou emphasized the scope of the outreach programs that he and two other PIOs offer 
throughout his state. Lou’s two colleagues primarily do presentations for businesses, 
churches, schools, and community groups on terrorism and natural disasters. In 2005, the 
PAO gave presentations to about 47,000 people. One of the PIOs has earned the nickname of 
“the earthquake lady” because she has become known for her earthquake preparedness 
lectures. “If we’re going to have a ‘Katrina’ like event here, it’s going to be an earthquake,” 
said Lou. The other PIO on staff does a weekly radio show in a rural area of the state. “This 
guy is good at talking their language, so to speak, so it resonates with a lot of people in that 
part of the state,” said Lou. “For us, it’s a great bonus.” Lou said that the PIO has developed 
a loyal following for his show, which focuses on personal and family emergency 
preparedness. None of the other states’ PIOs whom I interviewed mentioned having a radio 
show as part of their outreach activities. 
 In addition to coordinating the earthquake and general emergency preparedness 
messages, Lou also manages the state’s seasonal campaigns including flood, lightning, winter 
weather, and fire safety awareness weeks. For these campaigns, the PAO works with the 
National Weather Service as well as the governor’s office to ensure consistent messages and 
statewide reach. Each PIO I interviewed mentioned similar involvement in seasonal 
preparedness campaigns. National Emergency Preparedness Month, sponsored by the federal 
Department of Homeland Security, offers states an opportunity to join in the national effort 
to increase public awareness of terrorism and natural disasters and explain how citizens can 
help themselves survive an event. Several PIOs said that they plan large-scale events and 
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media campaigns to take advantage of the nationwide publicity from DHS. Because these 
campaigns are scheduled annually, each PIO bases his or her annual planning around these 
events. 
 Each PIO had resources and procedures in place to accomplish his or her routine 
responsibilities. In the next section, interview participants discuss what they believe they 
need to get their jobs done effectively and efficiently.  
 
Resources and Procedures for Getting the Work Done 
 The PIOs discussed several specific resources and procedures that allow them to do 
the daily public information tasks and outreach programs discussed above. This section 
describes how the SEMA PIOs use technology, how they get approvals for information 




 Technology was mentioned by all PIOs as an asset for getting their work done; 
however, the amount and types of technology varied among the agencies. Isabella uses email 
to distribute news releases, while Lou and Gretchen use an in-house Web-based system, and 
Mike and Peggy subscribe to commercial services such as PR Newswire to disseminate 
media information. Peggy stated that BlackBerry wireless devices have helped expedite the 
news release approval process and made her job much easier. “I can’t live without [my 
BlackBerry],” she said. “I sleep with my BlackBerry – it’s right next to me.” Gretchen was 
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the only PIO who said that the technology afforded to the public affairs employees is 
insufficient: 
I would say it always seems that public affairs is sort of the 
afterthought, I think, in terms of technology. Like we have pagers but we 
don’t have BlackBerries and things like that. That’s one area where we always 
seem to be lacking. We would like to be able to access our email and have our 
phone right there. But we do have – in terms of keeping aware of what’s going 
on and the state communicating with our state EOC – we can do that pretty 
easily with our communications center. We can just call in, like I said we are 
each on call 24 hours a day at some point during the month, so we have to talk 
to them to find out what’s going on. That helps keep us in the loop for things. 
We’re just not cutting edge. (Gretchen, SEMA PIO) 
 
 Some of the state emergency management agencies also rely on Web-based 
communications technology to communicate internally as well as externally with media. 
Mike found that Web EOC, a Web-based software program used by many state and local 
EMAs, is an effective tool for communicating with PIOs at a remote location. He said his 
agency is currently testing Web EOC for posting news releases and taking questions from the 
media. Lou said that his agency Web site has a media access page that is password-protected. 
News outlets can register and log onto the site for routine information such as highway 
crashes or for updates during emergencies. 
 Gretchen said her agency has a proprietary Web program that she called a “virtual 
JIC” (joint information center; see Appendix V) that was developed with help from the U.S. 
Coast Guard. “They (the Coast Guard) are a great resource to have to pick their brains and to 
come up with different ideas because they really know PR and how to promote their agency,” 
she said. Gretchen added that her agency also works with other federal entities, but that she 
found the Coast Guard is the most media-friendly and understands their public information 
needs the best. The final result is an online communications system that does not rely on a 
single computer or an agency network and can be used anywhere. The virtual JIC has a 
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media database, a system for expediting news release approvals, and a public space where 
citizens can go for information. Gretchen and her colleagues put their virtual JIC to the test 
when a meeting of world leaders took place in their state. Prior to this meeting, the PIOs 
educated the media about the virtual JIC and encouraged them to register so they would have 
access to news releases, media advisories, and other information during the event. The PIOs 
took questions from the media online and posted frequently asked questions for all media 
outlets to see. Gretchen said this tool helped reduce the number of inquiries her office 
received during the prolonged international event.  
 In addition to technology support, the PIOs explained how they acquire news release 
approval in their respective agencies. The following section presents the advantages and 
disadvantages the participants see with their agencies’ procedures.  
 
News Release Approval Procedures 
  Because each SEMA has a slightly different organizational structure, the news release 
approval process varies as well. Isabella said that her agency’s approval procedures are both 
a help and a hindrance to her work. “News releases must be approved by the division 
administrator and usually also by the governor’s office,” she said. “Simple information 
requests, such as those from the general public, do not need administrator or governor’s 
office approval. However, if we are dealing with sensitive issues, we will have the 
administrator and/or governor’s office sign off.” Sensitive issues include controversial topics 
that the governor or his staff may want to address. She believes this process can slow 
communication with the public when the people who are required to sign off are not 
available, or when there “is disagreement among those in the approval process. Conversely, 
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the approval process that sometimes slows us down also helps us to get information out 
quickly [because] we always know who needs to see and approve before dissemination.” 
 Lou believes that his approval process is fairly simple: he sends news releases to the 
division director before they distribute them to the press. As the press secretary, Peggy has 
direct contact with the governor’s office and sends her releases directly to the governor’s 
chief of staff or his press secretary. The governor’s staff makes edits “for style” and then 
distributes it to the media. “Our press releases are never held up,” said Peggy. “When I 
worked for the [previous] administration, we waited for hours. But now, technology has 
made everything so fast.” Gretchen’s priority is to keep the agency management and the 
governor’s office informed, so she sends news releases primarily as a courtesy rather than for 
official approval. “They don’t like surprises,” she said. The governor’s office approves 
releases during emergencies.  
 Mike said his agency has a pragmatic approach to news release approvals: 
I always like to make sure the director has a shot at it. If there’s special 
subject knowledge involved, I make sure the person who’s best able to review 
it for accuracy reviews it. If we are working with the governor’s office, 
obviously they are involved in it, especially if he is quoted or we are talking 
about a governor’s program. It doesn’t make any sense to do a news release 
without a review process, just so it’s accurate and doesn’t miss anything.  
 
Mike’s no-nonsense approach comes in handy when he deals with obstacles that 
threaten to delay the release of information: 
I’ve been doing this so long that I don’t tolerate delays, and if there’s a 
delay I just go ahead without whatever’s delaying things. You can’t sit around 
and wait for bureaucrats to make sure that all the i’s are dotted and the t’s are 
crossed. I work directly with the director of the agency and the governor’s 
press office, so whatever needs to be done gets done.  
 
Mike suggested that his professional experience and his relationship with the 
leadership allow him to use his own judgment when necessary. An intolerance of 
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bureaucratic obstacles was not evident in the other four interviews. No one else indicated that 
they have ever moved ahead on the distribution of information without official approval.  
In summary, all five SEMA public information officers indicated they have routines 
in place for media release approval. Not all activities are routine, however. The next section 
describes how the PIOs shift their agency’s resources, routines, and procedures discussed 
above to respond to a crisis. 
 
Transition from Routine to Crisis 
 Each PIO has a different approach to the transition to disaster mode. Some PIOs work 
more from behind the scenes, while others are highly visible and work side-by-side with the 
governor. Most of the PIOs drop their routine duties during a crisis response, but one stated 
that his agency has to juggle daily responsibilities during a crisis. No matter how they 
approach a crisis, they all agree that there is a difference between “routine” and “disaster 
mode.” For the SEMAs, disaster mode signifies that the states have activated an emergency 
operations center (EOC) to respond to a crisis situation. The following sections address 
aspects of disaster management, including activation of the EOC, recruitment of additional 
personnel, and the use of a joint information center (JIC). 
 
Activation of State Emergency Management 
 According to respondents, state agencies technically cannot respond to an emergency 
until localities request help or the disaster reaches beyond the boundaries of several local 
jurisdictions. The SEMA PIOs can, however, offer their support early on. Gretchen said that 
she and her colleagues will contact counties, especially if they are small and may not have a 
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full-time PIO, and offer help responding to media inquiries, writing news releases, or posting 
information on the Internet. This early contact makes it easier to get up to speed later on 
when local officials request state disaster assistance. Peggy, however, said she is less likely 
to offer assistance until someone asks for it. As she explained, “Every disaster is local, and 
until the counties say to us, ‘we need your help,’ we’re not in it. We are kind of hands off 
until you tell us you need us.” 
 Isabella’s agency is representative in the way that the PIOs drop everything and 
concentrate all their efforts on the disaster response. She explained that the PIOs have to be 
prepared for a long-term response that may keep them away from their routine duties for a 
long period of time. 
During a crisis situation all else is put on the backburner. Crisis 
situations range from those that are fairly small-scale, such as an incident 
where white powder is found at a business and we may work the issue for one 
or two days, to a larger-scale emergency or disaster, such as a tornado or 
flooding, that may last several weeks or months. Large or small, crisis 
situations usually invite a great deal of attention from the media, so our 
activities will center around taking media questions, setting up interviews or 
providing information, setting up news conferences, writing and distributing 
news releases, providing information to the public through the media and via 
our division Web site. (Isabella, SEMA PIO) 
  
 Lou’s agency is unique in that the PIOs have responsibilities for areas beyond 
emergency management. The department he works in includes the driver’s licensing office, 
state highway patrol, bureau of criminal identification (i.e., background checks and weapons 
permits), state crime lab, and the state police academy. When a crisis emerges, he and his two 
colleagues coordinate the workload so that the routine responsibilities are not neglected 
during an emergency. 
 When a crisis emerges, Peggy, a press secretary, has a hands-on role that surpasses 
what respondents referred to as typical PIO duties, such as writing news releases and fielding 
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media calls. She becomes personally involved in disaster assessment and advises the 
governor on requests for federal assistance. She quickly sets up press conferences to give the 
public an update on the situation as she learns it herself. 
Our typical disaster mode is, once there is a disaster . . . let’s say 
flooding. If there’s flooding in a certain area that’s substantial, we then, once 
the weather dies down and we can get into the air, we go up and do flyovers. 
We do have satellite trucks; in the past we deployed our satellite trucks for 
video to shoot back to the governor. But in this case we took our camera crew 
with us, because we have our own internal camera crews. We just did one in 
April. . . . We went up in the helicopters with the governor, we did the 
flyovers first, we flew over, we ran the rivers, we looked at the damage, we 
shot the damage with the cameras, and took the footage. That’s all done in a 
day. Then we can send an expedited request to the president. The governor 
can say, this is what I saw. This is what is going on in my counties, and we 
need your help. . . . That’s how we shift into disaster. And sometimes if it’s 
large enough we’ll take the governor with us, it just depends on how big it is 
and what’s going on. We can then land and do a press conference with him. 
At least it shows we’re doing something, we’re here to help. (Peggy, SEMA 
press secretary) 
 
 Although each state has a different procedure for gearing up for a crisis response, all 
interviewees described similar needs to recruit additional personnel to handle the workload 
brought on by a crisis. 
 
Recruitment of Public Affairs Personnel 
The SEMA PIOs believe the most vital resource for the public affairs office is 
personnel. During a crisis, they need more than the handful of full-time employees that each 
agency has dedicated to public affairs. Isabella said that she can pull in other department staff 
or PIOs from other state agencies when needed. Mike mentioned that he can request 
assistance from the governor’s press office, but that PIOs from many of the other responding 
agencies would work from their own agencies’ emergency operations center, rather than 
from a central EOC. Gretchen did not indicate that her agency brings in PIOs during a 
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disaster; however, her agency conducts statewide PIO training several times a year. Peggy 
said that once she decides to activate the JIC in her state, she brings in press secretaries from 
the agencies that are part of the response. Her state also provides crisis communication 
training for PIOs throughout the state. 
Lou’s agency had a unique approach to staffing the emergency operations center or 
field sites during an emergency. Lou coordinates a PIO association for his state, which is free 
for members of state and local government agencies to join. The association members meet 
on a regular schedule for training and networking. “It started out as mostly police and fire 
departments, but it’s gradually expanded,” said Lou. “We are seeing more city PIOs even and 
other agencies. So it’s a pretty good group of people. It’s a good way to coordinate and have 
some regular training and get to know the other PIOs that you might be working with in a big 
disaster.” When a crisis emerges, Lou and his SEMA colleagues can send a request for help 
on the association listserv, but he has found that the members often call him first to offer 
their help. For example, after Hurricane Katrina, several hundred evacuees were sent to a 
military base in his state. Once the association members learned what was happening, they 
contacted Lou and volunteered to work at the joint information center at the site of the 
evacuee camp. Lou said he was so overwhelmed with offers of help that he had to turn away 
some PIO volunteers. Lou said that the PIO association has been so effective that he is 
developing a series of training sessions and exercises that will allow the members to test their 
emergency response capabilities. 
 Once the public affairs offices have secured the necessary staff for an emergency 
response, they have to organize the additional personnel in an effective manner. All of the 
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states follow the joint information center concept that is described below to coordinate the 
public information function. 
 
The Joint Information Center 
 For many SEMA PIOs, activation of a joint information center by the lead PIO, either 
in the state EOC or in a remote field location, signals the beginning of disaster mode. Some 
states have their own terminology or guidelines for a JIC, but they all operate essentially the 
same way. Every public information function is accounted for in the organizational structure, 
such as news release writers, media monitors, graphic designers, photographers, 
spokespersons, translators, and administrative support. Members of a JIC may come from 
multiple state, local, and federal agencies. The goal of a JIC is to coordinate all public 
information during the disaster response and recovery phases to ensure consistency, 
accuracy, and timely dissemination. 
 Peggy said that roles and procedures are clearly spelled out during a crisis. “During a 
disaster, we all go into ‘disaster mode,’ where we all know our jobs,” she said. “It’s like a 
machine, and it works.” For Mike, an EOC with a JIC is a critical element for 
intergovernmental cooperation in a disaster situation. “It’s just a matter of recognizing that 
something is larger than a single agency and making sure that everybody is working 
together,” he said. He also believes that this realization can be hard when each agency has a 
different role to play in the crisis. 
If you are at the department of the environment, and the media is [sic] 
calling, and you have 15,000 gallons of gasoline presumably spilling into a 
nearby waterway, that is your only concern. You know it might be a terrorism 
incident, it might be an accident. You are not trying to save lives, although 
obviously first responders are. You are not doing traffic back-ups. . . . You are 
thinking about your issue, and the same is true of any other agency that finds 
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itself in the middle of something like that. Only when you activate an EOC do 
you begin to bring that awareness into play. Nobody sees beyond their own 
responsibilities and concerns, and that is normal, but it has potential from a 
communications perspective to create problems. (Mike, SEMA PIO) 
 
 Gretchen said that when her office implements a JIC she and her colleagues staff it 
around the clock. She also stressed the importance of intergovernmental cooperation during 
the crisis response: “We are doing fact sheets, coordinating with the governor’s office to 
keep them in the loop, working with our fellow state agencies, because you can’t have a 
disaster in a bubble. . . . So we are all singing from the same page, but we’re also aware of 
each other’s [role] to be sure we don’t step on each others’ toes, but we all have the same 
message.” The PIO responsibilities in the JIC also include coordinating dignitary visits and 
media tours of the disaster sites. They work closely with communications personnel from 
nonprofit emergency response agencies, such as the American Red Cross and religious 
organizations. Isabella said that, in addition to public information duties, her office usually 
gets assigned “special projects” during a crisis, such as making travel arrangements for 
visiting dignitaries, setting up a location for officials to meet, and arranging meals for state 
officials on site. 
 Once again, Lou’s agency has a unique attribute that the other state PIOs did not 
mention. He chairs a JIC Committee composed of representatives from the departments of 
health, transportation, natural resources, and human services, as well as the National Guard. 
The JIC Committee works to promote the use of JICs throughout the state, keeps a database 
of resources that agencies may need in the event of a major disaster, and coordinates real-
world exercises that allow the PIOs to practice emergency public communication. Because 
earthquakes are a viable threat in his state, Lou said the committee also keeps a list of 
alternate JIC locations in the event that the state EOC, where the JIC is normally housed, is 
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damaged. Lou and his colleagues used the database of resources during the Hurricane Katrina 
evacuations in 2005 to set up a remote JIC near the evacuee camp on a military base. 
 This section described how the public affairs offices in various state emergency 
management agencies initiate “disaster mode” and reorganize themselves into a joint 
information center. The next section gives examples of crises that the PIOs have encountered 
and illustrates how the SEMA PIOs function during a crisis. 
 
Crisis Response in the Public Affairs Office 
 During my interview with Mike, he explained that he views a crisis situation as fitting 
in one of three categories: “the obvious emergency situation,” such as a hurricane that can be 
predicted; “the exercise situation,” such as a radiological drill; and “the suddenly-nobody’s-
sure-who’s-in-charge-and-everybody-wants-a-piece-of-the-action situation,” such as the 
terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. He said that the third category, chaos, offers the most 
potential for communication failures. The other PIOs did not break down crises into specific 
categories when they discussed examples of disasters that they face. 
 The following story, as told by Mike, describes a chaotic situation that he experienced 
that had several unknown variables. In this case, the various responding agencies did not 
communicate with each other, and as a result the media and the public received inconsistent, 
unsubstantiated information from multiple sources. Mike explained that he and his agency 
learned from this experience how to better coordinate emergency responses. This event, 
which took place after September 11, 2001, illustrates many of the issues that emergency 
management PIOs face when responding with other agencies to a serious incident. 
 It wasn’t a big emergency, but it was an incident and it was clear that a 
lot of people were busy working it from a communications side but were not 
133 
 
necessarily talking to each other. It was a tractor-trailer hauling gasoline that 
went over a guardrail, over an overpass, and came down on [an interstate 
outside a large city], and obviously blew up. There was a big fire, and there 
were cars caught up in it. A lot of different agencies had a piece of it, like 
state police, environment, [SEMA], the governor’s office, transportation, state 
highway administration, and it was uncoordinated for a while. No one – I  
don’t think this will happen again; as long as I’m here it won’t happen – no 
one stopped to find out who were the players involved here and how do we 
make sure we’re all working together. It was one of those very unusual 
situations where it was possibly terrorism, there were environmental issues, 
the local jurisdiction was in charge, but the state highway administration had a 
piece, and the state police were involved. And it was interesting. (Mike, 
SEMA PIO) 
  
 Lou also addressed the difficulty that he has experienced when trying to coordinate a 
multi-agency response while working under chaotic conditions. “That can be a challenge 
when you are dealing with a complex issue, a complex disaster,” he said, “and there are a lot 
of response agencies involved coming in with different perspectives and sometimes different, 
I don’t think agendas is the right word, but viewpoints on those sorts of things.” Lou added 
that many state and local agency PIOs were activated for a major sporting event a few years 
ago, and that the experience helped them learn how to work together. However, he said the 
cooperation is still not perfect. 
 Peggy experienced a near-disaster that would have allowed little or no time to warn 
the public. Her agency took a call from a foreign embassy claiming that a bomb was onboard 
a train that was heading toward the state capitol.  
The Secret Service and FBI were on the conference call with the 
governor, and I was on the call, and I was sitting there thinking, ‘we’re 
screwed, we’re really screwed at this point.’ What do you do? We were just 
looking at each other like, damn. At this point it was a threat, so we’re just 
kind of figuring out…. They stopped the train so they could use sniffing 
helicopters, some kind of sniffing helicopters that can [detect] nuclear bombs 
and WMD; not sure what they are called. We were called back about 20 
minutes later to say stand down, it’s a non-threat. But for half an hour there, 




 Even though it proved to be a false report, the situation became tense and chaotic 
while they tried to gather information. She felt fortunate that all of the agencies were able to 
cooperate while gathering the information they needed without terrifying the public. The next 
section describes how the leadership changes in some agencies when they respond to crises 
such as those described above. 
 
Hierarchy in Disasters 
 Once the agency PIOs transition to disaster mode, they usually alter the routine 
approval process for information dissemination to include other government entities that may 
have an important role in the response, such as transportation or law enforcement agencies. 
Isabella, who routinely has her news releases reviewed by both agency and governor’s office 
officials, is the only person who said that the approval process does not change during a 
crisis. For the others, there may be more players involved in the process, but they believe it 
has a faster turnaround time than under normal working conditions. For example, Peggy, a 
press secretary, normally sends her news releases to the governor’s office for review, and 
they also send it to PR Newswire. During an emergency, when she often works after hours or 
needs to get information out quickly, Peggy can send releases to PR Newswire herself. 
Gretchen adds the governor’s office to her approval routing, and Lou has a specific news 
release approval form he uses to ensure that all the appropriate parties review information 
before it is distributed. 
 During an emergency, Mike’s agency switches from reporting to the military 
department to reporting directly to the governor. “It recognizes that you don’t need layer 
upon layer of bureaucracy,” said Mike, “or even if it’s a good bureaucracy in an emergency, 
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you need the shortest line possible to the person in authority.” Mike and his colleagues work 
closely with the governor’s press office on a routine basis, so the transition is generally 
seamless for communications. By working directly for the governor’s office, Mike and his 
colleagues are able to get the resources and assistance they need to respond to a disaster. 
 Although Lou’s department does not report to the governor, Lou said that SEMA has 
a close relationship with him and his administration. During a disaster, this relationship 
becomes an asset. 
The one thing that we have that I think helps us is our governor is very 
interested in our state’s preparedness for a terrorist event or natural disaster. 
He is very keyed in to what is happening and wants our state to be prepared. 
As an example, he had been in office for maybe a week when we had the first 
presidentially declared disaster. So it was baptism by fire, and even before that 
happened he was in wanting to know what our response would be if 
something big happened. So that’s definitely a bonus. It helps to have the 
governor of your state interested and tuned in to what’s happening in your 
area. (Lou, SEMA PIO) 
 
 In most of the agencies, the altered hierarchy tends to flatten the management 
structure and reduces the distance between the emergency responders to the governor and 
other key decision makers.  Many of the PIOs suggest that this helps to ensure consistent 
messages from all government agencies that are involved in disaster response. The next 
section describes how the PIOs work with the media during crises. 
 
Media Relations in Disasters 
 For SEMA PIOs, a disaster is synonymous with media attention. As Isabella 
observed, “Large or small, crisis situations usually invite a great deal of media attention.” 
Overall, the PIOs spoke of a cooperative relationship with the media, rather than an 
adversarial one. They, and their agency leaders, recognized the importance of working with 
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the media to inform the public during a disaster situation. Many of the resources that the 
PIOs mentioned were designed to make it easier to communicate with the media, such as 
Web EOC, news release distribution services, and proprietary Internet-based information 
programs to which reporters may subscribe. The PIOs also provided training sessions for the 
news media to help them effectively cover the event. For example, Gretchen’s agency held a 
meeting for all news assignment directors prior to a conference of international leaders to 
educate them about their public information resources and help them be more prepared for 
the upcoming event.  
 Lou believed that good relationships with the media can pay off during chaotic 
situations, and that the agency leadership’s attitude toward the media can make a big 
difference in that relationship. “It helps that we have a commissioner and most of our 
directors that are media-friendly and understand the importance of maintaining a level of 
transparency and openness and responsiveness to the media,” he said. “The media by and 
large understand that our policy is to be open . . . so that tends to help when you get in those 
stressful situations with tough stories and those sorts of things.” 
 Respondents explained that the joint information center concept was developed 
around the need to inform the media with consistent, accurate, and timely messages. By 
having all of the PIOs in one location, they believe that reporters do not have to consult with 
multiple spokespersons and sort out the various information that they collect, especially 
when timing is critical. Lou said that for the JIC to be effective, all of the key players need to 
be part of it. When he learns that other agencies or organizations that he has not included in 
the JIC, such as a school board, begin to talk with the media independently, he works with 
them to get them to synchronize their messages. “What they say can impact what we are 
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doing as a government agency,” said Lou. “So it’s a challenge to be sure that all the different 
entities are on the same page.” 
 Although he has a good relationship with media in his state, Lou said that reporters 
and editors do not always share SEMA’s priorities. “I think it’s a challenge trying to keep 
stories in the media focused on ways that are going to help the public get the information 
they need… or get [the messages] out accurately or not bury them in other stories that they 
are trying to do,” said Lou. Lou said this can become especially difficult during a prolonged 
crisis when the media turn to other stories while the public still needs to know about post-
disaster issues such as water quality or disaster assistance. 
 All of the PIOs indicated that they had a good relationship with news media and that 
they work to cultivate that relationship during routine times. At least one agency invests in 
that relationship by educating reporters on the media resources offered by SEMA. Although 
the PIOs rely on the media to disseminate public information during a crisis, they 
acknowledge that the media do not always share their goals. 
 
Results Summary and Conclusion 
 This chapter detailed the results from my interviews with five public information 
officers who work for different state emergency management agencies. The PIOs offered a 
glimpse into the daily work of a SEMA public affairs office, explained how their offices 
make the transition from routine responsibilities to respond to a crisis, and described how 
they function organizationally during a crisis. Although there were some variations in their 
responses, one common theme emerged: The organizational response to a crisis is always the 
same, no matter the nature of the crisis.  
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 Peggy and Lou provided examples of why they believe the response to all crises is the 
same. Peggy, a press secretary who works directly for the governor of her state, described 
how her agency brings together various PIOs to train for an annual radiological exercise. 
PIOs from other agencies who would not be involved in a power plant emergency often 
request to observe the exercise in action. Peggy explained that these PIOs use this 
observation as a learning experience, because, “The response is the same, no matter what the 
disaster is.” PIOs in Lou’s state rehearse using the joint information center structure for an 
annual chemical weapons stockpile emergency drill. Lou said that, although the exercise “is 
pretty specific to one topic, which is chemical weapons [accident] response, a lot of the 
procedures and a lot of the general philosophies for how to run a JIC can be translated to 
other incidents.”  
 The common element in a disaster response is a joint information center, or a state’s 
own version of the organizational structure for crisis communication. Each state has different 
numbers of full-time staff members, different projects that they do on a routine basis, and 
different chains of command. When these SEMAs transition into disaster mode, the PIOs 
tend to change their reporting structure, adjust their procedures for information 
dissemination, recruit additional personnel, and bring state and local PIOs from other 
agencies together into one team. This transition to disaster mode was the same whether it was 
for a power plant accident, an explosion on the interstate, a major flood, or a hurricane. They 
also used this structure during potentially chaotic times as well, such as for the major 
sporting event in Lou’s state or for the world leaders’ conference in Gretchen’s state. The 
only elements that would prevent the PIOs from activating a JIC would be time and scale. 
During the train bomb scare, for example, Peggy said that the emergency was over within 30 
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minutes. Had the bomb threat been real, she would have activated a JIC as part of the 
response. Also, the PIOs said they would not activate a JIC for minor incidents, such as 
earthquakes that do not cause major damage or injuries, or a wildfire that does not threaten 
homes or businesses. 
 Table 5.2 summarizes the organizational traits that I was able to determine from the 
five interviews. The key categories of attributes, which also emerged in the results discussion 
from the participant observations, are organizational structure, accountability, relationships, 
priorities, resources and training, and evaluation. Similar to the observation results, the 
attributes derived from the interviews differed according to “routine mode” and “disaster 
mode.” The public affairs teams must increase their staffs, their authority over other 
governmental entities, and the scope of their responsibilities to adequately respond to a 
public crisis. The PIOs work in a different location, follow new job descriptions, adjust their 
approval procedures, and take on new priorities. Once again, evaluation, which is nonexistent 
during routine times, based on remarks made in both the observations and the interviews, 
becomes an important element after a crisis. The differences between routine and crisis 
modes may be due to the greater consequences of an emergency situation and to the greater 
visibility of the public affairs staff during the response. 
 The fact that the organizational structure is either enhanced or altered to meet the 
demands of a crisis suggests that the routine structure is not adequate for emergency 
response. The greatest changes appear to occur after the crisis hits and the SEMAs activate 
an emergency operations center. The resulting organization looks very different from the 
organization in routine mode. 
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 There are some differences between the results from my observations and the 
interviews. These differences may be due in part to the different methods of data collection. 
The phone interviews prevented me from being able to observe the nuances of organizational 
life, while the six-week participant observation provided me with rich data. The differences 
may also be the result of the variations in each department’s structure. They are worth noting, 
however, to illustrate that although the various SEMA organizations are not identical, they all 
adapt to emergency situations in similar ways. 
 Most of the differences are found in the “routine mode” column of the organizational 
attributes charts (see Tables 4.1 and 5.1). The SEMAs who participated in the interviews 
appear to have more specialized job descriptions, tend to have more direct contact with the 
governor’s office, and demonstrate more individual autonomy under routine conditions than 
the SEMA that I observed. The five SEMAs who I interviewed also reported more routine 
contact with media and more coordination of messages with other agencies. The SEMA that I 
observed demonstrated more attention to issues management and media monitoring, and paid 
more attention to long-term projects than the other agencies.  
 There are fewer significant differences in the “disaster mode” columns between the 
SEMA that I observed and the five SEMAs that participated in the interviews. Two of the 
PIOs I interviewed suggested that they have individual autonomy during crises, but this was 
not apparent during my participant observation. None of the PIOs I interviewed mentioned 
that rumor control is a large part of their disaster response, while it was a top priority for the 
SEMA that I observed. Otherwise, the SEMAs as a group shared most of the attributes of 
disaster mode. All of the SEMA organizations look very similar when fully engaged in a 





Organizational attributes derived from interviews with five SEMA public affairs officers. 
 
Routine Mode Disaster Mode 
Structure 
SEMA PAO teams have two to six staff members 
The JIC (or a state’s equivalent) potentially has 
dozens of team members from reserves, PIO 
associations, and other agencies 
PAO job titles are designed for general PR 
responsibilities 
JIC job titles are designed for disaster 
management responsibilities 
Accountability 
Some states have specialized PAO positions, 
while others have more loosely defined roles 
PAO staff members have clearly defined 
responsibilities 
Two state SEMAs report directly to the governor, 
and three report to a department of public safety 
One SEMA that normally reports to a secretariat 
reports to the governor during a disaster; the 
other four stay the same 
News release approval procedures vary on 
whether they include the governor’s office 
One state adds governor’s office approval on 
news releases, and one adds EOC management 
Two PIOs demonstrate autonomy in their work Two PIOs demonstrate autonomy in their work 
Relationships 
PAO has strong relationship with media PAO has strong relationship with media 
PAO has strong relationship with other state, 
local, and federal agencies PAO oversees other state and local agencies 
All indicated close relationship with agency 
leadership or governor’s office 
All indicated close relationship with agency 
leadership or governor’s office 
PAO works in collaboration with other state 
agencies to train and prepare for emergencies 
PAO has access to other state agency personnel 
and resources and manages the statewide public 
information efforts 
Priorities 
For most states, priorities are dictated by the 
day’s events or political requests 
Disasters take priority, except in one state that 
juggles multiple priorities 
Proactive in preparing communities for crises Reactive in responding to crises 
Responding to media inquiries is a top duty Responding to media inquiries is a top duty 
Coordinating messages with other agencies Keeping the governor informed while coordinating messages with other agencies 
Resources and Training 
Rely on technology for communication, although 
each state varies in the resources for PR 
Rely on technology for communication, although 
each state varies in the resources for PR 
Multiple channels for internal communication Multiple channels for internal and media communication 
Rely on media for information dissemination Rely on media for information dissemination 
Coordinate statewide training Rely on statewide agencies for response 
Training and rehearsal for a variety of 
emergencies Every disaster response is a learning opportunity 
Evaluation 
Little or no formal evaluation Formal after-action reports 
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 Figure 5.1 illustrates how a SEMA public affairs organization adapts its behavior as it 
transitions from routine mode to disaster mode. As a public affairs office faces chaos, it can 
adapt by changing its structure, processes, and routines. The attributes that allow it to 
function in chaos are amplified as the organization converts from its routine structure to a 
crisis structure, the joint information center (JIC). The JIC offers the most coherent form of 
organization for a public affairs office to communicate during a disaster situation. As a result, 
the PAO is able to respond to disasters and other crises in a coordinated manner. They would 




The level of organizational adaptability as a SEMA public affairs office 




 This chapter described the results of my interviews with the five SEMA PIOs and 
compared those results with my participant observation. The six SEMA organizations 
increase in similarity as they respond to a crisis stimulus. The next chapter examines the 
              JIC activation 
 
     EOC activation 
 
            Crisis Mode 
 
 Recognition of Crisis 
 
       Issues Management 
 













Transition from Routine Mode to Crisis Mode
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theoretical application of the findings from the participant observations and interviews and 











DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The preceding chapters provided a description of my observations of a state 
emergency management public affairs office and details from my interviews with public 
information officers from five state emergency management agencies. This chapter compares 
those findings to the theoretical framework offered by high reliability organizations (HRO) 
and presents a new theoretical explanation of how crisis-mandated state agencies manage 
crisis communication.  
 
High Reliability in SEMA Public Affairs  
 The state emergency management agencies’ (SEMA) public affairs offices (PAO) 
displayed organizational characteristics that support those from HRO theory. Table 6.1 lists 
the SEMA attributes discussed in Chapters IV and V and their corresponding HRO attributes. 
As shown in the table, all of the primary elements of HROs are apparent in the six PAOs as a 






Comparison of organizational attributes from state emergency management public affairs 
offices and high reliability organizations. (HRO categories adapted from Roberts, 1990.) 
 
Attributes Derived from Interviews and 
Participant Observation Corresponding HRO Attributes 
Environmental & Organizational Elements 
Issues Management Preoccupied with failure Mindfulness 
Rumor control Reluctance to simplify  
Media monitoring 
Weather forecasts Sensitivity to operations  
Learning from mistakes during exercises 
and emergencies Commitment to resilience  
PAO managers part of upper management 
Consult with subject-matter experts Deference to expertise  
Mission to protect lives and property Consequences are catastrophic Issues 
A disaster is bigger than one agency 
Crises may span several jurisdictions Scale  
Emergencies or exercises are fast-paced 
The unexpected is routine High velocity environment  
JIC unifies governmental response  Common goals  
Relationship with media 
Reliance on technology 
Intergovernmental relations 
Tight coupling  
Organizational Actions & Practices 
Basic PIO classes 




Draft other state agency PIOs 
Call in PIO association members 
Redundancy  




JIC roles are clearly described Specified job functions  
Communication with leadership 
Agency-wide emails and alerts 
Public Outreach 
Direct information sources  
Exercises for risk industries 
Exercises for terrorism preparedness 
Exercise with baffling 
interactions  
JIC activates statewide PIOs Redundancy Response to tight coupling 
PIOs are assigned specific functions Job specialization  
Drop routine tasks to respond to crisis 
Approval process expedited for crisis 
JIC structure can be adapted to crisis 
System flexibility  
SEMAs flatten hierarchy and report directly 
to the governor during crises Hierarchical differentiation  
Juggle daily routines with crisis response Bargaining/negotiation  
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 After observing a SEMA public affairs staff in action and interviewing other state 
public information officers (PIOs), I realized that the organizations operate differently while 
doing daily, routine tasks, than they do while responding to an emergency. The policies, 
procedures, and routines that the staff followed while conducting normal public relations 
activities changed when a crisis threatened or emerged. In addition, I identified some HRO 
attributes in one phase but not the other, and I identified other organizational characteristics 
that are not explained by HRO theory. When a public affairs office was fully engaged in 
“disaster mode,” the organization looked much different than the PAO in “routine mode.”  
 The conditional differences in the SEMA organizational attributes are not made 
evident by a simple comparison of SEMA and HRO attributes. This realization required that 
I take another look at the crisis response process. Therefore, I separated the following 
discussion of organizational elements found in SEMAs according to routine and crisis.  
  
HRO Environmental and Organizational Attributes 
under Routine Conditions 
  
 Public affairs offices in emergency management agencies look much like the public 
affairs offices of most organizations. They produce typical public relations artifacts, such as 
publications, news releases, Web sites, and campaign materials. They respond to media 
inquiries, arrange interviews with reporters, and track stories about their organization in the 
news. When HRO attributes are applied to these routine responsibilities, however, a better 





 David’s agency practiced issues management on a daily basis. In addition to watching 
the news and alerting agency leadership of potential issues, the PIOs also monitor media 
inquiries, emails to the agency Web site, and information posted on online emergency 
management pages. Issues management supports the concept of sensitivity to operations, a 
strategy of mindfulness in HROs. In sensitivity to operations, personnel become aware of all 
of the activities going on in an organization so that they understand how their actions may 
affect other functions. Agency employees keep a close watch of signals from weather 
forecasts because SEMA employees anticipate that any change in the weather can create a 
problem for travel, public safety, or public services. Based on the information they receive 
from these sources, the PIOs consult with agency leadership and then may decide to generate 
news releases or media calls in response to hot issues. This constant watch of the weather 
supports another HRO strategy of mindfulness, a reluctance to simplify, because the staff 
members are aware that even small storms could produce flooding, damaging hail, and 
lightning (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
 While doing daily tasks and long-term projects, the PAO staff did not appear overly 
concerned about succeeding. David’s lack of preparation for the radiological exercise 
training sessions and the simple mistakes made while organizing the EOC grand opening do 
not support the HRO concept of a preoccupation with failure. When mistakes were made, 
David or his staff corrected them, but they did not discuss how to prevent those mistakes 
from happening again. As illustrated by the above examples, the PAO actions do not support 
the concept of a commitment to resilience during routine times, which would imply that the 
staff would resolve to avoid those errors in the future. On several occasions, others 
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overlooked or discounted the public affairs staff during decision making, such as when the 
PIOs were not informed of the launch of the state employee terrorism preparedness training. 
Therefore, the attribute of deference to expertise also was not supported by the research. This 
concept also applies to the PIOs seeking out experts, but this was rarely mentioned by any of 
the participants (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Likewise, the interviews with state PIOs did not 
support the theoretical concepts of a preoccupation with failure, a commitment to resilience, 
or deference to expertise under routine conditions.  
 An explanation for a lack of these concepts under routine working conditions may be 
due to the absence of major consequences and the lower visibility of public affairs staff. The 
PIOs typically do not deal with life-and-death situations in their day-to-day tasks, unlike in 
disaster situations. Also, there is less media coverage of SEMA activities when there is no 
imminent crisis. It appears that these attributes may help the SEMA staff avoid some errors 
made in routine projects, and that a preoccupation with failure in particular may be an asset 
to stress the importance of the public affairs function during the emergency exercise training 
sessions. The next section will discuss the HRO issues that emerged during my research. 
 
Issues 
 Four issues emerged during routine PAO activities that support HRO environmental 
and organizational characteristics: the issues of scale, common goals, tight coupling, and a 
high-velocity environment (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Part of the SEMA mission is to 
prepare all state, county, and city government agencies for disaster prevention and response. 
They also work with other agencies, such as law enforcement and the health department, to 
educate the public about emergency preparedness. Hurricanes, earthquakes, and tornadoes do 
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not stop for jurisdictional boundaries, so several localities often have to cooperate on disaster 
response and recovery efforts. In addition to multiple political jurisdictions, disasters require 
a multi-agency response that may include the departments of transportation, natural 
resources, or forestry, among others. These agencies must learn how to work together before 
a disaster hits. 
These findings support the HRO issue of scale as SEMA works with other PIOs to 
reinforce the idea that emergency planning is not only managed by SEMA, but by the state as 
a whole. Scale is an important concept in high reliability theory because an issue may appear 
much smaller, or conversely, much larger, than it actually is if individuals within an 
organization fail to understand the full scope of the event. Mike’s story about the explosion 
on the interstate when the various agencies did not communicate with each other and only 
attempted to address their specific area of expertise supports the concept of scale. A second 
issue, common goals, is supported by the fact that to succeed, all PIOs from state and local 
agencies must share the same goal of working to protect citizens and their property through 
coordinated emergency management. This work is done through intergovernmental relations 
among other state and local government agencies, which supports the theoretical concept of 
tight coupling. Tight coupling implies that one function cannot operate without close 
coordination and cooperation with another function (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). For example, 
broadcast studios would be useless if television had not been invented and mass produced. 
The television producers depend on people to buy television before they can become viewers. 
In addition to intergovernmental relations, several other examples of tight coupling 
occurred in routine public affairs duties. The PAOs rely heavily on technology, such as 
BlackBerry wireless communication devices, text pagers, cell phones, Internet news services, 
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and online emergency management programs. The PAOs also have a profound reliance on 
the media to communicate information to the public during an emergency, so the staffs work 
during routine times to develop relationships with local and state media. Finally, SEMA is 
bound to its mission to protect lives and property in an emergency; therefore, the completion 
of routine tasks depends on a lack of a crisis.  
Peggy, the press secretary, said that crises occur daily for her agency, and that major 
crises happen on the average of once every 15 months. The other PIOs felt that the lack of a 
crisis and the resulting fast-paced response is what separates routine from chaos. Therefore, 
Peggy was the only PIO whose comments supported the concept of a high-velocity 
environment under routine conditions. A high-velocity environment implies that an 
organization must make decisions quickly to adapt to changes in the environment (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001). Peggy’s perspective may reflect the fact that as a governor’s press secretary, 
she is exposed to a wide variety of issues that occur throughout the state. Also, she may have 
included threats in her estimation of crises, while other PIOs only included actual events. 
Because of this difference in perceptions of the routine environment, Peggy’s comments 
deserve further research to develop a better understanding of all the environmental factors.   
In sum, the findings from routine PAO activities supporting HRO environmental and 
organizational issues that emerged during routine PAO activities include the issues of scale, 
common goals, tight coupling, and, to a lesser degree, a high-velocity environment. The next 






HRO Organizational Actions and Practices 
under Routine Conditions 
 
The HRO literature examines organizational practices in response to complexity and 
tight coupling. During routine times, the PAOs exhibited nearly all of the HRO responses to 
complexity, but only two of the responses to tight coupling. 
 
Response to Complexity 
In response to complexity, the PAO routinely conducts training and rehearsals, 
participates in real-world exercises, demonstrates accountability and responsibility, has 
specific job functions, and uses direct information sources. The PAO helps fulfills the 
agency’s responsibility to train and prepare state agencies, local governments, and the 
general public for disaster preparedness through public information campaigns, information 
posted on the agency Web site, participation in disaster response drills, and formal and 
informal meetings with PIOs from across all branches and levels of government. The efforts 
made during routine times help ensure the response to future disasters will be more cohesive 
and organized. The preparation activities and exercises support the HRO activities of training 
and rehearsal and exercises with baffling interactions. The fact that the SEMA PIOs are in 
charge of coordinating all statewide preparedness activities supports the concept of 
accountability and responsibility in HRO theory; however, accountability of routine training 
was difficult to determine because the PIOs did not evaluate these activities. In addition, 
PIOs’ routine work did not reflect individual autonomy. The PIOs are not encouraged to step 
out of their job descriptions to solve problems, and they cannot distribute news releases, 
printed materials, or respond to media calls without going through a regimented approval 
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process. Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) argue that a lack of autonomy can limit personal 
accountability and responsibility within an organization. 
Gretchen’s agency is unique in that the six PIOs have specific jobs that are related to 
a different function, such as constituent services, radiological preparedness, and legislative 
matters. The job descriptions are based on operations that are tightly coupled with SEMA, 
rather than on technical skills. The other PIOs’ job titles suggest a focus on technical skills, 
such as an outreach coordinator, a Webmaster, or a writer. David’s staff felt that their job 
descriptions for day-to-day responsibilities are inaccurate, vague, or useless. At first glance, 
it appears that the SEMA public affairs organizational structure for daily tasks has specified 
job functions that help the office operate in a complex environment (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001). Upon closer analysis, however, most of the job functions are not tied to elements in 
the environment, with the exception being Gretchen’s agency. 
The PIOs’ reliance on technology results in up-to-the-minute access to situation 
reports, news, weather forecasts, email messages, and reports from the field. In addition, 
many of the PIOs have a direct line of communication to the SEMA senior staff members. 
Peggy, the press secretary, reports to the governor and has the added benefit of close contact 
with the agency director. The prevalence of communications technology and contact with 
agency leadership supports the HRO concept of direct sources of information. As a result, the 
PIOs have current and reliable information from various SEMA units, the governor’s office, 
and other agencies (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  
In sum, the following HRO attributes emerged from analysis of the organizations’ 
response to a complex environment: training and rehearsal, exercises with baffling 
interactions, and direct sources of information. Two organizational practices, (1) 
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accountability and responsibility and (2) specified job functions, were noted but did not 
strongly support the HRO theoretical concepts. Redundancy, a prominent element in the 
HRO literature in which personnel and systems are backed up with duplications, was not 
evident during analysis of routine mode activities (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). This may be 
explained by the simple fact that redundancy is not required for completing their routine 
tasks. The next section discusses the organizational responses to tight coupling that emerged 
from the SEMA public affairs research. 
 
Response to Tight Coupling 
The last category of HRO actions and practices concerns the organizational response 
to tight coupling. As discussed above, the PAO is tightly coupled with technology, 
intergovernmental relations, the media, and the absence or presence of an emergency. The 
SEMA public affairs personnel have the ability to adapt to changing conditions and learn 
from past emergencies, which helps them improve their preparedness and disaster response 
efforts. This adaptation can result in additional training, better communication with PIOs in 
localities and other state agencies, improved media relations, and a revised organizational 
structure. The specialized jobs in Gretchen’s agency create knowledgeable liaisons from the 
public affairs office who may work directly with the many agencies which with the SEMA 
PAO collaborates. The other SEMAs do not have specialized jobs that relate to outside 
agencies in this way. Therefore, during routine conditions, I observed two HRO attributes 
that support the theory’s expected response to tight coupling: system flexibility and job 
specialization. Other responses to tight coupling were not apparent under routine conditions, 
and thus did not support the concepts of redundancy, hierarchical differentiation, in which 
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the management chain can adapt to changes in the operating environment, and 
bargaining/negotiation, in which personnel may collaborate with others within the 
organization to adjust routines, resources, or procedures as needed. The absence of these 
concepts may be explained by the fact that state emergency management agency public 
affairs offices simply do not require duplicate personnel and systems, adjustments in 
hierarchy, and bargaining for resources while operating under routine conditions. In other 
words, SEMAs have all of the organizational attributes in place that they need to complete 
routine public relations tasks. Alternatively, SEMA public affairs offices may not display 
these attributes under routine conditions because they are under-resourced.  
In sum, the research supports the existence of several HRO attributes in SEMA public 
affairs offices under routine conditions (see Table 6.1). The absence of certain attributes from 
some of the six agencies – a preoccupation with failure, commitment to resilience, deference 
to expertise, redundancy, job specialization, and adjustments in hierarchy – surface when the 
agency makes the transition from routine to crisis.  The next section addresses the HRO 
attributes that emerge when a public affairs office shifts to crisis mode. 
 
HRO Environmental and Organizational Attributes 
under Crisis Conditions 
 
 Every PIO referred to “disaster mode” to distinguish emergency response from 
routine responsibilities. When disaster mode surfaces in a public affairs office, the staff 
members’ work changes in terms of roles, intensity, and even location. Because of the 
differences brought on by environmental conditions, I noted different attributes in disaster 
mode than in routine mode. As in the above description of routine conditions, this section 
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 The public affairs offices demonstrated all of the environmental and organizational 
characteristics of mindfulness found in HRO research under crisis conditions: a 
preoccupation with failure, a reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, a commitment 
to resilience, and deference to expertise. Some of the same problems that faced the PAO staff 
during routine times, including difficulty verifying details and a lack of autonomy, were still 
apparent during the simulated radiological disaster with David’s agency. 
 During the radiological exercise that I observed, the PIOs were concerned with 
correctly performing their tasks, at times double-checking with each other to make sure they 
carried out their respective responsibilities correctly. This attention to detail, however, could 
have been due to the fact that the exercise requirements are carefully orchestrated while 
under scrutiny by FEMA evaluators. David, the PAO director, commented that they have 
more “latitude” during a real crisis than during a graded exercise. The PIOs had a specific 
routing slip for news release approvals in the emergency operations center, and several 
additional people who are not part of the routine approval process had to review the releases. 
The PIOs who I interviewed also indicated that they have different approval procedures in 
place during crises, that they refer to checklists to ensure they complete all of their required 
actions, and that they involve people from outside of the public affairs office to help verify 
information. The measures that the PIOs took to avoid mistakes during the exercise support 
the HRO concept of preoccupation with failure (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
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 The PIOs followed up on all rumors during the simulated crisis and passed that 
information along to the leadership, the media, and the public inquiry center. The public 
inquiry center is also known as rumor control because the call takers pass on rumors to the 
PIOs while providing correct information to the public. The radiological exercise tested the 
PIOs’ responsiveness when rumors that the nuclear power facility was burning circulated 
among the local emergency management offices. The staff could have assumed that one 
person manufactured the story about the fire and that no one else would hear the false 
information, but the PIOs were aware that one seemingly insignificant bit of erroneous 
information could explode and cause widespread panic among the residents of the 
surrounding communities. This example supports the HRO concept of a reluctance to 
simplify. In high reliability organizations, team members pursue all signals of a potential 
problem, no matter how small or improbable, until they are satisfied that the issue is resolved 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
 As the scenario escalated, all personnel understood what actions they needed to take 
at the time, including issuing a specific news release, holding a media briefing, or recording 
an emergency alert system (EAS) broadcast. Their actions were closely tied to other groups 
within the EOC, so they had to coordinate their efforts and time their communications to 
coincide with other emergency response activities. These actions demonstrate that the SEMA 
personnel exhibited a high level of sensitivity to operations throughout the exercise. While it 
is tempting to only focus on their assigned responsibilities, the team members must be aware 




 Although the PIOs made some mistakes, they made a determined effort to correct 
errors and prevent them from reoccurring. For example, David’s staff quickly issued 
corrected news releases and re-recorded the EAS message once they discovered the errors. 
David then assigned staff specific tasks for verifying information in the future. These 
responses support the HRO concept of a commitment to resilience. During the exercise, the 
EOC’s operations director stayed in constant contact with David, often consulting with him 
on what measures should be taken next. In turn, David recognized the expertise that 
employees from other agencies, as well as the reservists, bring to the public information 
team. The PIOs who were interviewed also mentioned reliance on experts to give media 
interviews and on experienced personnel to fill vital roles in the joint information center. The 
leadership regularly consulted some PIOs, such as Peggy, during a crisis. The examples 
support the HRO concept of deference to expertise as demonstrated by both the PIOs and the 
SEMA leadership. 
 In summary, analysis of the public affairs offices in disaster mode supported the 
presence of all of the HRO environmental and organizational characteristics of mindfulness: 
a preoccupation with failure, a reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, a commitment 
to resilience, and deference to expertise. More mindful activities emerged during the disaster 
mode than in routine mode. The next section describes the HRO issues that surfaced during 
crises and how they supported the HRO theory. 
 
Issues 
 The issues that are prevalent in HROs were far more apparent during the simulated 
nuclear plant disaster than during routine times. The issues I observed supported all the HRO 
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issues: catastrophic consequences, scale, a high velocity environment, common goals, and 
tight coupling during the day-long radiological exercise. As the scenario progressed, the 
issues were amplified, particularly tight coupling. 
 The public affairs role is crucial during an emergency. Inaccurate or inconsistent 
information, and even poorly timed dissemination of accurate information, can have 
devastating results on a community that is struck by a disaster. For the radiological exercise, 
mistakes can have serious consequences on the state’s and the power company’s 
authorization to operate the nuclear power generation facility. The other PIOs I interviewed 
stated that consequences also can include failure to secure federal disaster funding, the spread 
of rumors that cause panic among the public, or failure to alert the public of dangers that 
follow a disaster, such as impure drinking water. These findings supported the HRO issue of 
catastrophic consequences for PIO actions under crisis conditions (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
The consequences are much greater during a crisis than during routine operations. 
 All of the PIOs believe that the response effort is much larger than their full-time 
staffs could manage; any emergency that the state would respond to exceeds the reach of a 
single governmental entity. This awareness that disaster response is greater than one agency 
supports the HRO concept of scale (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). The SEMA operating 
environment reaches beyond its headquarters building and its full-time staff. The scale of the 
event also determines SEMA involvement in a crisis. The state emergency response agencies 
do not get involved in a crisis until the situation gets too large for one locality to respond to. 
Once SEMA is activated, the political boundaries disappear, and the state as a whole 
responds to the crisis. This finding is significant because the size of the organization, in this 
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case an amalgamation of several governmental entities, swells to adapt to the scale of a crisis 
event.  
 The need for accurate, timely, and consistent public information is magnified as an 
emergency situation escalates and lives potentially are endangered. Therefore, a high velocity 
environment, which was not a prominent issue for all PAOs in routine operations, became 
obvious within analysis of the exercise and PIOs’ stories. All of the PIOs share the 
overarching goal of protecting lives and property during disasters as well as the more 
immediate goal during the exercise of passing with few or no critical errors. This element, 
which holds all of the pieces together for the public information function, supports the HRO 
attribute of common goals (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Although the PIOs would occasionally 
get caught up in different elements of the scenario, the common goals help them refocus 
priorities and consider how the public would receive the information they were releasing. All 
of the PIOs that I interviewed said that their agencies share the same goals of preparing the 
public, communicating during a crisis, and helping communities during the recovery.  
 The reliance on technology, other government agencies, and the media becomes 
much greater as the PIOs advance through the stages of a disaster response. This growing 
dependence supports the HRO attribute of tight coupling (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Tight 
coupling was more problematic for the PIOs during a crisis than during routine operations. 
Without access to communications technology, these PIOs found it cumbersome and time-
consuming to keep messages accurate, timely, and consistent. The level of intergovernmental 
relations also increases as PIOs work to coordinate efforts among various state, local, and 
federal agencies. Finally, the dependence on the media becomes more apparent during an 
emergency as radio stations carry the EAS messages and television stations display the 
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emergency messages in a crawl on the bottom of the screen. SEMAs would simply not be 
able to communicate quickly with the public during an emergency without the media.  
 In sum, HRO environmental and organizational attributes are more prevalent during a 
crisis than during routine times. Many of the HRO traits that were absent from day-to-day 
PIO tasks emerge when the staffs go into disaster mode. The next section details how SEMA 
PIOs are able to respond to complexity and tight coupling using actions and practices found 
in HROs. 
HRO Organizational Actions and Practices 
under Crisis Conditions 
 
As a crisis situation escalates, the public affairs office must respond to rapidly 
unpredictable changes while becoming more reliant on other government agencies, 
technology, and the media. These organizational changes support the manifestation in SEMA 
public affairs of HRO practices that respond to complexity and tight coupling. The practices 
in response to complexity include training and rehearsal, redundancy, specified job functions, 
direct information sources, and complex interactions. The practices in response to tight 
coupling include redundancy, job specialization, system flexibility, hierarchical 
differentiations, and bargaining/negotiation (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). All of the HRO 
practices that enable an organization to manage complexity and tight coupling during a crisis 
emerged during the interviews and observations. 
 
Response to Complexity 
 All of the SEMAs that participated in this study are involved in exercises that test 
response capabilities for nuclear power accidents, chemical weapons emergencies, and 
terrorist attacks. Many of the PIOs noted that since September 11, these exercises have 
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gained importance and have become more complex to imitate real-world disaster conditions. 
During exercises as well as actual crises, every emergency management agency relies on PIO 
reservists, recruits from other agencies, or volunteers from a PIO association to provide the 
personnel needed to sustain a complex or long-term disaster response. Therefore, training 
and rehearsal, exercises with baffling interactions, and redundancy, which are all important 
features of HRO theory, were supported in the results of this research (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2001). I did not find evidence of these attributes in the analysis of SEMAs in routine 
conditions. 
 During an activation of the emergency operations center or the joint information 
center, the SEMA PAO managers are in charge of all PIOs and reservists who are called in to 
support the effort. SEMA’s legislated mandate to coordinate the statewide response to 
disasters means the agency is held responsible for the actions of all agencies and localities 
involved in the response. PIOs maintain their news release approval processes but often 
involve additional reviewers with a faster turn-around time. The research supports the HRO 
concepts of accountability and responsibility in the PAO, which is amplified during a crisis 
or exercise. As I discovered during routine times, individual staff are not granted autonomy 
to act on their own even if warranted, something that personnel are encouraged to do in the 
organizations that HRO researchers observed (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). While individual 
accountability may be lacking, organizational accountability is high. 
 PIOs post up-to-the-minute incident logs on Web EOC for all emergency personnel in 
the state to follow during crises or exercises. Interpersonal communication within the EOC is 
highly effective as the PAO staff can simply walk into a nearby office to talk to decision 
makers and gather information. Many of the PIOs also have direct contact with the 
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governor’s office during a crisis. The various means of direct communication make the 
public information function reliable and efficient, even as a crisis escalates. While the PIOs 
need to stay informed, they also reciprocate by providing information to other agency 
divisions and by communicating directly with the media. Therefore, the HRO concept of 
sources of direct information is augmented during a crisis. 
 When an EOC is fully operational, the PAO activates a joint information center (JIC) 
that allows SEMA to coordinate the public information efforts and messages across all 
involved agencies and jurisdictions (for more information on the JIC concept, see Appendix 
V.) The JIC has highly specialized job roles that are designed to address all of the public 
information functions needed during a disaster. A JIC is not always used, however, if the 
situation is not large enough or does not last long enough to require the benefits of a JIC. If a 
situation escalates to the point that a JIC is needed, the structure eliminates confusion by 
addressing complexity, specifying roles, assigning a chain of responsibility, and providing 
sources of direct information. Everyone has an assigned role in the JIC that may not be the 
same role that they have in their routine jobs, and they have all been trained for that role prior 
to being summoned to join the JIC. Therefore, the most-apparent difference between routine 
and disaster modes is the change in the HRO concept of specialized job functions as 
evidenced in the activation of a joint information center. Specialized job functions leave no 
doubt as to team members’ responsibilities and are designed to address all of the needs of the 
organization while operating in a complex environment (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
 In summary, the prevalent HRO concepts in response to complexity are training and 
rehearsal, redundancy, specified job functions, direct information sources, and exercises with 
baffling interactions (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). These attributes are more prevalent during 
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crisis mode than routine mode, which would be expected as the level of complexity in the 
environment increases. The next section discusses the organizational attributes that emerged 
from analysis of the response to tight coupling. 
 
Response to Tight Coupling 
 As a crisis escalates, SEMA organizational practices and actions in the PAO become 
more tightly coupled with other systems that are responding to the emergency. During my 
observations and interviews, the PIOs indicated that they employed all but one of the HRO 
attributes for responding to tight coupling, as opposed to only one attribute found during 
routine times. I noted redundancy, job specialization, system flexibility, and hierarchical 
differentiations. The last HRO attribute of bargaining and negotiation was only apparent in 
one agency.  
 Once again, redundant technology is an asset for the PIOs. They can send messages 
simultaneously to BlackBerry devices, text pagers, and email accounts. The additional PIOs 
who are called in from state agencies not only provide extra personnel but also reflect 
attributes that support the concept of tight coupling with other state agencies. These PIOs 
become liaisons with their respective departments by easing communication flows and 
speeding up approvals and decision making. In many cases, the personnel from other 
agencies also have delegated authority to make decisions on the scene. Therefore, the HRO 
attribute of redundancy is a key factor in managing tight coupling with other groups during 
crises and exercises (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
 The joint information center structure brings together people from many different 
agencies to work as one unit for the state. The JIC also provides clearly defined roles for all 
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of the PIOs, meaning that reservists, PIOs from other state agencies, and the SEMA PIOs 
have clear expectations of their duties when they are called to the EOC. The confusion and 
irritation that many of the PIOs in David’s agency expressed about their routine 
responsibilities did not emerge while they were part of the JIC. Finally, the JIC supports tight 
coupling with local government PIOs who are actively involved in the radiological exercise. 
An external liaison in the JIC maintains close contact with all of the city and county PIOs by 
sharing information, reviewing their news releases, and ensuring that the timing and content 
of news releases are consistent. Therefore, the JIC provided SEMA with the HRO attribute of 
specialized jobs that are required for public information during a disaster. Of all the SEMA 
processes and activities, the JIC structure most closely resembled HROs in the manner that it 
addresses the issues of a volatile environment where the consequences can be catastrophic, 
the scale of the problem is beyond the scope of a single organization, the response is made in 
a high velocity setting, all of the players share common goals, and tight coupling is the norm. 
The JIC structure provides for all of the attributes found in HROs: mindfulness, responses to 
complexity, and responses to tight coupling (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  
 When a disaster strikes, SEMA PIOs drop their routine assignments so they can 
devote their full attention to the crisis response. They are given the flexibility to resume those 
tasks, or even to cancel some projects, once the crisis has been resolved. The approval 
process for news releases is simplified and expedited during a crisis, while it can take hours 
or days for approval on routine topics. The joint information center structure is also very 
flexible and can be adapted to specific conditions. For example, the JIC organization chart, 
found in Appendix V, represents a full activation of every role in the JIC system. As Figure 
4.2 illustrates, however, the SEMA only activated a fraction of those roles for the 
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radiological exercise that I observed. This flexibility makes the JIC system a valuable tool for 
emergency response. Therefore, the HRO concept of system flexibility was more strongly 
supported in analysis of crisis conditions than routine conditions (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
 Most of the emergency management agencies routinely report to another department 
or a secretariat one level removed from the governor. Once the governor declares a state of 
emergency, some of the SEMAs report directly to the governor’s office. Even in the states 
where the agency already reports to the governor, the SEMA has more administrative 
authority during a crisis. This change in leadership gives SEMAs the authority to call in state 
personnel and resources needed to respond to an emergency, and also expedites requests for 
activation of interstate mutual aid or requests for federal disaster assistance. The HRO 
concept of hierarchical differentiations is absent from routine conditions but becomes 
apparent once an agency enters disaster mode (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Within the public 
affairs function, the management hierarchy changes as the PAO staff members assume their 
new roles in the JIC, and the PAO director supervises all staff who are called to work in the 
JIC. Agency loyalties are put aside as everyone works for “the state” during a disaster. 
 Not every participant in this study worked solely for emergency management. Lou 
said that the PIOs in his agency work with several departments besides the emergency 
management unit, including the driver’s licensing and weapons permit agencies. Therefore, 
when a crisis emerges, he and his colleagues must ascertain who will staff the EOC and who 
will maintain the routine workload associated with the other departmental responsibilities. 
Unlike the other PIOs that I interviewed, Lou was the only one who couldn’t simply drop 
routine projects to respond to a crisis. Therefore, the final response to tight coupling during a 
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HRO attributes noted in six SEMA public affairs offices as a group 
(categories adapted from Roberts, 1990). 
 
Environmental & Organizational Characteristics of SEMA 









Routine X X X  X 
Crisis X X X X X 
Issues Consequences are catastrophic Scale 
High velocity 
environment Common goals Tight coupling 
Routine  X X X X 
Crisis X X X X X 

















Routine X  X X X X 












Routine  X X    
Crisis X X X X   
 
 In sum, as the crisis becomes more complex and tightly coupled, SEMA’s public 
affairs team takes on more HRO attributes to respond to the evolving situation. Table 6.2 
summarizes the HRO attributes that were noted during routine and crisis times. The 
proximity of all of the decision makers in the state EOC, the support from other state 
agencies, and the use of the joint information center structure facilitate the PAO’s propensity 
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to adopt HRO characteristics as the staff continue to respond to the disaster. Therefore, there 
are more HRO attributes found in crisis mode than in routine mode, but HRO theory does not 
account for all of the organizational attributes of state emergency management agencies. The 
next section discusses those gaps and presents a new theory to explain how the SEMA public 
affairs offices manage crisis communication. 
 
Generating a Model of Crisis Adaptive Public Information  
 By definition, a nuclear power plant is a high reliability organization (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001). No one, however, has explored the communication function related to a 
nuclear power operation, or for that matter, the state emergency management agency that 
would have to respond to a public safety issue at the plant. The power facility would not 
respond to a meltdown on its own; a crisis of that magnitude does not take place in a bubble. 
Although the power plant has its own experts to repair the physical damage and 
decontaminate the area, the plant operators do not have the power to issue evacuation orders 
for the surrounding communities, hand out doses of potassium iodide to protect residents’ 
thyroids from radiation, or stop all air traffic in the immediate vicinity. An HRO such as a 
nuclear power generation facility still relies on government agencies in a crisis, especially 
when it comes to public communication. 
 High reliability organization theory offers an explanation of the organizational 
practices in state emergency management public affairs offices. It is not a complete 
explanation, however. First, HRO theory has been applied to organizations that routinely 
operate under dangerous, chaotic conditions, but not to organizations that have both a routine 
mode and a disaster mode. HRO theory does not explain the fact that an organization can 
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have a very different structure after a crisis emerges. This theory also does not address the 
dual roles that PIOs demonstrate in routine and disaster modes. Finally, this theory does not 
address a major discrepancy found during my interviews and observations. HROs are found 
to be most reliable while performing day-to-day tasks, even if under volatile conditions, but 
the public affairs offices appeared to be less reliable in their day-to-day responsibilities than 
during a crisis response. In other words, the consequences of failure during a disaster are 
much higher than during routine times. During a disaster the consequences may include loss 
of life and property, while during routine matters the consequences may include a missed 
deadline or an underestimated budget.  
 To address these issues and create a more thorough explanation of organizational 
practices in state emergency management public affairs offices, I propose a new model: 
Crisis Adaptive Public Information (CAPI). CAPI addresses many of the organizational 
attributes offered by high reliability theory but also accounts for the metamorphosis that the 
SEMA public affairs offices experience when they enter disaster mode. This model is 
specially suited to the unique environment of government public information offices and is 
mindful of the fact that PIOs must perform dual roles in emergency preparedness and 
emergency response. The CAPI model provides a foundation for building a theory of crisis 
communication that is specific to the public sector. 
 Figure 6.1 illustrates the prevalence of HRO attributes in organizations. These 
organizational traits are the most evident under routine conditions and precipitate the use of 
issues management (mindfulness) to identify and respond to a crisis. The attributes level off 
once an organization has reached a crisis peak. On aircraft carriers, for example, this 
mindfulness would represent the constant scanning for potential dangers on the deck while 
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jets take off and land. If a danger was discovered, such as a hand tool that could be sucked 
into the jet’s engines, sailors would call a halt to all flight operations until the danger could 
be removed from the deck. The HRO theorists themselves admit that high reliability has not 
been tested during, nor was it intended for, wartime scenarios (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). For 
an aircraft carrier, routine operations are quite dangerous on their own, but a crisis would be 
engagement in battle. Note that the representation of HRO attributes in Figure 6.1 does not 
include the activation of an emergency operations center or a joint information center 




The prevalence of High Reliability characteristics as an organization transitions from 
routine to crisis operations. 
 
 
 On the other hand, Figure 5.1, described in the previous chapter, illustrated how the 
level of adaptability increases significantly from routine mode to disaster mode. As a public 
affairs office faces with chaos, it can adapt by changing its structure, processes, and routines. 
The attributes that allow it to function in chaos are amplified as the organization converts 
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Transition from Routine Mode to Crisis Mode
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from its routine structure to a crisis structure: the joint information center (JIC). As discussed 
above, the JIC offers the most reliable form of organization for a public affairs office to 
communicate during a disaster situation. As a result, the public affairs office is more reliable 
during a crisis than during routine times.  
 A pure HRO explanation for how a public affairs office in a state emergency 
management agency conducts crisis communication ignores the fact that in HROs the 
adaptive attributes level out as the organization approaches chaos. Therefore, a better 
explanation is needed of the PAOs’ transition from routine to crisis modes. The concept of 





 The key component that is missing from HRO theory is morphogenesis. Koehler et al. 
(2001) use this term to explain how an organization breaks down its previous form of order 
and reorganizes in response to a substantial stimulus, such as a disaster. The authors argue 
that an emergency management organization cannot effectively adapt to a chaotic system 
unless it goes through this metamorphosis. This concept explains what happens to a SEMA 
public affairs office when it transitions from doing routine public relations work to managing 
crisis communication.  
 For the SEMA PIOs, everything changes when they activate for a disaster. They may 
report to a new manager, work in a different office, have a new job title, have different job 
responsibilities with new hours, and be evaluated for a different set of job skills. The physical 
organizational structure transforms as the joint information center is initiated. Figure 6.2 
illustrates morphogenesis in a state emergency management public affairs office. The 
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organizational changes are the direct result of increased complexity and increased tight 
coupling that is generated by the emergence of a chaotic system: a public safety crisis. 
 Morphogenesis is, therefore, an important theoretical element that fills gaps left by 
HRO theory in the explanation of SEMA public affairs. The next section introduces a model 
that was specifically developed to inform crisis communication in emergency management 
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The Crisis Adaptive Public Information Model 
 This new model of crisis communication in state emergency management agencies is 
a blend of HRO theory and morphogenesis with a focus on public relations in the public 
sector. The Crisis Adaptive Public Information (CAPI) Model (see Figure 6.3) takes into 
consideration the wide range of responsibilities that SEMA PIOs have as well as their dual 
roles in public relations and emergency management. The model assumes the environmental 
constraints and opportunities found in the public sector, as discussed in Chapter One. It also 
explains how the public affairs offices adapt to a chaotic system. 
 During routine mode, the PIOs conduct traditional public relations tasks. By paying 
attention to the environment through issues management, the PIOs notice potential crises and 
begin preparations for a response. As a crisis emerges, the level of complexity and tight 
coupling in the public sector environment increase. The crisis becomes a bifurcation point, 
and the public affairs office responds to this change in the environment by going into disaster 
mode, in which PIOs drop routine public relations responsibilities and engage in crisis 
communication. Once in disaster mode, the organizational structure has transformed into a 
joint information center, and the public affairs office no longer resembles its routine 
structure. The disaster mode is sustained as long as the level of complexity and tight coupling 
remains high. Once a crisis is resolved, the level of complexity and tight coupling decreases, 
and the JIC structure is disbanded.  
 The SEMA public affairs members respond to a chaotic system by reorganizing itself 
into a new entity that is capable of managing the crisis. In much the same way that a chaotic 
system transforms itself through multiple iterations, the public affairs organization 
transforms itself to allow it to compensate for deficiencies in its routine structure that are 
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necessary for disaster response. During a disaster, the consequences of failure are much 
greater than under routine conditions, and the organization must change to meet the higher 
standards. The resulting organization looks much different from its original form; however, 
its components, or fractals, are still recognizable. As the chaos is brought under control, the 









 The findings in this dissertation present a theoretical foundation for future research. 
The results of additional observations and interviews would help refine the Crisis Adaptive 
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Public Information model and determine its suitability for use at the local and federal level, 
as well as in other countries. The CAPI model lends itself to the creation of an index to 
quantitatively assess the organizational attributes of emergency management agencies. 
Agencies would be rated based on the prevalence of specific attributes in their organization, 
such as use of a joint information center during a crisis. Comparative studies can then be 
conducted to gauge the differences among the jurisdictional levels of emergency 
management agencies within the United States and in other countries. The model can also be 
further developed through its application to non-governmental emergency organizations, 
such as the American Red Cross, or to for-profit organizations that offer disaster response 
services. 
 Real-time observations may also lend additional data that may not emerge from 
interviews after the fact. While observing a SEMA during a radiological exercise was 
informative, observations of an actual disaster response would provide rich data that is not 
available under simulated conditions. Future research also would benefit from analysis of 
agency crisis communication manuals and other artifacts that were not used in this study. 
Government agencies produce scores of documents related to public information before, 
during, and after a crisis that would further inform the CAPI theoretical framework. 
 It is important to note that this research did not judge the effectiveness of the 
communication practices that are part of the CAPI model. Evaluation of state government 
crisis communication practices would be an important next step in this research. Actual 
disaster events, such as Hurricane Katrina, could be explored for prevalence of public 
information attributes found in the CAPI model and then evaluated for their effectiveness. 
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After all, whether or not an organization is truly “reliable” depends on the results produced 
by its organizational practices. 
 Finally, this research presents new opportunities for public relations pedagogy. As 
explained throughout this dissertation, existing crisis communication guides and case studies 
that faculty use in the classroom are based on a corporate model. The concepts presented by 
CAPI offer new strategies for teaching crisis communication with a focus on government, 
nonprofit organizations, and emergency management. The consequences of failure differ 
greatly in the corporate crisis communication models than in the CAPI model. Students of 
public relations would be better prepared for a variety of occupations if they understood the 
different leadership qualities and skills sets that are needed for corporate public relations and 
public sector public information. 
Summary and Conclusion 
 The results presented in this research and the resulting theoretical framework 
answered the three research questions that were posed in Chapter Three. 
RQ1: What are the organizational characteristics of a particular state emergency 
management agency’s public information office? 
Through a six-week participant observation, I was able to study one SEMA under 
both routine and crisis conditions. The results show that the agency operates differently after 
it transitions to disaster mode. Some of the SEMA organizational characteristics supported 
the concepts from high reliability organizations. There were additional characteristics, 
however, that refute HRO theory. The concept of morphogenesis, in which an emergency 
management organization must undergo a transformation before it can respond to a crisis, 
explains why SEMAs have different organizational attributes before and after a crisis. The 
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crisis, therefore, becomes a bifurcation point marking the agency’s change in behavior as it 
attempts to adapt to a chaotic system. 
RQ2: Do emergency management agencies in other states demonstrate similar 
characteristics? 
 I interviewed public information officers from five state emergency management 
agencies to triangulate my findings from the observations. The findings confirmed the fact 
that a SEMA changes its structure when it transitions into disaster mode. The results also 
showed that the six SEMA agencies that participated in this study were more dissimilar in 
routine mode than in crisis mode. The resulting organizational structure found in crisis mode 
was very similar in all six emergency management agency public affairs offices. Had I only 
conducted the participant observation, the extent of the transformations into crisis mode and 
the fundamental differences in the pre-crisis stage may not have emerged from this research. 
RQ3: How well does High Reliability Theory explain the organizational 
characteristics and behaviors of state emergency management agencies’ public 
information offices as they respond to chaotic situations? 
 The final chapter applied the theoretical framework of high reliability to the results of 
the observations and interviews in state emergency management public affairs offices. 
Although HRO theory helps explain many of the organizational practices in SEMA PAOs, it 
leaves some gaps and questions that remained answered. As a result, a new theory is 
presented based on the research that addressed those gaps and accounted for the transition 
that PIOs experience when they encounter a crisis situation. Crisis Adaptive Public 
Information is a middle-range theory that provides an explanation of SEMA public affairs 
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practices as the agencies shift between routine and crisis conditions. It advances a neglected 
area of public relations research and offers a wealth of additional research opportunities. 
 State disaster management planning has increasingly come under scrutiny since the 
terrorist acts in September 2001. A 2006 study done by the Department of Homeland 
Security determined that only 10 states had sufficient plans in place for responding to 
disaster. The evaluation criteria included planning for crisis communication (Jordan, 2006). 
The theoretical framework offered by the CAPI model may gain additional significance as 
new federal regulations for disaster management, known as the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS), are adopted across the country. NIMS is a comprehensive, all-
hazards approach to disaster management that is intended to coordinate response efforts at all 
levels of government. The public information system provided by NIMS includes the joint 
information center structure that has been discussed at length in this dissertation. As 
explained in the NIMS regulations, “The public information system will ensure an organized, 
integrated, and coordinated mechanism to perform critical emergency information, crisis 
communications and public affairs functions which is timely, accurate, and consistent”  
(Department of Homeland Security, 2005).  Many of the participants in this study said that 
their state was already in compliance with the regulations outlined in NIMS, which is 
required by October 2006. States that are not fully in compliance by that time may lose 
federal funding for their homeland security projects. As demonstrated in this research, the 
various SEMA public affairs offices had many organizational differences under routine 
conditions, but once they transitioned into disaster mode and activated a JIC, they became 
much more similar. The additional attention placed on the public information function by 
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NIMS requirements and nationwide evaluation efforts will offer more opportunities to 
explore this vitally important component of disaster management. 
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APPENDIX I: Interview Guide 
 
Question 1: What do you do in a “normal” day in the public affairs office? 
 




1. How do you do that? 
2. What is the approval process like for items such as news releases or information 
requests? 
3. In what way are the procedures different, if at all, during a crisis situation? 
4. Which staff assists you in communicating with the public? 
5. Do you work with others outside of the public affairs office but within your agency? 
If so, with whom? 
6. Do you work with others outside of your agency? If so, with whom? 
7. What are some of the limitations, if any, to your being able to communicate quickly 
with the public? 
8. What are some of the things that help you do your job in communicating with the 
public? 
9. May I see an organization chart? 
10. What is your office’s annual budget, excluding salaries? 
11. Do you have a crisis communication plan? If so, may I have a copy? 
12. What are the most common crises your office responds to? Most unusual? 














APPENDIX III: Sample Contact Letter for Observation Study 
 
 





J. Suzanne Horsley                                                                                                   School of Journalism and Mass Communication 
Roy H. Park Doctoral Fellow                                       CB 3365 Carroll Hall 







Dear [public relations manager]: 
 
I am a Ph.D. student in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at UNC-Chapel 
Hill. As a former PIO in Virginia, my research interest is in government public relations. I am 
conducting a research project and would like to ask you and your public information office for your 
help. 
  I am researching how state government agencies communicate with the public during both 
routine and crisis situations. I believe that [name of agency] would offer a variety of public relations 
opportunities to research. For my study, I would like to conduct an initial interview with you and then 
observe your department for [amount of time]. After my observation is complete, I will conduct a 
follow-up interview with you or other members of your staff. 
  You can be assured that the names of your staff members and the department itself will be 
anonymous in my research. I will only identify your department as "a public information office in one 
state's emergency management agency,” and I will assign pseudonyms for anyone I speak with during 
the study. 
  Each interview should last about one hour. During the observation portion, I will be taking 
notes and asking questions as they come along, but I will attempt to be as unobtrusive as possible and 
not interfere with the work of the office.  
I will be contacting you in the next couple of days to answer any questions you have and to 
provide more details on my research project. If you would like to contact me before then, feel free to 





J. Suzanne Horsley 





 APPENDIX IV: Sample Consent Form 
 
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill 
Consent to Participate in a Research Study  
Adult Participants 
Social Behavioral Form 
 
IRB Study # JOMC 05-018 
Consent Form Version Date: 2/28/05 
 
Title of Study: Crisis Communication in State Government: An Analysis of Public Relations 
in Crisis-Mandated Agencies 
 
Principal Investigator: J. Suzanne Horsley 
UNC-Chapel Hill Department: School of Journalism and Mass Communication 
UNC-Chapel Hill Phone number: 919-962-1204 
Email Address: horsley@unc.edu  
Co-Investigators:  
Faculty Advisor:  Dr. Lois Boynton 
Funding Source: pending 
 
Study Contact telephone number:  919-923-2882 
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APPENDIX V: The Joint Information Center (JIC) 
 
 The second volume of A Governor's Guide to Emergency Management (Beauchesne, 
2002, p. 24) offers the following instructions for governors facing a crisis: 
· develop a communications strategy 
· prepare to answer questions from the public 
· develop effective media relations 
· define the role of the governor and key aides; and 
· establish a Joint Information Center 
 
 The joint information center (JIC) is a critical element of a state emergency 
operations center during a response to a disaster or terrorism. Public information officers 
(PIOs) from all agencies (state, local, and federal) that have a role in the response convene in 
the JIC and form a new work unit. The lead PIO from the state emergency management 
agency becomes the manager for all JIC staff. Once in the JIC, PIOs leave agency allegiances 
behind and work for one entity, the State. The PIOs would have trained for a specific role 
before being activated in a JIC. If warranted, representatives from non-profit organizations 
such as the American Red Cross also may be members of a JIC. Staffing in the JIC is flexible 
and can be adapted to suit the magnitude and duration of the crisis response. The chart shown 
in Figure A1 represents a full staffing of a JIC, but for most events, the staff is much smaller. 
 The purpose of a JIC is to provide consistent, accurate, and timely information to the 
public and the media during the disaster response and recovery. Primary duties include 
writing news releases and fact sheets, responding to media inquiries, updating information on 
the Internet, generating talking points, and monitoring news coverage. The staff also 
manages the public inquiry center (disaster hotline), coordinates information with PIOs in 
local jurisdictions or field locations, keeps the EOC leadership apprised of public information 
activities, and communicates regularly with the governor’s communication staff. 
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APPENDIX VI: Analytic and Theoretical Memos 
 
DATE: January 11, 2006 
LOCATION: SEMA Headquarters 
RE:  Emerging Organizational Characteristics 
 
I’m beginning to see from all the training sessions that the public affairs office makes a 
significant transition when it goes into crisis mode. It appears that the PAO would look like 
an entirely different organization during a crisis, so this is something I need to consider 
during the upcoming radiological exercise. So many things change when the PIOs respond to 
a crisis, much more than I had previously realized. It’s more than just reporting to the EOC. 
The PIOs take on new job responsibilities with new titles. They can double, or even triple, 
the size of the staff, depending on what the crisis requires. This means that the group of five 
PIOs has new colleagues that they have to work with in the EOC, which would potentially 
change the dynamics of this group. I am interested in seeing how the additional PIOs that 
come in for the power plant exercise fit in with this group, and if they share the same culture 
that I am observing in the SEMA public affairs office. 
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APPENDIX VII: Preliminary Charts 
 
DATE: February 7, 2006 
RE:  Preliminary model of SEMA public information 
 
As the PIOs move into disaster mode, it appears that their actions become more reliable. 
 
Table of Organizational Differences between Routine and Crisis Modes 
Routine Crisis 
Outreach Activities  
Training  
Media Relations Media Relations 
Office at HQ JIC at EOC 
Work for Secretary of Public Safety Work for the Governor 
Technology Issues More Technology Issues 
Internal Communication Channels More Internal Communication Channels 
State Job Titles JIC Job Titles 
Collaborate with other State Agencies In Charge of Other State Agencies 
Long-Term Projects Fast Turn-Around on Communications 
Part of Agency Leadership Part of EOC Leadership 
Staff of five PIOs Staff of 10 or more PIOs 
Low Consequences High Consequences 







APPENDIX VIII: Notes to Self 
 
DATE: January 20, 2006 
LOCATION: State EOC 
RE:  Reliability in Day-to-Day Matters 
 
Why don’t the PIOs all work from the same place – the EOC – all the time? Why change 
physical locations and go to the EOC when a disaster emerges when you could be “at the 
ready” all the time? They certainly have enough dedicated space and the equipment at the 
EOC, and it just sits there unused until the EOC is activated. Would that improve reliability 
during the routine and disaster modes? Ask David if he has ever thought about this, and if 
any other states routinely work from their EOC. 
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APPENDIX IX: Theory Memo 
 
DATE: February 6, 2006 
LOCATION: SEMA Headquarters 
RE:  Reliability in Day-to-Day Matters 
 
Today, Zahra asked for my help with stuffing envelopes for the upcoming EOC grand 
opening celebration. Zahra, Jack, and David were working in the small conference room 
when I arrived. As they worked, David noticed that there were more sheets of address labels 
than invitations. He became angry, told everyone to stop, and starting counting labels. Jack 
and Zahra appeared uncomfortable during the silence. Zahra kept trying to explain that she 
had ordered the amount that she was told to order, but David shushed her and continued 
counting. He said there were 200 more labels than invitations. Zahra looked stunned and 
started looking under the table and chairs for a missing box of invitations that wasn’t there. 
She repeated that she ordered the number of invitations she was told to order, implying that 
David gave her the wrong numbers. David said that the labels contained names that weren’t 
on the invitation list, but then he muttered that he really wasn’t sure. He told Zahra to order 
more invitations, even though that introduced new concerns about having enough space for 
all of the guests at the event. The lists of names had been provided from several departments 
within the agency, and no one was in charge of verifying names or checking for duplicates. I 
thought that this would have been be a simple task for a group of people who are accustomed 
to excelling in more complex activities. This makes me question whether high reliability only 
exists during crisis, and not during the more mundane activities. In some ways, that’s the 
opposite of HRO theory – HROs are reliable while doing routine tasks in volatile conditions.  
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APPENDIX X: Glossary of Terms and Acronyms 
Used in Emergency Management4 
 
After Action Report – formal evaluation completed after a disaster or an exercise. 
CEM – Comprehensive Emergency Management; an integrated approach to managing 
emergency program for all four phases (mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery), for all types of emergencies and disasters (natural, manmade, or terrorism), 
and for all levels of government (local, state, and federal). (Farazmand, 2001) 
DFO – Disaster Field Office; An office located near the scene of a disaster to support the 
response and recovery operations. 
DHS – Federal Department of Homeland Security 
Domestic Terrorism – “Domestic terrorism refers to activities that involve acts dangerous to 
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any 
state; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence 
the policy of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and 
occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation Counterterrorism Division, 2001) 
EAS – Emergency Alert System; A voluntary network of broadcast stations that carry 
emergency messages issued by state, local, or federal emergency management 
agencies. 
Emergency – Any event, or threat of an event, natural or manmade, which may result in harm 
to the public or damage to property or natural resources and requires a government 
response.  
EOC – Emergency Operations Center; a state or local management center from which 
disaster response and protective action orders are coordinated. 
ERT – Emergency Response Team; composed of representatives from each agency that has a 
response role in a disaster. 
ESF – Emergency Support Function; specific areas of disaster response that augment state 
and local response efforts. Examples include law enforcement, animals and 
agricultural issues, transportation, military support, and public information. 
FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency 
International Terrorism – “International terrorism involves violent acts or acts dangerous to 
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, 
or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the 
                                                 
4 Unless otherwise noted, the definitions were obtained from state emergency management agency materials. 
The exact sources are not disclosed to preserve the confidentiality of study participants. 
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United States or any state. These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population; influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; 
or affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or 
kidnapping and occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States 
or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are 
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale 
in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.” (Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Counterterrorism Division, 2001) 
JIC – Joint Information Center; The primary location for coordinating media relations during 
a disaster response. (See Appendix V) 
KI – Potassium Iodide. A medication that helps reduce the effects of radiation on the human 
thyroid gland; given to disaster response workers and residents of areas located in the 
pathway of the radioactive release. 
Major Disaster – Any natural catastrophe that is determined by the president of the United 
States to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant federal disaster assistance. 
Mutual Aid Agreements: Formal or informal agreements between jurisdictions that promise 
assistance during a disaster. 
NEMA – National Emergency Management Association 
NIMS – National Incident Management System; A federally mandated incident management 
system used by localities, states, and the federal government for integrated 
prevention, response, and recovery efforts. 
NRC – Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
NRP – National Response Plan; An all-hazards plan for policy making and coordination of 
domestic emergency response at the federal level. 
NWS – National Weather Service 
PAO – Public Affairs Office 
PAR - Protective action recommendations; recommendations for public safety during an 
emergency, including sheltering in place or evacuating. 
Phases of disaster management – Mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery  
Phases of a radiological emergency – Notification of an unusual event, alert, site area 
emergency, and general emergency. 
PIC – Public Inquiry Center; also known as rumor control or disaster hotline. 
PIO – Public Information Officer 
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Shelter-in-place – Orders to seek shelter in an enclosed building rather than evacuating to 
another location. 
SMA – Statewide Mutual Aid; assists cities and counties to more quickly and efficiently 
provide assistance to each other in response to a major disaster. 
Tabletop Exercise – As part of training for a disaster exercise, the players talk through the 





APPENDIX XI: Sample page from interview transcripts 
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